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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, there has been a rapid increase in funds made available by 
the international donor community to support local civil society actors in fragile states. 
Current peacebuilding and development efforts support and strive to recreate an active, 
vibrant and ―liberal‖ civil society. In the case of Sierra Leone, paradoxically, the 
growing support has not strengthened civil society actors based on that liberal idea(l). 
Instead of empowering individuals, enhancing democratic ownership and pro-active 
participation stemming from the civil sphere, Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape 
appears to be neutralised, depoliticised if not instrumentalised to provide social 
services the state is either too weak or unwilling to deliver. 
 
In critically assessing how Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere became depoliticised during the 
country‘s peacebuilding and development phase, the thesis advances three main 
arguments. First, it supports the commonly agreed consensus in scholarship that post-
war civil societies have become instrumentalised to serve a broader liberal 
peacebuilding and development agenda in several ways. Second, a deeper inquiry into 
the history of state formation and political culture of Sierra Leone reveals that Ekeh‘s 
(1975) bifurcated state is very much alive. In short, Western idea(l)s of participatory 
approaches and democracy are repeatedly challenged by a persisting urban-rural 
divide as well as socially entrenched forms of neopatrimonialism, elite-loyalism and 
tribalism. Sierra Leonean civil society finds itself currently in the midst of 
renegotiating those various intersections of a primordial and civic sphere. Third, the 
effects colonialism has had on African societies are still reflected in the current 
monopolisation of wealth and power among a few (elites) next to a vast majority 
living in abject poverty. More concretely, how abject poverty, human development 
and above all the lack of education affect activism and agency from below remains a 
scarcely addressed aspect in the peacebuilding and development literature.  
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Introduction and Research Approach 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. In a wider sense, it seeks to advance our 
understanding of non-Occidental post-conflict societies. It critically reflects upon the 
consequences of applying a liberal notion of the concept of civil society in present 
peacebuilding and development efforts. Correspondingly, it highlights recurring 
theoretical, analytical and practical dilemmas in strengthening the civil sphere in sub-
Saharan African fragile states with a particular focus on Sierra Leone. In a narrower 
sense, the thesis critically assesses and examines how the civil sphere is currently a 
subject of (re)construction in post conflict countries, and how this affects Sierra 
Leone‘s civil society landscape and consequently its political influence, space and 
voice. In doing so, it identifies and examines a striking paradox that occurred during 
the peacebuilding and development process of Sierra Leone in the period from 2002-
2013: even though peacebuilding and development efforts support the (re)creation of 
an active, vibrant – liberal – civil society, unexpectedly, this rising support has not 
strengthened Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape based on a liberal intellectual 
tradition and idea(l).  
 
As Chapter 1 (Section 1.1) and Chapter 3 (Section 3.1) illuminate, overall, there 
has been a rapid increase in funds for local civil society actors in fragile states over the 
past two decades. In the case of Sierra Leone (see Chapters 5 and 6), funding for CSOs 
(Civil Society Organisations) was scarce before the civil war (1991-2002) but 
increased to 26 percent of ODA (Official Development Assistance) and non-ODA aid 
in 2006. It was during the later stages and shortly after the conflict, when Sierra Leone 
experienced a mushrooming of local CSOs, CBOs (Community Based Organisations), 
civic associations and home-grown youth clubs. A mapping analysis conducted for the 
thesis identified 358 formally registered civil society organisations in Sierra Leone as 
of March 2014 of which 213 were local CSOs and 145 INGOs (International Non-
Governmental Organisations).1 All these developments were surrounded by a 
noticeable ―local‖ turn over the past decade within the international donor 
                                                 
1
 More details about the mapping analysis are provided in the Method section of this introduction and in 
Appendix 3.  
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community‘s rhetoric and approaches towards strengthening civil societies in fragile 
states. In other words, the construction of a strong and vibrant civil society in post-
conflict environments became to be seen as a key component of democratisation, 
peacebuilding and development processes. Concepts such as ―self-determination‖, 
―local-ownership‖, ―cultural particularism‖ or ―everyday-resistance‖ emerged as 
recurring themes in scholarship and gradually informed donor language and project 
and programme support. Surprisingly, in the case of Sierra Leone the increasing 
attention and support towards the local civil sphere over the past ten years did not 
strengthen the country‘s civil society landscape based on those liberal idea(l)s. On the 
contrary, interviewees conducted with 41 CSOs, 5 CBOs and local grassroots 
associations, predominantly described Sierra Leone‘s civil society as fragmented, 
lacking in power, influenced by the government, tribalised, dormant or weak (see 
Chapter 6).
2
 In the course of the research for this thesis and two extensive field 
research stays (2011 and 2012), it also became evident that the majority of Sierra 
Leone‘s civil sphere lacked political influence, space and voice. The author‘s 
observations are also reflected in the latest Freedom House study (2014) which 
recently downgraded Sierra Leone‘s status from ―free‖ (2012) to ―partly free‖ (2014) 
due to persistent problems with corruption and lack of transparency. In short, after ten 
years of peacebuilding and ongoing development efforts, Sierra Leone‘s civil society 
appears to be depoliticised - a phenomenon defined in Chapter 1 as ―a process that 
removes civil society actors gradually from any form of political influence‖. For the 
overall argument of the thesis, it is important to note at this point that processes of 
political deprivation not only affect the political nature and culture of a society, but 
simultaneously the political culture of a society can also influence the degree of 
political activism or willingness to advocate for a need or cause. Whereas liberalism 
would characterise a political civil sphere as independent from the state, a 
depoliticised civil sphere would no longer be a watchdog of or advocate for specific 
governmental actions and policies. Instead, actors are prone to being instrumentalised 
by the state or other external players to serve a government‘s agenda and political 
aims.  
 
Thus far, only a few scholars have explicitly alluded to the depoliticising effects 
                                                 
2
 More details about the scope and exact number of interviewees are provided in the Method section of 
this introduction and in Appendix 1. 
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of peacebuilding and development on the civil sphere. These include: Howell and 
Pearce (2002), Goetschel and Hagmann (2009) and Verkoren and van Leeuwen 
(2012). Despite their valuable findings and analysis, which the thesis will elaborate on, 
all of them also share one common argument and approach: they locate the causes of 
depoliticisation effects in external interventionism alone. It will become apparent in 
Parts II and III of the thesis, why this is a limited casual explanation and it is here 
where the thesis will make a new contribution to the existing literature and debates. In 
agreement with the commonly established consensus that externally-led peacebuilding 
and development efforts put local civil society actors at risk of being instrumentalised, 
two additional factors that tend to be overlooked will be identified. The first one refers 
to the political culture of a society. A deeper inquiry into the history of state formation 
and the political culture of Sierra Leone (see Chapter 4) reveals that Ekeh's (1975) 
bifurcated state is still very much alive. In short, Western idea(l)s of participatory 
approaches and democracy are repeatedly challenged by a persisting urban-rural 
divide as well as socially entrenched forms of neopatrimonialism, elite-loyalism and 
tribalism. Sierra Leone‘s society finds itself currently in the midst of renegotiating 
those various intersections of a primordial and civic sphere. The second factor is 
concerned with abject poverty, human development and, above all, the lack of 
education. The effects colonialism has had on African societies are still reflected in the 
current monopolisation of wealth and power among a few (elites) alongside a vast 
majority living in abject poverty. More concretely, how abject poverty, human 
development and, above all, the lack of education affect activism and agency from 
below remains scarcely addressed in peacebuilding and development literature.  
 
The argument above does not imply that there is not a rapidly growing body of 
literature on the local turn and/or role of civil society in peacebuilding and 
development processes (see Chapter 1). There are numerous international and local 
frameworks and evaluations targeting civil society actors and their specific 
peacebuilding and development functions (Chapter 3 will delve into this point). These 
contributions and new directions are undoubtedly of extreme value to research and 
practice. However, they fall short in addressing, or at least in bestowing consideration 
upon, the unintended consequences of exporting and applying a liberal notion of civil 
society to non-Western (and often postcolonial) fragile states (see Chapter 2). All the 
same, existing studies fail to thoroughly examine how local political voice and culture 
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is socially engineered in the transitional processes from peacebuilding towards 
development. More research needs to be done on the casual mechanism of 
depoliticisation effects impinging upon the civil sphere in fragile states in various 
contexts and post-conflict environments. Alternative approaches towards 
strengthening local civil societies in fragile states are scarce. It is here where the thesis 
attempts to fill a gap and make a new contribution to ongoing peacebuilding and 
development research, critical debates and discourses.  
 
I. Introducing the broader debate: The (re-)construction dilemma of sub-Saharan 
African civil spheres in peacebuilding and development processes. 
The rapid invasion, occupation and partition of African territory by European 
powers (Germany, Italy, France, Britain and Spain) between 1876 and 1912 - known 
as the Scramble for Africa - and the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, resulted in the 
colonisation of almost all of Africa, with Liberia and the Ethiopian Empire 
(Abyssinia), being the exceptions. In Comaroff and Comaroff's words (1999, p. 23):  
 
Throughout Africa, it gave birth, under the midwifery of the imperial state, to a world of 
difference, discrimination, and doubling: a world in which national, rights bearing 
citizenship and primordial, ethicized subjection – modernist interventions both – were 
made to exist side by side, a world composed of ‗civilized‘ colonists governed by 
European constitutionalism and ‗native tribes‘ ruled by so-called customary law.  
 
The subsequent process of decolonisation in sub-Saharan Africa produced more 
civil wars than (liberal) civil societies. Independence around the mid-twentieth century 
led to political violence, in some instances genocide, as well as constantly deepening 
impoverishment of the region. According to the Upsala Conflict Data Program / Peace 
Research Institute Oslo armed conflict database (Straus, 2012), between 1946 - 2010 
around thirty countries in sub-Saharan Africa (that is 65% of all states in the region) 
experienced armed conflict.
3
  Notably, most of them were civil wars. More recently, 
political violence in the region is declining in frequency and intensity. As pointed out 
by Straus (2012), civil wars in the late 2000s dropped to less than half in comparison 
to the mid-1990s. In an attempt to rebuild and reconstruct these fragile states (and their 
societies) the international community has deployed a total of 27 peacekeeping and/or 
observer missions in the past, and currently runs nine peacekeeping operations across 
                                                 
3
 See: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (22/05/2014) UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia: 
www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University, accessed on 22.05.2014 
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the African continent.
4
 These peacekeeping missions are usually followed by several 
peacebuilding operations and initiatives as well as various development programmes 
and plans led by the international community. The results, however, have been rather 
disappointing and large parts of sub-Saharan Africa remain in an acute economic 
crisis, marginalised from the international sphere and politically volatile. External or 
international efforts to establish peace and foster sustainable development are 
repeatedly criticised for imposing top-down or culturally insensitive approaches to re-
build these states (e.g. Duffield 2001, Lederach 1997, 2010, Goetschel and Hagmann 
2009, Richmond and Mitchell 2011, Wennman 2010). The list of criticisms is long; 
they range from disregarding self-determination, local ownership, cultural 
particularism, or the everyday realities and challenges of the very people affected; to 
perceiving liberal peacebuilding and development operations as neo-colonial or 
imperialist endeavours. In response, there has been a burgeoning interest in the 
potential, role and involvement of local civil society in peacebuilding and 
development processes among academics and practitioners. (Re)enforcing, 
(re)creating, (re)building or strengthening civil society, has become the new 
legitimising toolkit for external interventions and peacebuilding and development 
agendas. Prescriptions and slogans like ―strengthening civil society initiatives‖ or 
―enhancing civil society participation‖ have arisen as key ingredients in the language 
of peacebuilding agendas, priority plans and strategies. In short, the promise of a 
vibrant and democracy-committed civil society often serves as a universal panacea 
towards democratisation and hence peace and development in fragile states. Civil 
society simply emerged as ―one of those things (like development, education, or the 
environment) that no reasonable person can be against. The only question to be asked 
of civil society today seems to be: How do we get more of it? ‖ (Ferguson, 2006, p. 
91). 
 
In light of the above, a growing number of scholars have started to examine the 
role and functions of local civil societies in building a deeply-embedded peace into a 
society as a whole (e.g. Fitzduff 2004, Paffenholz 2010; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; 
Rethink in collaboration with Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 
Georgetown University, Conference Report 2011; van Tongeren, Brenk, Hellema and 
                                                 
4
 See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml, last visit 13.07.2014 
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Verhoeven 2005). Undoubtedly, all these contributions help us to get a more thorough 
understanding of the potentials of local civil societies to contribute to the 
peacebuilding and development process of a conflict-shattered state. What most 
authors generally tend to overlook, however, is that civil society, as an intellectual 
construct of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century capitalist Western society, never really 
matched the realities of social and political life in fragile states outside the Occidental 
World. There is very little critique of, or thorough reflection upon, the consequences 
of importing a liberal notion of civil society to non-Western regions. To put it another 
way, the historical, socio-ethnographic and local context of civil society as well as an 
understanding on its own terms, remains often unaddressed in peacebuilding and 
development research. By and large, civil society has become an uncontested idea(l). 
Accounts on the role, functions, potentials or activities of civil society in 
peacebuilding processes seem to be frequently detached from a considerable body of 
(predominantly postcolonial) literature that questions the usefulness of the concept of 
civil society in non-Western environments (e.g. Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chatterjee, 
2004; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Datzberger, 2015b forthcoming; Ferguson, 
2006; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Harbeson, Rothschild and Chazan, 1994; Ikelegbe, 
2001; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001; Lewis 2001, Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005; Mamdani, 
1996; Orvis, 2001). Implicitly all these authors share one core argument, namely, that 
a liberal and also normative notion of civil society cannot be equated with the actual 
societal and political experience as well as social modes of organisation. 
 
Above all, throughout the postcolonial period, Africa‘s general experience with 
democracy has been a paradoxical one. The everyday life of Africans is firmly 
entrenched in three distinct legacies. These include precolonial traditions and 
institutions; colonial economic, social, and administrative structures; and frameworks 
designed during the anticolonial struggle (Chazan, 1994 pp. 67 – 105). From colonial 
rule onwards the civil sphere became a constant subject of externally and internally led 
de- and re-construction processes. In the attempt to sweep up the shambles of the past, 
re-construction efforts of the civil sphere are based on a societal morality of the liberal 
West. Yet, these liberalisation processes are continuously challenged by persisting 
forms of neopatrimonialism (which are not only culturally rooted but were also 
intensified during colonialism) and patriarchal power structures as well as informal 
political and economic systems. In short, one encounters corruption, tribalism, 
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ethnicism and regionalism in varying degrees throughout Sub-Saharan African 
societies. Thus, after several devastating peacebuilding and development failures 
during the 1990s, the international community realised that peacebuilding and 
development had to go beyond the sheer technicalities of instituting free market 
economies, multiparty electoral systems or a broader human rights agenda. Projects 
and programmes started to engage in efforts to promote norms and values reflecting 
liberal thought patterns from the bottom-up. Activities usually range from human 
rights training to mainstreaming gender equality or the promotion of community based 
development. Rapidly, civil society emerged as the legitimising entry point towards a 
liberal peacebuilding, development and democratisation agenda. The local turn did not 
come without its unintended consequences, however, in that strengthening local civil 
societies has gradually emerged as a donor-driven rather than an endogenous, locally-
driven and socially engineered process. While local civil society actors are 
continuously strengthened, capacitated or trained to ensure participatory and 
communal involvement and voice, those CSOs also became the safety net for dealing 
with the casualties of economic liberalisation and privatisation (cf. Kaldor, 2003). In 
many fragile states, international and local CSOs have emerged as a parallel actor to 
complement and carry out functions that the state is too weak, incapable, or unwilling 
to perform. But also the history of non-fragile, middle income countries has repeatedly 
shown that the instrumentalisation of the civil sphere should not be treated too lightly. 
Frequently, an imposed (neo-)liberal agenda led to a gradual retreat of the state, 
thereby shifting more and more responsibilities towards the civil sphere. Since the late 
1970s, the radical transformation in Latin America has served as a case in point. In 
most Latin American countries, civil society has surfaced as a parallel actor next to the 
state in the midst of a weakening public welfare system that struggles to take care of 
people in need (Balbis 2011, Cammet and MacLean 2014).  
 
What makes the Sierra Leonean case interesting is that it not only highlights how 
funding allocations or liberal interventionism hamper the agency of the country‘s civil 
sphere but also that there are several additional factors that have to be taken into 
consideration. On the one hand, abject poverty and pressing developmental needs 
restrict many locals from independently engaging in the domains of social life where 
public opinion and opposition can be formed (see Chapter 6). On the other hand, the 
country‘s history of state formation also shaped the social fabrics of Sierra Leone‘s 
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civil society as we encounter it today (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Sierra Leone is a 
country full of socially entangled dualisms grounded in the intersections of a 
primordial and civic sphere. To be more specific, it will be argued that present efforts 
to strengthen civil society landscapes in fragile states not only heavily depend on but 
also intrude into the political culture of a society (Almond and Verba 1963). That is, 
how political life is socially engineered through people‘s predominant beliefs, 
attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their 
country, and the role of the self in that system (ibid. p. 12). As early as the late 1950s, 
prominent Western scholars pondering the concept of democracy (e.g. Robert Dahl; 
Seymour Martin Lipset; Dankwart Rustow) have argued that, both classical and 
modern forms of democracy require a distinctive set of political values and 
orientations from its citizens. These are not only manifested through voting but also 
through high levels of political interest, information, knowledge, opinion formation, 
and organisational membership (Diamond, 1994). Their accounts of democracy gives 
rise to several questions that are frequently disregarded when it comes to studying the 
(re)construction of societal order through liberal interventions in non-Western 
contexts. First, mainstream peacebuilding and development research does not focus on 
the extent to which the political culture in post-conflict sub-Saharan Africa actually 
differs from the Western ideal. Second, if the political culture of a society is defined as 
being closely related to the attitudes towards the political system, it should be 
questioned whether a liberal understanding of civil society is applicable to the context 
of sub-Saharan African states. Third, to a large extent, the issue of political culture is 
also closely interwoven with questions on the nature and characteristics of state-
society relations and a societal renegotiation thereof.  
 
Against this introductory background, and by drawing on the case study of 
Sierra Leone, the thesis will explore the following research question:  
 
Why are civil society landscapes in non-Western fragile states at risk of being 
gradually depoliticised? 
 
II. Method 
The research question was formulated by means of deductive logic in the course 
of a four-year long research process from 2010 - 2014. In its initial stages the project 
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started with a general inquiry about the role of civil society during the country‘s 
peacebuilding and development stage and the thesis was based on a very broad 
spectrum of information. It was during field research stays in 2011 and 2012 that the 
main topic and research question of the thesis became more and more evident. By 
means of deductive reasoning, the main assumption and core argument about a 
incremental depoliticisation of the civil sphere was gradually further narrowed down 
to specific causalities (e.g. historical, social or political) that explain this phenomenon 
in much greater detail.  
Accordingly, the thesis approach is to interlink the theory with empirical data 
collected in Sierra Leone and to draw on distinct but nonetheless closely related areas 
from humanities and social sciences. These include: international relations, sociology, 
political science, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and peacebuilding and 
development studies. As the ensuing sections will specify, the thesis‘ overall research 
design incorporates a mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative 
forms of data collection.  
 
Sierra Leone as an exploratory single case study (Pilot Study) 
The thesis applies a single case study approach combining illustrative, 
exploratory and critical elements. It is illustrative in that it resembles a plausibility 
probe, which is understood here as an intermediary step between the testing of an 
assumption and causal explanation. This allows the researcher to sharpen an 
assumption or theory, to refine operationalisation processes and analytical 
frameworks; or to explore the suitability of a particular case as a vehicle for testing a 
theory before engaging in a costly and more time-consuming comparative research 
effort. Therefore, following Gerring (2004, p. 342), the thesis approaches the method 
of a single case study as an ―intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of the 
understanding of a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded 
phenomenon, e.g. observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of 
time‖. In examining the Sierra Leonean case it is expected to lay the groundwork for a 
future comparative research agenda. Hence, Sierra Leone is used as a pilot study in an 
attempt to examine a correlative relationship of peacebuilding and development 
processes and how they affect the agency and voice of the civil sphere. More 
generally, plausibility probes, be they exploratory and/or illustrative, can serve the 
researcher as an important tool in theory development. In informing while 
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simultaneously testing an assumption, single case studies open up new perspectives for 
reassessing and re-evaluating social phenomena. Single case study approaches are 
therefore applied as a preliminary step in exploring a relatively under researched and 
puzzling occurrence. The ultimate aim is to generate new knowledge. This allows the 
researcher a high degree of flexibly and independence with regard to the overall 
research design and the way data was collected and analysed.  
 
How data was collected, applied and used 
The project draws on expert interviews and primary and secondary literature, as 
well as on ‗grey literature‘ in the form of non-published discussion papers, concept 
notes, articles, background papers, and transcripts of speeches. A considerable amount 
of qualitative and quantitative data was collected and gathered over the past four years. 
Qualitative data was obtained through interviews with 41 CSOs (of which two were 
INGOs run by locals), 5 CBOs and local grassroots associations, 8 youth and street 
clubs, 2 communities, 3 Sierra Leonean scholars in the fields of political science, 
history and peace and conflict studies (two from Forah Bay College and one from 
University of Richmond), 2 Government Officials, 1 female Paramount Chief and 
numerous informal conversations with ordinary Sierra Leoneans. A full list of all 
interviewees, including times and locations, is provided in Appendix 1. In view of the 
fact that some interviewees requested anonymity the thesis applies an encoding system 
(see numbers next to interviewees in Appendix 1). With only a few exceptions and for 
matters of consistency, the author also applied the encoding system when interviewees 
had noted that their viewpoints could be disclosed. All interviews were semi-
structured but revolved around the same set of questions during both field research 
stays. A full list of questions is listed in Appendix 2.  
 
In addition, an extensive mapping analysis was compiled at the beginning of 
2011 and regularly updated until March 2014. It serves as a quantitative tool to 
compare the representation and agenda-setting of local versus international CSOs in 
the on-going peacebuilding and development process. The mapping, attached to the 
thesis as Appendix 3, encompasses in total 358 registered civil society organisations of 
which 213 are local CSOs and 145 INGOs. Data for the mapping analysis was 
retrieved and compiled from: 
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 UNIPSIL (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office Sierra 
Leone)  
 OSSA (UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa)  
 Global Hand  
 Directory of Development Organizations Sierra Leone, Volume I.B. / Africa, 
Edition 2010  
 Accountability Alert Sierra Leone  
 
Methodological challenges and limitations 
Due to the unpredictable nature inherent in both the institutional life and funding 
allocations from donors of INGOs and CSOs, the thesis recognises that the mapping is 
not fully complete and therefore subject to change. Correspondingly, the author cannot 
exclude the fact that some of the local CSOs listed in Appendix 3 are either briefcase 
CSOs, have already moved down to the status of a CBO, or are no longer active. 
Whenever it was evident that an organisation did not, or no longer exists, the list was 
updated accordingly (as at March 2014). In short, the mapping serves as a quantitative 
tool to provide a general image of Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape and snap shot 
of its specific actors and peacebuilding and development functions. 
 
Furthermore, the research project anticipated conducting interviews in Freetown, 
Bo, Makeni, Kabala and Koido. While extensive research was possible in the first four 
listed locations, the author was unable to access Koido during the research stay as both 
field research stays were conducted during rainy season and heavy rainfalls made 
certain parts of the country almost impassable. Nevertheless, the author managed to 
interview experts in Freetown who either work for local CSOs in Koido/Kono district 
or implement projects in various rural communities in the area.  
 
III. The thesis contribution to current research agendas about civil society in 
peacebuilding and development processes 
Paffenholz‘ (2010) work provides an impressive account of past and current 
research agendas about the role and potential of civil society in peacebuilding. 
Crucially, she observes that the rapid growth in civil society peacebuilding initiatives 
from the mid-1990s onward is not matched by an accompanying research agenda. In 
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her view, only a few publications explicitly deal with the subject, which she 
categorises as follows (2010, p.58):  
 Actor-oriented, lessons-learned studies that aim to understand who is doing 
what (e.g.: van Tongeren et.al. 2005) 
 Single actor-oriented studies that analyse the role of particular civil society 
actors (mostly NGOs) in peacebuilding (e.g.: Aall 2001; Barnes 2005; 
Pouligny 2005; Diebel and Sticht 2005; Richmond and Cary 2006; Goodhand 
2006) 
 Studies that analyse civil society itself as an actor within the framework of the 
liberal peace (Bendaña 2003, Paris 2004, pp. 179-211 and 2006, Richmond 
2005, pp. 127 -148, Heathershaw 2008, pp. 607-609 and pp. 616-618, 
Galvanek 2013, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) 
 Studies assessing the effectiveness of NGO peace work in general or 
evaluating the impact of civil society initiatives (Anderson, Olson, and 
Doughty 2003) or evaluating the impact of specific (mostly conflict resolution 
workshops) civil society initiatives (D‘Estrée et al. 2001; Çuadar 2004; 
Ohanyan with Lewis 2005; Atieh et al. 2005); while a number of assessments 
and evaluations of particular projects have taken place most of them are not 
publicly available.  
 Country case studies: Folley (1996) on El Salvador; Paffenholz (2003) on 
Somalia and (1998) on Mozambique; Belloni (2001) on Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Patrick (2001) on Timor-Leste; Orjuela (2003) and (2004) on Sri Lanka, 
Challand (2005) on Palestine.  
 
In the view of the fact that the thesis perceives and approaches peacebuilding as 
closely intertwined with development, the author suggests including two additional 
categories and analytical angles to Paffenholz‘ original list. Although Paffenholz 
recognises the development dimension of peacebuilding in what she calls ―sustainable 
peacebuilding‖, she also asserts that ―the framework of liberal peace gives justification 
for civil society support, whereas the framework for sustainable peacebuilding gives 
practitioners directions for how to support civil society‖ (p. 59). While her distinction 
is generally accurate, it still sidelines a small but important body of literature that 
critically reflects upon the relationship of development assistance and civil society in 
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transitional (mainly non-Western) societies. More explicitly, it is felt that two 
additional categories should be added, namely:  
 Studies that critically explore the relationship of civil society and development 
assistance in fragile and developing states (e.g. Eade 2000, Howell and Pearce 
2001, Van Rooy 1998, Weijer and Klines 2012) 
 Critical studies on how civil society is (re-)built, created and constructed in the 
peacebuilding and development process of a country (Cubitt 2012, Verkoren 
and Van Leeuwen 2012, Van Leeuwen 2012) 
 
In making use of a country case study approach, the thesis situates itself in the 
last category within this broad spectrum of analytical directions. Notably, the critical 
study of the re-construction process of civil society in the non-Occidental world is still 
a growing field in the interdisciplinary ambits of peacebuilding and development 
studies. Even more so are studies on the depoliticisation of the civil sphere in non-
Western fragile states. Thus far, there are only two contributions (M‘Cormack-Hale, 
2013; Cubitt, 2013) that address how civil society has become subject of re-
construction in the peacebuilding and development process of Sierra Leone. However, 
both focus merely on the influence of the international community and how this led to 
the instrumentalisation of the country‘s civil society landscapes. The thesis‘ original 
contribution will be in pointing to two additional factors (political culture and how 
poverty affects civic activism) that cause depoliticisation (thus not only 
instrumentalisation) of the civil sphere. It is also the first study that thoroughly 
assesses this phenomenon through an extensive mapping analysis conducted over the 
period of four years in the case of Sierra Leone. Similarly, the thesis suggests a matrix 
of local factors to further substantiate the argument of how the political culture of a 
country can aggravate depoliticisation effects as well. Lastly, a working definition of 
the term depoliticisation will be elaborated and put forward in the context of 
peacebuilding and development processes in fragile states.  
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IV. Disambiguations. 
 
What is peacebuilding and how does it relate to development?  
Various definitions of peacebuilding can be found in academic and practitioners‘ 
circles. A definition that capture the broad contours of these different definitions 
characterises peacebuilding as:  
 
A strategic process involving a synergetic series of actions targeted at addressing the 
sources of conflict and supporting the structures and capacities for peace; usually includes 
a variety of institutional and socioeconomic measures, at the local or national level aimed 
at institutionalising justice, building positive peace (McCandless and Bangura, 2007, 
p.101). 
 
In addition to the above definition, peacebuilding is further perceived as a post-
war activity, which, in an ideal case, leads to sustainable and long-lasting 
development. In Lederach‘s words: ―When things are suddenly headed towards a 
[peace] agreement the work is hardly over. It has only begun‖ (2005, p.37). 
Peacebuilding is therefore understood in Galtung‘s terms, as the transition from 
negative peace (absence of violence) to positive peace (absence of any structural 
violence), and consequently intertwined with a broader development agenda. 
Consequently, peacebuilding and development are approached as mutually 
constitutive, yet context-specific.  
 
The thesis will approach the term development in the same manner as World 
Development,5 which defines it as:  
 
A process of change involving nations, economies, political alliances, institutions, groups 
and individuals. Development processes occur in different ways and at all levels: inside 
the family, the firm and the farm, locally, provincially, nationally, and globally. 
 
Is Sierra Leone still a fragile state?  
The concept of ―fragile state‖ is not firmly defined either academically or across 
development agencies (Holden and Pagel 2013, pp. 8-9). For instance, the World Bank 
does ―not presently define conflict-affected states as such definitions could reflect a 
political bias. Governments of client countries may define conflict differently than 
                                                 
5
 World Development is a multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of 
world development. Its impact factor is 1.733 and it is ranked among the top journals in development 
studies. For more information see: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/world-development/, 
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international institutions such as the World Bank‖.6 Experts on the subject also 
continue to disagree about what constitutes fragility. However, while there is no 
commonly accepted global list of fragile states, there is at least a consensus on some 
clear-cut examples (e.g. Afghanistan or Somalia).7
 
 
The UK government‘s Department for International Development (DfID) 
nevertheless operates on a working definition and holds that a fragile state (2005, p.7): 
 
(…) covers countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to 
the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state 
for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public 
resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in 
which the poorest people sustain themselves. DfID does not limit its definition of fragile 
states to those affected by conflict. 
 
The Operational Plan (2011-2015) of DfID‘s Governance & Fragile Sates 
Department further states that fragile and conflict affected states are furthest behind on 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with only 10% of them on track to halve 
poverty and hunger by 2015. On the whole, out of DfID‘s 28 priority countries, 20 are 
considered to be fragile.8
 
Similarly, for the OECD (2011): 
 
a fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and 
lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are 
also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural 
disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a 
population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and 
expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional 
complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum.  
 
On the basis of this definition, the OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee) 2013 report on 
fragile states focuses on 47 countries. Sierra Leone is one of them.  
Since the end of the civil war (1991-2002), Sierra Leone‘s transition from 
conflict to peace and development has often been portrayed as a success story. On 31 
                                                 
6
 World Bank: Fragile and Conflict Situations FAQ, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,menuPK:5
11784~pagePK:64171540~piPK:64171528~theSitePK:511778,00.html, last visit 15.07.2014 
7
 DfID (2005) p. 7. 
8
 The operational plan does not specify which countries among DfID‘s current 28 priority countries are 
considered as fragile. According to DfID‘s annual report 2012-13 current priority countries include: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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March 2014, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone 
(UNIPSIL) completed its mission drawdown and transferred its responsibilities to the 
UN country team consisting of 19 agencies, funds and programmes.9 The Government 
of Sierra Leone (GoSL) is eager to continue this trajectory away from the country‘s 
violent past to become a beacon of development. The Agenda for Prosperity, launched 
in July 2013, anticipates that Sierra Leone will become a middle-income country by 
2035, and a net lender within 50 years, with 80% of its population above the poverty 
line. Following three consecutive peaceful elections (2002, 2007, 2012), Sierra Leone 
was recently classified as a ‗Low Income State‘ and is no longer considered as a 
‗Fragile State‘ by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, in alignment with 
DfID‘s and the OECD‘s above-depicted definitions of state fragility, the thesis still 
considers the country to be fragile. The significant achievements in Sierra Leone since 
2002, notwithstanding, the country is still in the lowest ranks of the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and various challenges remain. Part II of the thesis will 
further delve into this point.  
 
V. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three main sections, Part I: Theorising, Analysing and 
Assessing Civil Society in Peacebuilding and Development Processes; Part II: Civil 
Society in Sierra Leone. Exploratory Case Study and Part III: Peacebuilding and the 
Depoliticisation of Civil Society in Sierra Leone.  
 
Part I sets the theoretical, conceptual and analytical scene for the thesis as a 
whole. It critically reflects upon how civil society is theoretically approached in 
current peacebuilding and development discourses, fills conceptual gaps and suggests 
an analytical framework to be applied to the case study of Sierra Leone. More 
generally, Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are intended to challenge common theoretical and 
practical perceptions as to how scholarship and practice currently approach, analyse 
and assess civil society as actors with specific functions in peacebuilding and 
development processes.  
 
                                                 
9
 For more information see: http://unipsil.unmissions.org/, last visit 12.05.2014. 
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Chapter One starts off with a recapitulation of and critical reflections on 
recurrent peacebuilding and development discourses in relation to the civil sphere in 
fragile states. In identifying areas that warrant further examination within ongoing 
peacebuilding and development discourses, it arrives at the following conclusions that 
will inform the ensuing discussions of the thesis as a whole. First, research and 
practice continue to operate on the basis of a westernised usage of the term even 
though the boundaries of the ―state‖ and ―civil society‖ can be blurred and hazy in 
non-Western fragile states. Hence, alternative approaches towards civil society are an 
extension of liberal values and idea(l)s rather than paving the way towards new 
analytical dimensions and avenues. While current discourses clearly state the need to 
give voice to alternative, oppressed actors, most authors do not analyse these 
alternative voices (cf. Paffenholz 2010). This is unfortunate, as precisely those voices 
can lay the groundwork for new alternatives. Similarly, Chapter 1 argues that recurring 
debates tend to overlook a striking phenomenon when it comes to strengthening the 
civil sphere: the depoliticisation of civil society landscapes in fragile states. Ongoing 
debates on and around the issues of local ownership, self-determination, cultural 
particularism and everyday resistance did actually not bring about new insights as to 
how those political voices from below are socially engineered. In this regard, political 
culture, as a hitherto unexplored terrain, is expected to provide new insights regarding 
the matrix and fabrics of conflict ravaged societies. The political culture of a society is 
not only a contributing factor towards depoliticisation but also opens up the space to 
rethink how we define and approach the concept of civil society in non-Western 
environments. 
 
Chapter Two responds to and builds on the theoretical engagements in Chapter 
1 by bringing forward the argument that when it comes to our understanding of civil 
society in the non-Occidental developing world, research and practice has to shift 
settled modes of thinking. In setting up some conceptual parameters for the remainder 
of the thesis, it will put forward a broad definition of the Western usage of the term. It 
will then continue to highlight how the diffusion of norms, that is to say, how a liberal 
interpretation of the concept of civil society became the operational and definitional 
baseline for many leading international organisations (IOs) and other international 
actors engaging in the rebuilding of fragile states. In challenging a liberal usage of the 
concept in post-conflict sub-Saharan African states, it will point to the need to shift 
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settled modes of thinking and acknowledge that meanings of civil society have to be 
placed in a historical, contemporary and local context. This is a necessary first step in 
order to address the thesis‘ overall question of why civil society actors are at risk of 
being gradually depoliticised. This further implies the need to question our objective 
thinking and accept local characteristics that are already part of, and grounded in, 
existing experiences. Against this background, it suggests a matrix of factors to better 
approach and contextualise (most) sub-Saharan African civil societies. The matrix is 
expected to provide useful insights into the political culture and social fabrics of a 
society and how political activism, agency and voice are socially engineered.  
 
Chapter Three sets forth how the thesis will analytically and methodologically 
examine the depoliticisation phenomenon in the empirical Part II. It first provides an 
overview of the main international mechanisms and frameworks that support but also 
evaluate the effectiveness of civil society in developing countries and fragile states. In 
doing so, it addresses two simple yet important questions for the remainder of the 
thesis. First, who are the typical actors that ought to be strengthened, (re-)built or (re-
)constructed based on a Western and liberal notion of civil society? Second, what 
functions, activities and tasks are these actors usually expected and funded to carry out 
and perform? While the thesis does not flesh out policy-oriented recommendations on 
the effectiveness of civil society actors, or what civil society has to or should 
contribute to peace and development of a fragile state, it will make use of both (actor 
and functional) perspectives in its own distinct way. Actor-oriented frameworks are 
used to facilitate an understanding of the characteristics of civil society while 
simultaneously widening the space for voices from below. Functional approaches, on 
the other hand, are applied to classify and characterise their activities. A combination 
of both approaches will be used as a methodological tool to assess and explain why 
civil society actors in Sierra Leone are at risk of being depoliticised through the 
functions they are funded to carry out.  
 
In applying the theoretical and analytical framework set out in Part I of the 
thesis, the ensuing empirical Part II will then illustrate why settled modes of thinking 
about strengthening Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere need to be reconceptualised. Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 place Sierra Leone‘s present-day civil society landscape into a postcolonial 
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and socio-historical context and elaborate why the country‘s civil sphere, despite 
liberal peacebuilding and development efforts, lacks agency and voice.  
 
Chapter Four reaches far back into history in order to delineate how social and 
political features of Sierra Leonean civil society evolved under completely different 
circumstances in time and space. Accordingly, it will provide a short introductory 
background to the demographics and current developmental status of the country. It 
then continues to briefly delineate Sierra Leone‘s early precolonial and colonial 
history and the country‘s societal structures of the civil sphere therein and highlights 
how the civil sphere became gradually more formalised, mainly by the Krio society 
under the influence of British colonial rule. Hence, the chapter sets the historical scene 
for ensuing discussions about the bifurcated state and how colonialism sowed the 
seeds for a primordial and civic public in the same land. As pointed out by Harris 
(2013, p.166), while the British colonial administrative method of ―indirect rule‖ 
reconfigured local political hierarchies through capitalist and governmental 
penetration, many societal features in the form of political and social practices 
remained or were even strengthened, including: chieftaincy, spiritual beliefs, judicial 
and land practices or secret societies.  
 
Chapter Five delineates how the country‘s civil society landscape evolved from 
1951 until the end of the civil war in 2002. From independence onwards, liaisons 
between civic groups and the government were either suppressed or co-opted by a 
corrupt regime. In many instances the societal logic of neo-patrimonial power 
hierarchies also infiltrated civil society actors (e.g. Sierra Leone‘s Labour Union 
during Stevens‘ rule). Nonetheless, Sierra Leone experienced notable moments of 
democratic openings (such as the student protests in 1977 and 1991 or the public 
demonstrations in 2000), stemming from a politically active and mainly Freetown-
based civil sphere. All in all, the country‘s civil society landscape surfaced as a 
supressed yet politically active and, later, also humanitarian actor. At the same, time 
the century-long accumulation of grievances in combination with a number of tragic 
events transformed fragments of an emerging youth culture (thus, segments of the civil 
sphere) into a bloody rebellion. In this regard, Chapter 5 expounds how Sierra Leone‘s 
civil war emerged and was fought between several different fractions, what role civil 
society played in it and, more importantly, how the war changed the political leeway, 
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influence and agency of the civil sphere. The analytical framework presented in 
Chapter 3 will be applied to identify what kind of actors appeared and which functions 
they undertook. Overall, the war created an exceptional vacuum in which CSOs could 
mushroom and emerge. The 1990s were characterised by a resurgence of a vibrant 
CSO landscape with an interest in establishing peace and making the transition 
towards democracy and sustainable development. However, in spite of Sierra Leone‘s 
vibrant and politically active civil sphere during the war, only a few selected CSOs 
were actually able to contribute to the peace negotiations at a national level.  
 
Chapter Six commences with a short background to the most crucial 
developments during the country‘s peacebuilding and development phase and the role, 
as well as involvement and reconstruction, of civil society therein. Its main intention is 
to flesh out the characteristics of civil society as we encounter them in Sierra Leone 
today. Particular attention will be paid to voices from the civil sphere and how Sierra 
Leonean‘s perceive their own civil society landscape themselves. In this context, the 
chapter identifies and discusses a striking phenomenon. Despite growing attention and 
financial support towards local CSOs and a very vibrant civil society during and 
shortly after the war, in the later stages of the peacebuilding process, Sierra Leone‘s 
civil sphere appears to be ―toothless‖, ―dormant‖ or ―inactive‖ – phrases repeatedly 
used by interviewees. What is more, field research also revealed that civil society in 
Sierra Leone struggles with fragmentation, a top-down mentality among CSOs 
themselves and regionalism expressed in a salient urban–rural divide. In further 
examining what caused this depoliticisation phenomenon during the country‘s 
peacebuilding and development phase, Chapter 6 also elaborates on the interplay of 
local ownership and the influence of the international community. Lastly, the 
analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 will be once more applied to critically 
assess the empirical data gathered in both field research stays. It arrives at the 
conclusion that gradually CSOs emerged as actors who fulfil functions to complement 
services of the state. In addition, Sierra Leone‘s post-conflict phase experienced a 
noticeable return towards a political culture in which both the civic and the primordial 
publics strongly intersect.  
 
Part III merges the theory (Part I) with empirical and historical findings (Part II). 
In doing so, Part III seeks to find explanations for the phenomenon of the 
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depoliticisation of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere, while simultaneously exploring 
alternative and new entry points towards empowering and strengthening post-conflict 
societies during the transition from conflict towards peacebuilding and development.  
 
Chapter Seven will advance three main arguments. First, it supports the 
consensus that civil society has become instrumentalised, serving a broader liberal 
peacebuilding and development agenda in numerous ways. The reasons for this 
phenomenon can be located in donors‘ ―cherry picking‖ (Cubitt 2013) of only well-
established actors, but also in weak state capacities (M‘Cormack-Hale 2013) or a top-
down mentality and bad coordination among local CSOs, to name a few. Second, a 
deeper inquiry into the cultural particularisms and political culture of Sierra Leone 
reveals that Ekeh‘s bifurcated state is very much alive. In other words, Western 
idea(l)s of participatory approaches and democracy are challenged by a persisting 
urban-rural divide as well as socially entrenched forms of neopatrimonialism, elite-
loyalism and tribalism. This observation should not be misinterpreted as giving a sense 
that Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere is not open to or capable of establishing democratic 
and participatory societal structures. On the contrary, Sierra Leonean society finds 
itself currently in the midst of renegotiating those various intersections of a primordial 
and civic sphere. Yet efforts to strengthen the civil sphere concomitant with rigid 
monitoring mechanisms and evaluation frameworks frequently lack the aptitude to 
grant such processes enough leeway and time. Third, the effects colonialism has had 
on African societies are still reflected in the current monopolisation of wealth and 
power among a few (elites) next to a vast majority living in abject poverty. More 
concretely, abject poverty, human development and, above all, the lack of education 
affect civic activism and agency remain a scarcely addressed aspect in peacebuilding 
and development literature. Critically reflecting upon these entanglements, Chapter 7 
argues for the need to re-conceptualise settled modes of thinking in order to further 
advance our knowledge about war-torn civil spheres in non-Western fragile states. It 
will explore how a society‘s political culture, as well as the matrix of local factors 
discussed in Chapter 2, may enhance our understanding as to how agency and voice is 
socially engineered. Yet, how values and norms that constitute a liberal civil society 
are going to be socially entrenched in the long haul should be the task of the Sierra 
Leonean civil sphere and not the Western researcher or practitioner. Though such an 
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organic progression cannot take place if the average Sierra Leonean is deprived of 
basic physiological needs. 
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PART I 
 
Theorising, Analysing and Assessing Civil Society 
in Peacebuilding and Development Processes 
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Chapter One 
 
Civil society in peacebuilding and development discourses. 
A critical assessment. 
 
 
Scholarship, practice, policy-making and programming in the area of 
peacebuilding and development have emerged in response to the compelling 
recognition that conflict and development are deeply intertwined, as are the building of 
sustainable peace, human security and development (cf. McCandless and Karbo, 
2011). There is widespread consensus in academia and amongst practitioners alike that 
peace cannot be separated from social and economic development and vice versa. 
Nonetheless, in theory, as in practice, interdisciplinary conversations as well as project 
and programme implementation remain challenged by different approaches to 
peacebuilding and development and their respective frameworks (cf. Jantzi and Jantzi, 
2009). Remarkably, when it comes to the role or potential of civil society in 
peacebuilding and development processes, both realms share one common approach: 
strengthening, supporting, involving and even intervening through local civil society 
actors emerged as a legitimising toolkit for external efforts to build peace and sustain 
development. As Verkoren and van Leeuwen (2012, pp. 160–161) emphasise, in the 
field of development collaboration, during the 1980s, civil society grew to be the 
preferred instrument of development and it became an alternative to governments in 
providing development needs. The same can be observed in the realms of 
peacebuilding. After the end of the Cold War, and through the 1990s, the creation and 
consolidation of CSOs emerged as a central part of strategies for peace. Consequently, 
in the literature as well as practice, civil society emerged (with few exceptions to the 
rule10) as an idealised panacea and agent for both development and peace in fragile 
states.  
 
This chapter reviews and assesses the most frequently occurring peacebuilding 
and development discussions in relation to the civil sphere. It will first elaborate on 
                                                 
10
 See, for instance, Holmén‘s (2010) controversial book, Snakes in Paradise: NGOs and the Aid 
Industry in Africa. 
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how and why civil society has become an object of reconstruction within the realms of 
liberal peacebuilding and development assistance. An overview will then be provided 
of the major critiques of how a liberal agenda, or attempts at societal transformation 
based on a liberal idea(l), affect local (civil) societies. With the realisation that such a 
review is far from being extensive, it will highlight some of the most frequently 
recurring discourses related to the civil sphere in the literature. This critical reflection 
is intended to set the theoretical scene for the remainder of the thesis. Successively, the 
chapter arrives at two main conclusions.  
 
First, apart from Africanist scholars and literature (e.g. Orvis, 2001 or 
Ikelegbe, 2001) only a few peacebuilding researchers have started to question whether 
Western (that is to say liberal) conceptualisations of civil society are indeed applicable 
to environments where societal structures differ tremendously, both historically or 
culturally, from that of the Occidental World (cf. Datzberger, 2015b forthcoming). For 
now, it must be stressed that mainstream research and practice (and most of its critics) 
continue to apply an intellectualised Western/liberal usage of the term, even though 
the boundaries of the state and civil society are frequently blurred and hazy in fragile 
non-Western states. In other words, alternative approaches towards civil society are an 
extension of liberal values and idea(l)s rather than paving the way towards new 
theoretical and analytical dimensions. Chapter 2 addresses these analytical voids and 
outlines in more detail why societal fabrics and political culture should not be 
overlooked in the attempt to explain causes and effects of depoliticisation occurring in 
peacebuilding processes in non-Western fragile states.  
 
Second, the chapter also introduces the issue of depoliticisation as a 
phenomenon that has been sidelined in past and present debates revolving around civil 
society in peacebuilding and development processes. While Chapter 1 will, for now, 
only highlight that the depoliticisation probelmatique is a marginalised theme, the 
empirical Part II will then explain and assess why it has occurred in the case of Sierra 
Leone.  
 
Moreover, in agreement with the commonly established consensus that post-
war civil societies have become instrumentalised to serve a broader liberal 
peacebuilding and development agenda in several ways, Chapter 1 further sheds light 
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on another frequently disregarded factor - the political culture of a society. The 
political culture can not only aggravate depoliticisation effects but also reveal a 
significant amount of information about how local political voice and consequently the 
actions and reactions (positive as well as negative) towards democratisation, 
peacebuilding and development processes are socially engineered.  
 
1.1. Liberal peacebuilding and development approaches towards civil society.  
The concept of ―liberal peace‖, broadly defined, goes as far back as classical 
liberal thought, suggesting that democracy and free trade reduces the incidence of war 
(cf. Oneal et al., 1996). The Zeitgeist of the democratisation processes in Southern 
Europe and in Latin America, from the 1970s onwards, and the liberalisation of 
Eastern Europe, since the late 1980s, shaped the pro-liberalisation rhetoric of 
peacebuilding and development discourse in the early-to-mid 1990s. The appeal of 
both modern democracy and the free market came to be seen as a panacea and magical 
formula for peace and development in conflict-affected countries around the world. 
Therefore, it is worth recalling that liberalism, despite its variants from neo-, to social 
and moderate, can be roughly characterised by reference to four distinct features or 
perspectives (Gray, 1995, p. 86). These include individualism, which asserts the moral 
primacy of the person against any collectivity; equalitarianism, which confers the 
same basic moral status on all human beings; universalism, which affirms the moral 
unity of the species; and meliorism, which asserts the open-ended improvability of 
human life, through the use of critical reason. However, soon liberal peace and 
development interventions had to face the dilemma that non-Western and often 
century-long suppressed post-conflict societies never experienced a political culture 
based on freedom, equality and societal as well as political emancipation in the way 
that it had been cultivated over the centuries in the Occidental World. As the child of 
modernity and European political theory, liberalism continues to be repeatedly 
challenged by the nature of conflict-shattered societies – especially outside the 
Western World. Many of those societies are scarred by the legacies of colonial rule, 
societal, economic, political and/or ethnical disorder, elite capture and severe poverty. 
Specifically, the clearly demarcated liberal boundaries of state/society and 
politics/economics frequently do not match the structure, social stratification and 
everyday realties of local societies that are supported or (re)constructed based on a 
liberal ideal.  
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Realising that peacebuilding and development had to go beyond the sheer 
technicalities of instituting free market economies, multiparty electoral systems or a 
broader human rights agenda, international peacebuilding and development actors 
started to engage in efforts to promote norms reflecting liberal thought patterns, as we 
encounter them in the West. In practice, such efforts led to externally driven agendas, 
literally ―liberalising‖ the civil sphere in question by means of all kinds of projects or 
programming on the ground. To give an example, in 2009, the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) provided USD 140,000 of funding to Sierra Leone for 
a project entitled ‗Attitudinal and Behavioural Change (ABC) Secretariat‘ (see United 
Nations PBF/SLE/A-6, 2010). The project description reads as follows11:  
 
One of the causative factors of the decade long civil war is the negative attitude of Sierra 
Leoneans towards state property and the citizenry. It is the view of government to change 
this negative trend by re-orientating the minds of our citizens through continuous 
engagement and discussions on the need to change their attitude towards work, authority, 
state property and fellow citizens. There are challenges the country needs to overcome in order 
to achieve the intended goal; principal among these is the fear of change manifested by the 
tendency for Sierra Leoneans to continue doing things that are not in the interest of the country. 
 
Project language, such as ―re-orientating the minds of our citizens‖, goes hand in 
hand with Duffield‘s (2001, p. 11) general observation that apart from inducing liberal 
institutions, peace and development programming and interventions are also directed 
toward ―transforming dysfunctional and war-affected societies into cooperative, 
representative and especially, stable entities‖. Moreover, as the project description 
highlights, when it comes to civil society, liberal agendas place less emphasis on the 
self-determination of a war-torn society and instead focus more on societal 
transformation of war-affected societies based on liberal idea(l)s. To strengthen this 
point further, it is worth briefly listing the PBF project‘s immediate objectives, which 
included: 
 
1. Citizens understand their roles and responsibilities, and exercise their rights. 
2. Sierra Leoneans demonstrate responsibility and commitment to upholding the laws, 
values and ideals, which promote peaceful coexistence and development in their 
country. 
3. Increased transparency and accountability with enhanced productivity in major sectors 
of the economy. 
                                                 
11
 Document: PBF/SLE/A-6/. PBF project documents can be downloaded at the UNDP MPTF website: 
http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/country/SLE, last visit 05 July 2014. 
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4. The Attitudinal Change Secretariat is capacitated for sustained project implementation. 
 
In addition, the project implementation encompassed the production and 
distribution of around 750,000 promotional materials and leaflets, the printing and 
distribution of approximately 2,000 T-shirts and the broadcast of pertinent discussions 
on radio and TV.  
 
The Sierra Leone ―attitudinal change‖ project unequivocally exemplifies three 
essential developments. First, civil society is instrumentalised to serve in the 
implementation of a broader liberal agenda. As Chapter 3 will elaborate at length, civil 
society has become an approach, output, outcome and strategy in the realms of 
peacebuilding and development assistance. Second, the fact that the international 
community implements ―attitudinal change‖ projects once again reconfirms that 
peacebuilding and development efforts frequently struggle with societal and cultural 
particularism, as well as the political culture of a society on the ground. Third, the 
project‘s objective of educating Sierra Leoneans about their roles and responsibilities 
in exercising their rights, hints at the lack of political involvement, influence and 
activism stemming from the civil sphere. 
 
From a different perspective, the institutionalisation of a liberal agenda in fragile 
non-Western states presupposes the importing, transplanting and rooting of liberal 
values and norms to seemingly ―illiberal‖ societies. In doing so, supporting civil 
society is geared towards the construction of a particular kind of social order, 
organised around the individual and his or her own rights (cf. Barkawi and Laffay, 
2001). It targets peoples‘ principal beliefs, attitudes, values and ideals, thereby 
indirectly suggesting what roles the individual, the self, and the community should 
play in that system. Implicitly, it is about the reformation of the political culture of a 
society, which depending on a country‘s socio-economic and historical context, might 
or might not have led to conflict in the first place. Specifically, a liberal agenda starts 
from the premise that reforming state-society relations based on the societal norms of 
liberalism, creates and fosters responsive and legitimate institutions that can 
effectively deal with the peacebuilding and development process of a conflict-ravaged 
country. The (re)construction of a strong and vibrant civil society in post-conflict 
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environments thus became a key component of democratisation, peacebuilding and 
development efforts led by the international community. 
 
This trend has led to a striking phenomenon, in that (re)building the civil sphere 
has gradually emerged as a donor driven, rather than endogenous process. The figures 
speak for themselves. There has been a rapid increase of funds by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation (OECD) countries via Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). While in 1985–1986, funding provided to CSOs amounted to USD 3.1 billion 
per year, it increased to USD 6.7 billion in 1999 and USD 7.1 billion in 2001 (Debiel 
and Sticht, 2005, p. 10). In comparison, Department for International Development 
(DfID) reports that in May 2013, it spent at least £694 million through CSOs in the 
period of 2011–12, of which £327 million were used by CSOs in DfID‘s country 
offices and £367 were channelled through the headquarters level. In total, £154 million 
went to Africa, £102 million to South Asia, and the remaining £71 million to other 
countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen (ICAI, 2013). Likewise, 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has 
established a relationship with over 30,000 CSOs worldwide.12 Many of them are 
located in fragile and underdeveloped states and benefit from numerous long-term and 
short-term funding schemes monitored and administered by agencies such as United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF), to name the most prominent. 
Similarly, since 1981, the World Bank has strengthened its engagement with civil 
society. Projected CSO involvement in Bank-funded projects has grown over the past 
decade, from 21 per cent of the total number of projects in fiscal year 1990 to an 
estimated 81 per cent in fiscal year 2009. In addition, the World Bank has increasingly 
involved CSOs in the formulation of Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).13  
 
                                                 
12
 For more detailed information access: http://www.un.org/en/civilsociety/, last visit 22 October 2013. 
13
 For more detailed information access: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093161~menuPK:22
0423~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html, last visit 22 October 2013. 
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The growing attention towards civil society in fragile states undoubtedly turned 
externally led programming into more inclusive and comprehensive processes. For 
instance, the second United Nations Secretary General‘s Report on the Aftermath of 
Conflict states, under point 36 (2012, p. 11): 
 
Political or economic exclusion, horizontal inequalities and discrimination undermine 
sustainable peace. A successful peacebuilding process must be transformative and create 
space for the wider set of actors – including, but not limited to, representatives of women, 
young people, victims and marginalized communities; community and religious leaders, 
civil society actors; and refugees and internally displaced persons – to participate on all 
aspects of post-conflict governance and recovery. Participation and dialogue enhance 
social cohesion and national ownership, and they leverage resources and knowledge for 
peacebuilding existent within post-conflict societies.  
 
The language and rhetoric of the United Nations Secretary General‘s report 
clearly recognises complex transitions from conflict to peace as participatory 
processes, which can be nurtured but not entirely imposed through external assistance. 
More generally, since the landmark 1992 document Agenda for Peace, there has been 
a ‗steady increase in the deployment of localism in the discourse and practice of the 
liberal peace, together with actions by local communities to harness, exploit, subvert 
and negotiate the internationally driven aspects of the local turn‘ (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013, p. 771).  
 
This is not to imply that liberal peacebuilding and development agendas outside 
the Occidental World do not struggle with their own dilemmas. There is a vast body of 
literature critically assessing and reflecting upon the past and current practices, and 
consequently the effects of assisting and strengthening local societies in fragile states, 
based on the values of liberalism (e.g., Campell, Chandler and Sarabaratnam, 2011; 
Duffield, 2001; Jarstadt and Sisk, 2008; Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009; Paris 
and Sisk 2009; Lederach, 1996, 2010; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011; Wennman, 
2010). As Sisk explains (2008, p. 18), dilemmas inherent in liberal peace and 
development ―are often interacting, there is seldom one dilemma at a time, and one 
dilemma may make another dilemma even more critical‖. Furthermore, in this regard, 
the hype on and around the realm of civil society, or the ―local turn‖ (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013), in liberal peacebuilding and development frameworks could not 
escape from challenging new side effects, in practice, as in theory, directly affecting 
the civil sphere. ―The local turn poses a fundamental challenge to the dominant ways 
43 
 
of thinking and acting about peace. Rather than peace being framed by a historical 
discourse of Western/Northern power and epistemological advancement, more 
democratic understandings of peace, politics and the state, as well as of the 
postcolonial international order, are emerging‖ (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, p. 
772). 
 
1.2. Critical discourses on liberal peacebuilding and development approaches 
towards civil society 
Critics of a liberal agenda are found in both disciplinary ambits – development 
and peacebuilding as well as peace and conflict studies. It is worth remembering that 
development paradigms entered the peacebuilding debates in the early 1990s, when 
development actors took on new tasks in response to the challenges posed by post-
conflict peacebuilding (Paffenholz, 2010, p. 47). Although there is widespread 
consensus that peacebuilding and development are deeply intertwined, in theory, as in 
practice, interdisciplinary conversations, as well as project and programme 
implementation, remain challenged by different approaches to peacebuilding and 
development and their respective frameworks. Jantzi and Jantzi (2009) addressed this 
particular divergence in an article entitled ―Development Paradigms and Peacebuilding 
Theories of Change: Analysing Embedded Assumptions in Development and 
Peacebuilding‖. They argue that peacebuilding and development discourse evolved 
along different paths, and at a different time in history. To support their claims, Jantzi 
and Jantzi contrast three main development paradigms, ―modernisation‖, ―growth with 
equity‖ and ―liberation from dependency‖, with the peacebuilding theories of change 
elaborated by Church and Rogers (2006). In doing so, they arrive at an interesting 
conclusion: ―regardless of the variation in the literature, when it comes to development 
practice, the overwhelming majority of development programmes are modernisation-
based followed by a significant minority drawing on growth with equity‖ (p. 76). 
Consequently, ―it appears that many of the peacebuilding theorists and practice models 
could be correlated with the modernisation frameworks in development‖ (p. 78). 
Against this background, the modernisation-oriented development paradigm (based on 
the values of liberalism as also addressed in Section 1.1) came under immense 
criticism from the mid-1970s to 1980s. The profiled proponents of a modernisation 
paradigm in the field of development include Rostow (1970), Inkeles (1975) and 
Sachs (2006). The profiled peacebuilding scholars leaning towards modernisation 
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models are for instance Boulding (1978) and Mitchell (2000). Critics of the 
modernisation paradigm mainly allege that development should not become a 
modernisation project and thus emerge as a path for them to become us. Borrowing 
Nordveit‘s words (2009, p.8): ―Rarely, do we look at the background of problems and 
their historic evolution; and even more rarely do we consider the relation between the 
one and the other‖. In the search for alternatives, academics and practitioners alike 
began to question the underlying assumptions of modernisation theory and to 
implement different development models targeting the civil, and thus the local, sphere. 
The two most common intellectual streams that emerged out of this endeavour are 
commonly referred to as the ―growth with equity‖ model and the ―liberation from 
dependency‖ model. Renowned proponents in the development field of the ―growth 
with equity model‖ include Schumacher (1973) and Chambers (1997), and in the 
peacebuilding field experts like Anderson (1999) or Lederach (1995). With regards to 
the latter, the ―liberation from dependency‖ model, profiled development scholars are 
Freire (1968), Hope and Trimmel (1984), and Easterly (2001). In the field of 
peacebuilding profiled prominent scholars are Galtung (1996), Curle (1990), and 
Fisher and Zimina (2009). Depending on the preferred philosophical ideology and 
background, these peacebuilding and development paradigms typically synthesise the 
ideas of social theorists and philosophers of intellectual traditions ranging from 
Durkheim and Spencer to Foucault, Habermas and Marx. More specifically, both 
paradigms serve as a ―local‖ lens for interpreting the nature of society, the causes of 
poverty and conflict and the implied solutions for development and peacebuilding 
theory and practice (Jantzi and Jantzi, 2009).  
 
The field of peace and conflict studies has a narrower approach. While it is less 
concerned about developmental issues, it distinguishes instead between five different 
schools, which can be regarded as middle-level theories of peacebuilding. These 
include: the conflict management school, the conflict resolution school, the 
complementary school, the conflict transformation school and the alternative 
discourse school (Paffenholz, 2010, pp. 43–64). Even though all of the schools pay 
attention to the actors from the bottom, the emphasis on the importance of the local 
sphere finds its origins in Lederach‘s conflict transformation school. It is the 
alternative discourse school in particular which continuously points to the weaknesses 
of all strands. Authors share the claim that the ―liberal imperative‖ (Richmond, 2005, 
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p. 208) has become a self-referential system, which has long lost its connection to the 
real world and the needs of people and their experiences of the everyday in 
peacebuilding and development processes (Paffenholz, 2010, p. 55). Critical voices 
usually substantiate their arguments by means of a Foucauldian discourse analysis 
with particular focus on his concept of gouvernmentalité or biopower, or a Marxist-
inspired analysis highlighting social justice and equality. These discussions frequently 
support or rely on a Gramscian notion of civil society (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1); 
thereby emphasising the emancipatory or transformative potential of the civil sphere in 
fragile states (e.g., Bendaña, 2003; Featherstone, 2000; Heathershaw, 2008; Mac 
Ginty, 2006, 2013; Richmond, 2005, 2013). Recently, the alternative discourse school 
has dominated, or at least, gained significantly more attention in present peacebuilding 
and development research. Nonetheless, the core critiques about liberal peacebuilding 
and development processes (closely related to the above discussed modernisation 
paradigm) focus not so much on the what but the how. This specific point is addressed 
in Roland Paris‘ seminal article ―Saving Liberal Peacebuilding‖, in which he 
maintains (2010, p. 354):  
 
There has been much written in recent years on the need to promote ‗alternative versions 
of peace‘ that are not rooted in liberal peacebuilding models. On the surface, such writers 
appear to reject the idea of liberal peacebuilding, but on closer examination many actually 
embrace variants of liberal peacebuilding. 
 
The same can be observed about the discourse on civil society. Hardly any critic 
of liberal peacebuilding and development interventions would argue heatedly against 
established universal values, such as human and civil rights, equality, or more 
concretely, equal access to education, justice and healthcare, freedom of speech, equal 
voting rights, children‘s rights or gender equality. On the contrary, the  repeated calls 
for emancipatory or transformative peacebuilding and development, mirrored in 
Section 1.1, presents liberal thought patterns of individualism, equality, universalism 
and meliorism (Gray, 1995). Consequently, it is not the liberal orientation of 
peacebuilding and development that is the central subject of critique but ‗the illiberal 
behaviour of international administrators, including their relatively unconstrained and 
unaccountable exercise of power and methods that discourage local political activity 
and participation‘ (Paris, 2010, p. 355). As far as the civil sphere is concerned, the 
core critiques are primarily occupied with issues of exclusion, marginalisation or 
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structural barriers, and unequal power relations (at the local, regional and international 
levels) – presumably caused by liberal peacebuilding, development practices and elite 
capture. While some academics (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2011) started to emphasise how 
imposed liberal orders fuel forms of local resistance (thereby often following Scott, 
1987, 1990), others, such as Narten (2009), highlight the issue of potential liberal 
peace spoilers among the civil sphere. Likewise, Paris, in one of his earlier influential 
works At War‟s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (2004), argues that the 
challenge for peacebuilders is to promote ―good‖ civil society, while simultaneously 
restraining its ―bad‖ variant, particularly during the early phases of a peacebuilding 
mission, when governmental institutions are still being constructed (2004, p. 194). 
However, his statement leaves an essential question unaddressed. That question is: 
Who is to determine good and bad? Are there instances when seemingly illiberal 
loyalties towards paternalistic and neo-patrimonial hierarchies can be justified? Are 
illiberal practices, rituals or customs more context sensitive, or rather destructive, in 
establishing peace and fostering development (cf. Mac Ginty, 2010)? Foremost, who 
should set the ethical and legal boundaries of illiberalism? In Lidén‘s (2009) words: 
―What are the ethical implications of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding?‖ 
 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this chapter and the thesis as a whole to 
do justice to recapitulating all the dilemmas, weaknesses and debates that occur in the 
literature on and around the interplay of civil society, liberal peacebuilding and 
development in fragile states. Thus, with the caveat that the subsequent discussion is 
far from extensive, some of the most frequently reoccurring themes in the literature 
were singled out to be reassessed and summarised. These include: 
 Civil society and the issue of self-determination 
 Civil society and the issue of local ownership  
 Civil society and the issue of liberal ideas versus cultural particularism 
 Civil society and the issue of everyday resistance 
 
While these issue areas are overwhelmingly discussed independently from each 
other in the literature, it is anticipated that the ensuing sections will make it more 
evident that within the interplay of civil society and peacebuilding and development, 
there are still many bridges to be built. Two themes that can be related to the above 
47 
 
discourses in one way or another but which are not prominently discussed topics in 
the literature include:  
 Civil society and the issue of depoliticisation 
 Civil society and the issue of political culture 
 
In the following it will be argued that ongoing debates on and around the issues 
of local ownership, self-determination, cultural particularism and everyday resistance 
do not actually bring about new insights as to how those political voices from below 
are socially engineered. In pointing to the issue of depoliticisation as an until now 
marginalised theme, the issue of political culture is expected to provide new insights 
regarding the matrix and fabrics of conflict ravaged societies and why they do not 
match with liberal idea(l)s.  
 
1.2.1. Civil society and the issue of self-determination 
Critics generally contend that liberal peace and development processes tend to 
downgrade local-autonomy, self-organisation and self-government (cf. Barata, 2012). 
Specifically, the processes of self-determination are frequently criticised for being 
externally imposed on the less empowered, such as minorities and indigenous peoples. 
For instance, the international community‘s engagement in former Yugoslavia is 
commonly used as a prime example for having violated the principle of self-
determination, from the perspective that existing internal borders were changed despite 
ethnic conflicts inside those territories. History has repeatedly shown that the maxim 
of self-determination can interfere with several principles required to obtain legitimacy 
in statebuilding processes. On paper, the principle of self-determination of peoples 
remains one of the fundamental rights that are firmly established in international law. 
Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates, under Article 1(2), that the 
purposes of the United Nations are:  
 
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace.  
 
The Charter reflects both US President Woodrow Wilson‘s Fourteen Points of 
1918 and the Inter-Allied Labour Conference in London in 1918, which state that ―It is 
the supreme principle of the right of each people to determine its own destiny that 
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must now decide the steps to be taken for settlement‖. Despite de jure recognition, in 
practice, there are still many legal as well as political issues affecting the autonomy of 
ordinary civilians in fragile states. The most salient is likely that present international 
law does not recognise minorities as separate peoples and hence precludes them from 
invoking the principle of self-determination. What is even more challenging is that 
there is no legally recognised definition of the term ―people‖ in international law (cf. 
Gudeleviciute, 2005).  
 
Alongside these legalistic flaws, theoretical as well as practical issues around the 
maxim of self-determination were already explicitly highlighted in Gilbert Murray‘s 
influential essay on the ―Self-determination of Nationalities‖ (1921). For Murray, the 
real reason why any mass of people has a right to decide their future in a particular 
way is because they wish it, not because they form a ―nation‖ or a ―nationality‖. He 
further warned that the principle of ―self-determination‖ inherits a number of practical 
problems, such as:  
 How to determine the limits of the unit which is to exercise self-
determination;  
 The geographical position of such units, as it may affect the interests of 
many people outside;  
 Self-determination becomes impossible where culturally distinct people are 
geographically mixed up with some alien nation (e.g., like the Jews were in 
Poland or Romania, or the Armenians in Turkey); and,  
 The strategic interests of a large nation may clash with the desire of a small 
homogenous group.  
 
According to Murray, the problem of self-determination is therefore 
theoretically, as well as practically, insoluble. Apart from these conceptual problems, 
found in the entire idea, political as well as economic interests have gradually 
weakened the principles inherent in the maxim of self-determination. 
 
The African case perfectly illustrates how borders are ―political creations on the 
basis of the usefulness to those who created them‖ (Herbst, 1996, p. 692). Ironically, 
the processes of self-determination in sub-Saharan Africa are primarily associated 
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with the period after decolonisation, roughly from 1945 onwards. It is repeatedly 
argued, that independence during that time had produced more unstable societies and 
stateless refugees than stable states and democracies. However, Herbst‘s (1989) 
article on the creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa reminds us of 
two important facts. First, Africa‘s present political map was drawn between 1885 and 
1904, thereby ignoring demographic, ethnographic and topographic factors. Second, 
since independence, the vast majority of these borders have remained virtually 
untouched, not because the local populations have been determined to maintain them, 
but because the system, for the most part, continues to serve the political needs of the 
former colonialists and present-day African leaders. With the later establishment of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), newly introduced laws and norms once 
again effectively suppressed the right of self-determination. Herbst therefore 
concludes, ―borders are always artificial because states are not natural creations‖ 
(1989, p. 692). 
 
The extent to which the long-term effects of the scramble for Africa and 
externally imposed borders have caused civil unrest and conflict in the region remains 
a highly debated point (cf. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011). Moreover, the 
whole thought and ideology behind the concept of self-determination never really 
mixed well with the social structure and cultural particularism of pre-colonial Africa 
in the first place. In pre-colonial Africa, political power was exercised over people, 
not over land or territory. Because of the poor soil and underdeveloped agricultural 
technology, most communities were either nomadic or semi-nomadic (Goody, 1980). 
Therefore, the whole notion and concept of self-determination in pre-colonial Africa 
would have been detached from any territorial claims. In many societies, communal 
and (semi-)nomadic lifestyles formed the very basis of their survival. 
 
Against this background, the rationale for the Western idea behind self-
determination cannot be regarded as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding and 
development agendas. Rather, as a concept, it is much more an idealistic, if not 
romantic, extension of it. As a philosophical and intellectual construct of the Western 
World, it is based on the principle of equal and individual rights. Nonetheless, in 
practice, vague legal language and the political and economic interests of foreign and 
local elites and imperialism frequently suppress these aspirations.  
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If the aim is to understand the dynamics inherent in present sub-Saharan African 
post-conflict societies better, they should be reconnected with a pre-colonial and 
colonial past (cf. Chabal, 1996). The entire notion of self-determination (based on 
liberal ideals) would subsequently gain a new meaning and change its analytical 
dimensions as well. On the one hand, such a new analytical angle would imply both 
acknowledging and recognising how identity is distorted and deconstructed over time. 
On the other hand, an expanded approach would widen the space for a thorough 
reflection upon how colonialism and the events on and around independence have 
become an integral part of present sub-Saharan African identities. More importantly, 
considering how the effects of colonial rule differ between each country, region, 
society, community and respective coloniser – identity must be embraced in the 
plural.  
 
1.2.2. Civil society and the issue of local ownership 
The dilemma of local ownership is closely related to the topic of self-
determination. The concept emerged out of the sentiment that, ―the local population 
must participate in, and indeed own, the reconstruction process from the start‖ (Orr, 
2004, p. 302). Since the early 1990s, the international community has been repeatedly 
under attack for undermining individual and communal skills, as well as locally rooted 
and more culturally sensitive approaches, which would actually better correspond with 
a society‘s own functions and objectives. In the understanding of Lidén (2009, p. 618), 
―the failure to generate local ownership of the liberal peacebuilding project is 
symptomatic of the distance between its ‗global‘ objectives and the local conditions 
for their realization‖. For the most part, it is generally argued that locally owned 
peacebuilding and development processes are more attentive to ―highly developed 
skills and complex webs of social and cultural relationships that are often difficult for 
outsiders to comprehend‖ (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002, p. 8). The concept of local 
ownership thus assumes that through processes of cooperative and cumulative 
learning, locals have worked out how to survive in frequently difficult and harsh 
conditions during the various peacebuilding and development stages (ibid., pp. 8–9).  
 
Accordingly, researchers, and practitioners, warn that the social capital of 
conflict-affected societies is not frequently acknowledged or incorporated into project 
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and programme design and that this raises concerns about the lack of local legitimacy 
in externally led interventions. The international (donor) community clearly took heed 
of these warnings, and local ownership has become a ―near orthodox commitment‖ 
(cf. van Billerbeck, 2011). The term has gained immense prominence in current 
peacebuilding and development rhetoric and practice. For instance, the Secretary 
General‘s first report on ―Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict‖ 
stresses that peacebuilding has to be first and foremost regarded as a ―national 
challenge and responsibility‖ (2009, p. 4). Within the broader development 
community, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) guidelines now provide a clear definition of national 
ownership (2006, p. 147):  
 
The effective exercise of a government‘s authority over development policies and 
activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially – on external recourses. For 
governments, this means articulating the national development agenda and establishing 
authoritative policies and strategies. (…) For (aid) donors, it means aligning their 
programmes on government policies and building on government systems and processes 
to manage and coordinate aid rather than creating parallel systems to meet donor 
requirements.  
 
Furthermore, the ―UNDP Human Development Index Toolkit for National and 
Regional Human Development Report Teams‖ (p. 23) recommends achieving national 
ownership: 
 
(…) through a process that draws upon national development actors and capabilities 
throughout preparation, yielding a product firmly grounded in the country‘s past and 
existing development actors and capabilities throughout preparation, yielding a product 
firmly grounded in the country‘s past and existing development plans. National ownership 
implies a commitment to broad, collective ownership encompassing different viewpoints. 
It also contributes to capacity development. A report rooted in national perspectives 
inspires trust in the Human Development Report as a source for policy dialogue and 
development alternatives.  
 
Unquestionably, attempts and approaches to ensure local ownership in 
peacebuilding and development practice are no longer scarce. Nonetheless, on closer 
examination, there are a few recurring dilemmas concerning the issue of local 
ownership and the civil sphere in fragile states.  
 
First, most key documents and literature on peacebuilding and development fail 
to distinguish between the meanings and implications of national and local ownership 
52 
 
(e.g.: Donais 2012, UN PBSO
14
). Concretely, the terms national and local, are used 
interchangeably and it is not clear whether authors and reports that refer to national 
ownership include the grassroots level alongside government officials and elites. 
Barnett, for instance, suggests (2006, p. 110): ―If peacebuilders are serious about 
preparing states for self-governance, then local elites must be included in the 
reconstruction process‖. Who exactly belongs to the local elite is a complicated 
question in the sub-Saharan African context, however. Does it encompass the chiefs 
and village elders and authorities or is it limited to government officials and local 
politicians? What about the civil sphere? Thus, both terms not only remain ill-defined 
concepts but their different nuances and scopes are unclear.  
 
Second, von Billerbeck (2011) elaborates in depth how local ownership and its 
relation with legitimacy, sustainability and democratisation reveal another plethora of 
contradictions. For example, its legitimising qualities are complicated by the fact that 
it is practically impossible to work with all potential owners of the peace and 
development process. Foremost, according to Billerbeck, actors (in particular the 
United Nations) that use local ownership as an approach to peacebuilding appear to 
prioritise norm compliance and diffusion over operational outcomes on the ground. 
From her perspective, to a much greater degree, local ownership is a normative, almost 
visionary ideal – rather than a common practice in fragile states. Put another way, 
local ownership emerged as an imperative moral concept in peacebuilding rhetoric 
even though its de facto implementation is hampered by several practical, if not 
political, challenges - which leads to the next point.  
 
Third, peacebuilding and development processes and their analogous funding 
schemes and allocations are extremely prone to elite capture and corruption – at the 
state, regional and communal or grassroots levels – thereby affecting the legitimacy of 
programmes and projects. To that effect, local ownership is further challenged by local 
customs and social structures (inherited from pre- and colonial times), which are 
usually not practised in the West. An example can be given by drawing on Labonte‘s 
(2008) study on how the Sierra Leone chiefdom system affected peacebuilding 
                                                 
14
 See also PBSOs workshop report: ‗From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership 
in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.‖ June 2011, retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/national_ownership_report.pdf, last visit 05 July 2014 
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partnerships that were designed around the principles of local ownership. Funding 
allocations for peacebuilding projects were channelled through so-called ―Village 
Development Communities‖. While reviewing several external project evaluations, 
Labonte made an interesting observation. Instead of strengthening social cohesion and 
local ownership, the majority of these community-driven programmes tended to 
aggravate social exclusion, especially among ex-combatants and war-affected youth. 
The reasons for this could be found in traditional patterns of behaviour based on 
hierarchical, or better yet, neopatrimonial power structures between the elders and the 
youth. At the grassroots level, elite capture challenged the project‘s overall objective 
to meaningfully enhance the skills, capacities and knowledge of all community 
members. The project, while locally owned, was based on illiberal particularities, as 
opposed to complying with the norms of ownership along the ideals of liberalism.  
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, there are also, of course, examples when 
approaches towards enhanced local ownership are successful. Referring again to the 
case of Sierra Leone, the NGO Fambul Tok has become a widely praised example of 
how peacebuilding, and in this particular case, reconciliation and social cohesion, can 
be locally nurtured and somewhat ―owned‖.15 The NGO was founded shortly after the 
end of the war, against the background that many Sierra Leoneans were dissatisfied 
with the reconciliation process induced and steered by the international community. 
The rural districts outside Freetown especially felt that little had happened to heal the 
wounds of the civil war. Moreover, the Special Court was viewed as being costly and 
inefficient, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was generally 
portrayed as being poorly organised. In 2007, the Sierra Leonean human rights activist 
John Caulker had the idea of reinstating forms of reconciliation at the community 
level, as it was practised before the war. These practices generally take place in village 
ceremonies, around a bonfire, to encourage victims and perpetrators to tell stories 
about the war, confess to victims, ask for forgiveness and to then be forgiven. Fambul 
Tok began its work in 2008 and is now active in all 14 of Sierra Leone‘s districts, 
enjoying widespread participation and recognition amongst Sierra Leoneans. Given 
the unique interplay between forgiveness and regret in the scope of traditional forms of 
                                                 
15
 The work of Fambul Tok was subject of a 2011 documentary film and also featured by the BBC, 
TEDx, as well as by all major local Sierra Leonean newspapers. Members and beneficiaries are invited 
regularly to give talks organised by aid agencies, the UN and universities around the world.  
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reconciliation, local initiatives such as Fambul Tok are frequently used as examples 
for having a greater long-term potential of a broader acceptance of post-war justice 
amongst the populations (cf. Ainley et al., 2013). 
 
To recapitulate, this section pointed out that local ownership has arisen as a 
normative and moral concept that faces many political, practical and conceptual 
dilemmas when put into common practice on the ground. While there are some 
successful project-based examples on how local ownership can be implemented in 
post-conflict states (e.g. Fambul Tok), in the broader context of a country as a whole, 
the concept still suffers from being ill-implemented and defined. In this regard, local 
ownership is, once again, not an alternative concept to the liberal peace but rather an 
intended outcome of it. In its most ambitious form it builds on the aspirations of liberal 
thought patterns in striving for democratisation and legitimacy stemming from the 
civil sphere.  
 
From this perspective, the chapter suggests making a clear distinction between 
local and national ownership when it comes to studying the interplay of civil society 
and peacebuilding and development. More concretely, local ownership is understood 
as closely interlinked with the grassroots level and hence also the broader civil sphere. 
It is approached as a legitimising process that is sensitive towards the cultural 
particularisms and historical context of a society. National ownership, on the other 
hand, is understood as closely interlinked with the government and elites. As a concept 
and approach it is therefore less inclusive of the civil sphere. The proposed distinction 
shall not idealise or even romanticise the local level over the national level or the other 
way round. On the contrary, as will be seen in later discussion, neither level is immune 
to elite capture and corruption. It is not expected that this definitional division will 
solve all the conceptual and practical dilemmas inherent in the idea of local ownership. 
Instead, it is seen as a starting point in the quest for alternatives to study the civil 
sphere in fragile states. 
 
1.2.3. Civil society and the issue of liberal ideas versus cultural particularism  
Besides the dilemmas of self-determination and local ownership, current 
discourse additionally focuses on the moral and ethical aspects of liberal peacebuilding 
and development. As Dunne accurately maintained (2011, p. 179): ―the key question 
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for Liberalism at the dawn of a new century is whether it can reinvent itself as a non-
universalizing political idea, which preserves the traditional liberal value of human 
solidarity without undermining cultural diversity‖.  
 
In brief, debates in the literature revolve around questions such as: Can 
international interventions avoid cultural imperialism while simultaneously protecting 
and integrating marginalised groups into the peacebuilding and development process? 
What if local or indigenous idiosyncrasies, traditions and customs violate universal 
recognised norms (cf. Mac Ginty, 2010)? In a lecture entitled, ―What is the Ethics of 
Peacebuilding‖, Lidén (18 January 2007) formulated these recurring dilemmas, 
inherent in peacebuilding and development processes, along the lines of:  
 The liberalisation of culture versus building on existing culture 
 The liberalisation of power versus the conservation of existing power 
structures, and 
 The liberalisation of gender patterns versus the preservation of existing gender 
patterns 
 
Lidén is aware that his list is nowhere near extensive and that it still leaves a lot 
of room for opposing dilemmas. For instance, the dilemma of supporting conventional 
religious institutions versus stronger integration of local religious leaders and faith-
based organisations could be included. Lidén‘s lecture resulted in a subsequent article 
on the ethical implications of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding operations 
(2009). Here, he critically examines the normative and theoretical potential of three 
ideal types: a re-liberal peacebuilding process that prescribes a more coercive 
approach, a social peacebuilding process that emphasises local agency and the 
promotion of socioeconomic rights, and a multicultural peacebuilding process that 
roots peace in indigenous norms and institutions (Ibid., 2009, p. 616). While Lidén‘s 
analysis proposes the social ideal type as a political theoretical approach to 
peacebuilding, he admits that ―the challenge for peacebuilding theory is to make the 
premises and objectives of these practices more explicit and allow them to inform the 
politics of peacebuilding as well as ethical choices for the implementation of better 
policies‖ (ibid., 2009, p. 632).  
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More broadly, as is the case with practitioners, scholars frequently point to the 
growing bureaucratisation of peacebuilding and development assistance, which 
repeatedly undermines the potential of local societies to sustain the peace and foster 
development in conflict-affected societies. Denskus (2007), for example, 
provocatively states that ―peacebuilding does not build peace‖, as post-conflict 
rehabilitation has lost any sense of context or the people in that context. For him, 
peacebuilding processes are caught up in dichotomies and preconceived perceptions. 
His arguments go hand in hand with earlier assessments, such as the work of Sawyer 
(2005), who examined the peacebuilding process of Liberia in depth. Being a Liberian 
himself, Sawyer brings attention to the fact that the Liberian Joint Needs Assessment, 
which was prepared by the National Transitional Government for Liberia, the United 
Nations and the World Bank, was disappointingly quiet on the critical question of 
what Liberians themselves possess, even in their state of misery. Sawyer thus urges a 
move towards asking different questions, such as: How have the Liberian people 
coped with the collapse of their state and all its consequences? What residual 
institutions sustained them? Moreover, what potential do these offer for post-war 
recovery (2005, p. 58)? Sawyer focuses attention on the different response 
mechanisms that civil society organisations and initiatives have to offer. In addition, 
he concludes that despite the devastation of recent years, Liberia still has a 
considerable pool of human and social capital, which post-conflict reconstruction 
should not ignore – if it is to be sustained over the long-term (see also Pham, 2006).  
 
Peacebuilding and development practice responded to these challenges and harsh 
criticisms with an increased focus on programming and funding for community-based 
approaches (CBA). The work of Lederach (1995), in particular, became influential in 
shaping and promoting CBAs in fragile states. This is especially so for INGOs, such as 
Peace Direct,16 which made it their overall goal and objective to enable local people to 
find their ‗own solutions for their own problems and conflicts‘. In practice, this means 
that CBAs seek to ―empower local community groups and institutions by giving the 
community direct control over investment decisions, project planning, execution and 
monitoring, through a process that emphasises inclusive participation and 
management‖ (Huma, 2009, p. 4). Programmes and projects usually target issue areas, 
                                                 
16
 For more information, see: http://www.peacedirect.org/uk/about/, last visit 6 November 2013. 
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such as security, socioeconomic recovery, media, communication and civic education, 
transitional justice and reconciliation, heritage and cultural preservation. Chapter 3 
will provide an in-depth discussion of the different forms that CBAs can take – 
ranging from associations to community based organisations (CBOs) and village 
leadership. For now, it is worth noting that CBAs surfaced as a much-hyped tool and 
instrument among aid agencies, international organisations and INGOs alike. For the 
most part, INGOs (and the international organisations and Western governments that 
fund them) hold positive outlooks of the potential of indigenous and traditional 
approaches to peacebuilding, as they promise and give hope to produce a better (thus 
long-lasting and locally owned) peace.  
 
Against this background, Mac Ginty (2008, 2010) carefully analyses current 
efforts to tailor peacebuilding and development into more context-specific and 
culturally sensitive approaches. With the goal of understanding these peacebuilding 
processes from a different perspective, he looks into indigenous and communal forms 
of peacebuilding and weighs their potential as well as their pitfalls. In doing so, he is 
careful not to romanticise the emerging trend of reviving practices of traditional and 
indigenous approaches to peacebuilding. Instead, Mac Ginty provides a sharp 
reflection on the rediscovery and the advantages as well as the inherent difficulties of 
indigenous and traditional forms of resolving conflict. He labels traditional and 
indigenous methods of conflict resolution as ―organic peacebuilding‖, in that they 
have the same perceived advantages as organic farming: sustainability and 
independence from expensive and artificial additives (in the form of external peace 
support interventions), therefore, it originates locally. Still, as stressed earlier in 
reference to Lidén‘s (2007; 2009) work, Mac Ginty finds that local or indigenous 
methods of conflict resolution are not always consistent with the recognised norms and 
principles of the Western World, in the sense that they can be either deeply violent 
(e.g., vigilantes, mobs and lynching) or exclude women from the process and thus 
hinder the mainstreaming of gender equality. Therefore, indigenous practices have 
frequently been ―genetically modified‖ to serve a liberal peace compromise. Similarly, 
Boege (2011) also asserts that traditional approaches are frequently ‗conquered‘ by 
external actors, only to be placed in the framework of Western concepts of what ought 
to lead to sustainable peace and development.  
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For the most part, the literature on the dilemma of liberal ideas versus cultural 
particularism once again illuminates the complexity of understanding and assessing 
the role and potential of the civil sphere in fragile states. The dichotomies of liberal 
versus traditional values and practices continue to be widely debated – on 
philosophical as well as practical grounds.17  
 
Against this background, it must be emphasised that current research tends to 
avoid one uncomfortable question: do war-affected societies always have to pull the 
rabbit out of the proverbial hat and provide us with their own (culturally more suited) 
solutions to any given dilemma at hand? This is not to say that local societies are 
unable or uncreative in dealing with the challenges in the aftermath of a conflict. 
Instead, this thesis will bring forward the argument that those who are affected seldom 
cause the dilemmas that are occurring in peacebuilding and development processes. In 
fact, from a historical perspective, many of these seemingly illiberal practices were 
actually introduced during colonial rule. Some of the atrocities committed in the sub-
Saharan African civil wars (e.g., cutting off people‘s limbs) were also widely practised 
by the Belgium colonial empire under the rule of King Leopold II (1835–1909). 
Together with the legacies of colonial rule, current global and structural barriers have 
continued to challenge local societies. Therefore, can Western donors really expect 
local societies in fragile sub-Saharan African states to find their own local solutions to 
externally introduced challenges, such as trade barriers (affecting local labour markets) 
and international immigration law? These aspects not only trigger potentially new 
forms of internal conflict, but they also render the slogan ―African solutions for 
African problems‖ close to irrelevant.  
 
1.2.4. Civil society and the issue of everyday resistance 
As the previous debates have shown, peacebuilding and development research 
relentlessly forces us into a corner full of even more puzzling questions. New 
dilemmas emerge out of old ones, thereby generating completely new bodies of 
literature. Sections 1.2.1–1.2.3 emphasised that critics of liberal peacebuilding and 
development interventions share one common theme, and that is how liberal agendas 
                                                 
17
 Recently, several scholars found a theoretical refuge in the concept of hybridity. See, for instance, 
Mac Ginty, Roger (2010): International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace 
(Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies), Palgrave Macmillan. Or, Richmond, Oliver P. and Mitchell, 
Audra (2011) Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, Palgrave Macmillan.  
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are internationalised rather than context-specific, culturally sensitive or localised. 
Enquiries into how the civil sphere copes with, absorbs and reacts to liberal values, 
which are brought about via external aid on a daily basis, are closely connected with 
the issue of local ownership or cultural particularism. In particular, de Certau‘s (1980) 
The Practice of Everyday Life and Scott‘s (1987, 1990) reflections of everyday 
resistance gained immense popularity in current peacebuilding and development 
research. Their approaches have been adopted as a way of framing local resistance to 
the liberal agendas of donor governments and the international community. Some of 
those discussions will be briefly described below.  
 
Critics argue that among the several (unintended) consequences arising out of an 
externally-imposed liberal agenda in fragile states, most interventions fail to engage 
with the everyday lives of the very people affected, thus treating locals as subjects 
rather than citizens. In Richmond‘s words (2009, p. 557), ―the ‗liberal peace‘ is 
undergoing a crisis of legitimacy at the level of the everyday in post-conflict 
environments‖.  
 
Overall, there is a widespread consensus in the literature that liberal 
peacebuilding and development interventions are provoking legitimate resistance and 
opposition from those who are directly affected by the implementation of a liberal 
agenda in fragile states (Dudouet, 2011; Galvanek, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2010; 
Richmond, 2009, 2011). In the context of the critique of liberal peacebuilding and 
development interventions, resistance is commonly understood as a reaction taking on 
various forms. It is far from being a uniformly used term and it depends heavily on 
context and time. Scholars typically grant themselves a certain definitional flexibility 
when it comes to a common usage. Resistance can range from violent actions by peace 
―spoilers‖ (cf. Narten, 2009) to more subtle, non-violent or even invisible variations 
(cf. Dudouet, 2011; cf. Scott, 1987, 1990). Following Scott, resistance embraces both 
collective as well as individual acts of resistance (1985, pp. 290). Mac Ginty further 
maintains that (2010, pp. 403–404):  
 
Just as most liberal peace implementation is subtle (for example, multiple small-scale 
governance projects), resistance to the liberal peace may also be subtle. It may take the 
form of non-cooperation, not necessarily in a wilful sense but based on a calculation that 
life would be easier without the entanglements that exposure to liberal internationalism 
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might bring. (…) Local actors might also choose to cooperate with certain aspects of the 
liberal peace while resisting, subverting or ignoring other aspects. 
 
Finally, scholars pay additional attention to the intentions behind specific acts of 
resistance. For Scott, these intentions gain significantly more importance than their 
actual consequences, recognising that many acts of resistance may fail to achieve their 
intended result (Scott, 1985, pp. 289–292). ―Where there is strong evidence for the 
intention behind the act, the case for resistance is correspondingly strengthened‖ (ibid., 
p. 290). 
 
In some way, the concept of everyday resistance to a liberal agenda surfaced as 
an alternative site of knowledge for peacebuilding (cf. Richmond, 2009; Galvanek, 
2013): be it to simply recognise resistance for what it is, or for developing creative 
ways of responding to various acts of resistance and modifying current initiatives 
accordingly (Galvanek, 2013, p. 15).  
 
As an approach to examining the ill-beings of a society exaggerated, or even 
caused, by liberal interventions for peacebuilding and development, resistance is 
deeply interlinked with the local sphere. Accounts of local resistance usually reflect 
the voices from below: the powerless, the marginalised and discriminated people. For 
Galvanek (p. 11–12), these voices include : 
 
(…) not just those of women and migrants, but also the poor, the slum-dwellers, the 
refugees, those caught up in and suffering from conflict in general, the oppressed and 
discriminated, and in its most general form, those that are referred to as the ‗locals‘. It is 
on these levels of society and among these groups – which have been historically 
overlooked or forgotten – that we can witness (often unconscious) resistance to their 
social, political or economic situations. 
 
In this context, it is worth briefly highlighting the World Bank‘s fascinating, yet 
frequently unrecognised, book trilogy, Voices of the Poor, published between 2000 
and 2001. The study gathered the opinions of 60,000 poor women and men in over 60 
countries worldwide, asking how they would eradicate poverty and improve their 
lives. Even though the project‘s overall objective was not to look into forms of 
resistance from the local sphere it is, indirectly, nevertheless an extremely useful and 
context-specific account on the circumstances that can cause or trigger acts of 
resistance. For instance, in response to the question regarding what interviewees 
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perceive as ―ill-being‖, the most common answers were (Narayan et.al. 2000b, p. 23): 
material deprivation, physical ill-being, bad social relations, vulnerability, worry and 
fear, low self-confidence, and powerlessness, helplessness and frustration. Likewise, 
there are significant commonalities in the way poor people describe their lives: a sense 
of powerlessness and voicelessness; the precariousness of their livelihoods and a lack 
of security; isolation, humiliation and lack of connections to resources and 
opportunities, and gender inequality.18 Even though these perceptions of poverty may 
not be entirely novel, they are still useful in sensitising one‘s understanding of why 
resistance is caused not only by material but also by physiological wellbeing. Clearly, 
the weighting of these dimensions varies significantly by location, individual(s), time 
and personal circumstances. Unfortunately, not many follow-up studies have been 
undertaken and critical (or alternative) discourse remains largely detached from these 
findings. This observation also corresponds well with Paffenholz‘s general criticism 
(2010) that authors who argue that we need to give voice to alternative, oppressed 
actors do not actually analyse these alternative voices. In her view, given that the main 
focus of these studies continues to be the liberal peace and how the international 
community suppresses local actors, there seems to be an inherent contradiction to the 
very alternative discourse for which these authors advocate (ibid., p. 56).  
 
Overall, there is no doubt that the burgeoning interest in acts of resistance to 
liberal agendas in fragile states is of extreme value when it comes to studying the 
(re)construction of the civil sphere. They constitute a form of political action in 
contrast to processes of political deprivation as will be outlined in the ensuing section. 
Acts of resistances also illuminate how a liberal peacebuilding and development 
agenda is socially accepted and absorbed. Nonetheless, for many research projects and 
studies, and this is also the case for the thesis at hand, it would go far beyond the scope 
and research intent to focus on acts of resistance to such a narrow degree. This is not 
to say that the current discourse regarding resistance should be sidelined in research 
and practice as a whole. Instead, they can serve as an important reminder to become 
                                                 
18
 For more detailed information visit: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20622514~
menuPK:336998~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html, or watch the documentary 
at:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:22283349~
pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html, last accessed 4 November 2013.  
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more observant of the subtle reactions and actions of locals regarding liberal practices 
to strengthen and support civil society.  
 
1.2.5. Civil society and the issue of depoliticisation 
All of the previously discussed discourses are widely debated topics in the 
peacebuilding and development literature. Inevitably, they will be recurring themes in 
the empirical Part II of the thesis. Especially self-determination, local ownership and 
forms of everyday resistance presuppose a liberal understanding of civil society that is 
vibrant and politically active in order to challenge authorities, alert about injustices 
and advocate for specific concerns and needs. But what if cultural particularisms or, as 
will be discussed later, the political culture and nature of a society are not going to stir 
up the fire required for political engagement and influence? Why do local societies 
lack this kind of influence and voice? A phenomenon that surprisingly remains only 
marginalised in research on peacebuilding and development processes is the issue of 
depoliticisation. This void is striking and it is here where the thesis wants to make an 
original contribution to ongoing debates by drawing on the case study of Sierra Leone. 
Beforehand, it is essential to clarify how the term depoliticisation will be approached 
and conceptually used. In the scope of the thesis, depoliticisation is defined and 
understood as: 
 
A process that removes specific actors (civil society or, more broadly the 
civil sphere) gradually from any form of political influence. As a 
consequence, processes of political deprivation affect the political nature 
and culture of a society while at the same time the political culture of a 
society can also influence the degree of political activism or willingness 
to advocate for a need or cause. Depoliticisation can also reflect or even 
cause political neutralisation expressed in the sheer lack of interest in 
politics. Whereas liberalism would recognise a political civil sphere as 
independent from the state, a depoliticised civil sphere would no longer 
be an independent and legitimising watchdog of or advocate for specific 
governmental actions and policies. Instead, actors are prone to being 
instrumentalised by the state or other external players to serve a 
government‟s agenda and political aims.  
 
Only a few authors have hinted at the depoliticisation effects occurring during 
several stages of peacebuilding and development endeavours. The most common 
argument highlights that civil society actors are manoeuvred into activities and areas 
in which they undertake duties that complement or carry out functions that the 
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government is too weak, incapable or unwilling to perform (Goetschel and Hagmann 
2009, Holmén 2010, Howell and Pearce 2002, Verkoren and van Leeuwen 2012). In 
carefully assessing civil society actors and functions, Chapter 3 and Part II of the 
thesis will discuss this phenomenon in significantly greater detail as well. Two notable 
academic contributions supporting this claim are Goetschel and Hagmann‘s (2009) 
article ―Civilian Peacebuilding: Peace by Bureaucratic Means?‖ and Verkoren and van 
Leeuwen‘s (2012) article ―Complexities and Challenges for Civil Society Building in 
Post-conflict Settings.‖19 Both pieces share the same line of reasoning. They blame 
externally-led peacebuilding processes for depoliticising social transformation from 
below. However, all of these authors leave it open for the reader to further contemplate 
how the political bargaining power of weaker social groups as well as the social 
reproduction of peacebuilding and development processes can best be approached, 
understood and assessed. All the same, they limit their argument to the influence of 
external actors alone. Although the thesis recognises the instrumentalisation of the 
civil sphere as one dynamic connected to depoliticisation effects, it yet identifies two 
additional dynamics that reinforce processes of depoliticisation as well. The first one 
refers to the political culture of a society, how it was socially constructed in the course 
of the history of state formation and how it affects the political involvement of the 
civil sphere today. The second one is concerned with abject poverty, human 
development and above all the lack of education, and how all of these affect activism 
and agency from below. Successively, the thesis will elaborate on both factors to a 
much greater extent.  
 
For now it is worth stressing that the issue of depoliticisation should not be 
treated too lightly. In many post-conflict societies, an imposed liberal agenda led to a 
gradual retreat of the state, thereby shifting more and more responsibilities towards the 
civil sphere. Since the late 1970s, the radical neoliberal transformation in Latin 
America has served as a case in point. In most Latin American countries, civil society 
has surfaced as a parallel actor next to the state in the midst of a weakening public 
welfare system (Mentan 2010). The most striking example is probably Haiti, which is 
infamous for being a ―Republic of NGOs‖ (Kristoff and Panarelli, 2010). After India, 
                                                 
19
 There are also a few – but not many – contributions in the development literature, e.g., Pearce's 
chapter on "Manufacturing Civil Society from the Outside: Donor Interventions" in Howell and Pearce's 
(2002) book Civil Society and Development. 
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it has the second highest number of CSOs (international and local) per capita in the 
world. Current estimates of the number of CSOs operating in Haiti, prior to the 
earthquake in 2010, range from 3,000 to as many as 10,000 (ibid.). This additionally 
undermined the Haitian government in carrying out several of its own responsibilities. 
It further led to the dilemma of whether the country should move towards a system of 
shared responsibilities between CSOs and the state in the realm of social welfare. In 
short, Haitian CSOs are overwhelmingly more occupied with providing social services 
than campaigning and advocating for better social policies and the provision of service 
by the state.  
 
Although the situation in sub-Saharan Africa is not (yet) nearly as extreme as in 
Haiti, the majority of local CSOs no longer serve (in a liberal interpretation) as 
political and emancipatory actors to campaign for the establishment of stronger 
governmental social policies. On the contrary, they are gradually co-opted into 
providing services that were previously considered the responsibility of the state (cf. 
Verkoren and van Leeuwen, 2012). Even if local CSOs benefit from funding schemes 
targeting ―attitudinal change‖ or advocate for liberal values, such as human rights, 
their activities tend to train or educate the local population as opposed to challenging 
local politics, behaviour, and traditions that stand in stark contradiction to universal 
human rights. Paradoxically, project design and implementation based on liberal 
conceptions of the civil sphere frequently limit local civil societies from independently 
engaging in the domains of social life in which both public opinion and opposition can 
be formed. As will become more evident in the case of Sierra Leone, liberal attempts 
to support and strengthen the local civil society landscape have become a vicious 
circle of aid dependency, severely affecting the establishment of a public social 
welfare system and shifting responsibility towards the civil sphere. The subsequent 
chapters of the thesis will illuminate how this not only affected the (re)construction of 
the civil sphere in Sierra Leone, but also how other factors, such as political culture 
and poverty, further aggravate depoliticisation effects during the peacebuilding and 
development phase.  
 
1.2.6. Civil society and the issue of political culture  
A common theme in the previous sections revolved implicitly and explicitly 
around the issue of political change and why it should be attuned to local and cultural 
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characteristics in conflict-ravaged societies. In Goetschel and Hagmann‘s words 
(2009, p. 68): ―the idea is thus not to determine whether or not peacebuilding works, 
but to understand (…) how it is reproduced socially‖. The fundamental question is 
therefore: What can peacebuilding and development research and practice potentially 
learn from the historical, cultural, social and consequently the political matrix of a 
conflict-ravaged society? A deeper enquiry leads inevitably to the disciplines of 
political science and sociology. This disciplinary intermezzo gave birth to the concept 
of the ―political culture‖ of a society, which was famously coined and defined by 
Almond and Verba as (1963, p. 12): 
 
(…) political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and 
attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a political culture just as 
we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations 
toward a special set of social objects and processes.  
 
Over the past decades, the political culture of a society came to be seen as a key 
variable in determining how and when a political system moves closer or further from 
the perfect ideal of democracy (Diamond 1994). Specifically, a political agenda only 
gains legitimacy at the domestic level if it is based on a political culture cherishing 
specific values, beliefs, orientations and norms. Diamond further contends, ‗the 
development of a democratic culture cannot be taken for granted as a natural by-
product of democratic practice or institutional design‘ (1994, p. 7). Nonetheless, the 
issue of political culture is complicated by the fact that the social groups within a 
society do not necessarily share the same political culture, nor are these values and 
beliefs evenly distributed throughout the population (Diamond, 1994). Every society 
consists of various subcultures, which should caution researchers against applying a 
too deterministic approach towards the political culture of a society.  
 
Therefore, given the complexity of the concept and how political culture differs 
within societies, Almond and Verba suggest further distinguishing between three 
patterns of political cognition: participant, subject and parochial. A participant is 
assumed to be aware of, and informed about, the political system in both its 
governmental and political aspects. A subject tends to be cognitively oriented 
primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy and judiciary. 
The parochial tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware of the political system in all of 
its aspects (1963, p. 79). Clearly, their distinction should not exclude certain flexibility 
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for greyscales and the various overlaps. Their classification, nonetheless, gives rise to 
several questions that are frequently disregarded when it comes to studying the 
(re)construction of societal order through liberal interventions in non-Western 
contexts.  
 
First, mainstream peacebuilding and development research does not focus on the 
extent to which the political culture in post-conflict sub-Saharan Africa actually differs 
from the Western ideal. To look at it another way – how significant is political culture 
when confronted with externally-led liberal peacebuilding and development 
interventions? On the surface, democratic institutions were more or less successfully 
(re-)established in most of the fragile sub-Saharan African states. Underneath this 
surface, the civil sphere remains largely embedded in neo-patrimonial and/or religious 
networks and tribalism (cf. Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 1996; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). 
Although researchers and practitioners recognise the cultural particularism of a society 
(see Section 2.2.3 of this chapter), those discourses remain largely detached from a 
vast body of post-colonial literature focusing on the legacies of colonialism and the 
bifurcated state, and how both affected and shaped the political culture in 
contemporary sub-Saharan African societies.20 The impact of persisting neo-
patrimonial networks and tribalism on the political culture of the civil sphere 
undoubtedly merits further examination. A thorough investigation and reflection of the 
political culture of a society, and how it is/was historically and socially engineered has 
the potential to provide an alternative approach in current studies on civil society 
formation in fragile non-Occidental states.  
 
Second, if the political culture of a society is defined as being closely related to 
the ―attitudes towards the political system‖, it is questionable whether a liberal 
understanding of civil society is applicable to the context of sub-Saharan African 
states. As will be elaborated in more depth in Chapter 2, the intellectual tradition of 
liberalism embraces the realm of the individual, the very self who strives for personal 
rights, political freedom and speech. In short, an emancipatory interpretation of 
liberalism attributes civil society with a transformative character. It is in the nature of 
any liberal project (no matter whether it targets peacebuilding and development or any 
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 There are a few exceptions to the rule; see, for instance, Lidén, 2009.  
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other field) to constantly question the authority of the state and the freedom of the 
individual therein. Ironically, critics of a liberal peacebuilding and development 
agenda frequently call for local emancipation and transformation from below; hence, 
reflecting, instead of opposing liberal thought patterns. This creates intellectual as well 
as analytical confusion. Nonetheless, the critical literature fails to consider the fact that 
in the sub-Saharan context, the role of the individual cannot usually be that easily 
detached from (political and non-political) attitudes towards the community. The 
argument here is not that sub-Saharan African societies do not have emancipatory or 
transformative features as such. Instead, it is essential to set forth mind-sets (values, 
norms, orientations) about how to live a responsible communal life; moreover, the 
political nature of communities can stand in stark contrast to liberal or emancipatory 
understandings of individuality in the context of a society as a whole.  
 
Third, to a large extent, the issue of political culture is also closely interwoven 
with discussions on the nature and characteristics of state-society relations. Van 
Leeuwen and Verkoren (2012) initiated an interesting debate on why the idea of a 
social contract between the state and society needs to be renegotiated in non-Western 
post-conflict environments. Both authors rightly caution that neoliberal agendas 
underlie aspirations for civil society building, drawing on the model of a Western state 
with an effective bureaucracy that provides for the wellbeing of its citizens. More 
knowledge is needed about how ―indigenous‖ (understood by the author as non-
Occidental) manifestations of civil society acquire legitimacy and maintain their own 
forms of accountability (2012, p. 87). In further advancing van Leeuwen and 
Verkoren‘s points, the thesis additionally contends that a renegotiation of the social 
contract needs to recognise that these indigenous peculiarities (or the cultural 
particularism) of state society relations surfaced in a completely different manner and 
time in history than in the (neoliberal) West. Numerous debates on the effects of 
colonial rule offer a great entry point to anchor and interlink current peacebuilding and 
development research more thoroughly with the past (e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff, 
1999; Mamdani, 1996; Mbembe, 2001). As mentioned earlier, the issue of political 
culture can tell us a lot about the nature and characteristics of state-society relations. 
As a domain of social life, it appears to be a promising new entry point to revisit how 
we approach local societies in fragile non-Western states. All the same, it opens new 
avenues towards a more thorough understanding of the opposing tensions between the 
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individual and the community, and between particular and universal values – hence 
liberal interests.  
Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, it served as a background chapter 
on the most frequent theoretical and practical dilemmas in the current discourse about 
liberal peacebuilding and development approaches towards the civil sphere. Second, it 
looked at both the discourse and the issues with a critical eye and sought to identify 
areas that reward further (re-)examination in scholarship and practice.  
 
It highlighted how the realms of peacebuilding and development experienced a 
noticeable shift towards the civil sphere in the past two decades. Civil society not only 
emerged as an agent for peace and development but also as an object of reconstruction 
based on liberal idea(l)s. Despite well-intended ambitions to ensure inclusiveness in 
liberal peacebuilding and development processes (Chapter 3 will further take up this 
point), externally-led efforts are repeatedly challenged by the legacies of colonial rule, 
cultural particularism and the political culture of local societies in fragile sub-Saharan 
African states (see Part II). As a result, peacebuilding and development actors 
gradually engaged in activities that cultivated, or engineered, societal transformation 
from the bottom-up. At the same time, buzzwords such as self-determination, local-
ownership and cultural particularism have arisen in scholarship and practice, 
promising to ensure a more emancipatory model of peacebuilding and development. 
Even though these concepts have a longstanding theoretical tradition and practical 
usage, it was argued that they continue to be ill-defined and flawed, if not ambiguous 
terms. When related to questions of legitimacy in the sub-Saharan African context of 
rebuilding fragile states, they reveal a plethora of both practical and theoretical 
contradictions. Consequently, the discourse drifted into a philosophical impasse 
revolving around Dunne‘s overarching question: Can liberalism even reinvent itself as 
a non-universalising political idea that preserves the traditional liberal value of human 
solidarity without undermining cultural diversity? It may be impossible to resolve this 
issue on practical and philosophical grounds. For now, researchers as well as 
practitioners have found refuge in exploring the possibilities of cultural particularism, 
also understood as ―traditional‖ or ―alternative‖ forms to build peace and sustain 
development. It is repeatedly argued that peacebuilding and development assistance 
have to be more context-specific and culturally sensitive. Nonetheless, since practices 
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may interfere with the ethics of liberal and universal idea(l)s, we are also cautioned not 
to over-romanticise the potential of the local sphere. Similarly, discourses on local 
resistance remind us to become more observant of the subtle reactions and actions of 
locals concerning liberal practices to strengthen and support civil society.  
 
As the discussions on self-determination, local-ownership, cultural particularism 
and everyday resistance reveal, the ongoing discourse (e.g.: Mac Ginty and Richmond 
2013) does not really offer alternative options to liberal agendas in fragile states. 
Rather, they are an extension, if not idealistic version, of liberal values and idea(l)s 
(Paris, 2010). Whereas the current discourse clearly states the need to give voice to 
alternative, oppressed actors, most authors neither analyse these alternative voices 
(Paffenholz, 2010, p. 56) nor examine how/where they are socially engineered. This is 
unfortunate, as it is precisely those voices, and the ways in which they are socially 
manufactured, that can lay the groundwork for new alternatives in peacebuilding and 
development theory and practice. It is here where the thesis makes a new contribution 
to the field. Sections 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 highlighted two issues, which although 
inextricably intertwined, hitherto remained only marginally explored in the literature 
and research: the issue of depoliticisation; and the political culture of the civil sphere 
in peacebuilding and development processes. Until now, the mainstream as well as the 
alternative discourse has largely failed to address a striking paradox. Namely, even 
though peacebuilding and development efforts are directed towards (re)constructing 
civil societies based on liberal idea(l)s (individualism, equalitarianism, universalism, 
meliorism), their implementation practices can have, even if unintentionally, 
depoliticisation effects on local civil society landscapes. Chapter 3 and Part II of the 
thesis will elaborate on this phenomenon in significant depth. It is not that there are no 
political or activist voices from the civil sphere; it will instead be argued that these 
voices are not frequently represented through the formal institutional setting of CSOs. 
In addition, ongoing debates on and around the issues of local ownership, self-
determination, cultural particularism and everyday resistance did not actually bring 
about new insights as to how those political voices from below are socially 
engineered. In this regard, political culture, as a hitherto unexplored terrain, is 
expected to provide new insights regarding the matrix and fabrics of conflict-ravaged 
societies. The political culture of a society may be not only a contributing factor 
towards depoliticisation but also open up the space to rethink how we define and 
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approach the concept of civil society in non-Western environments. The following 
chapter will therefore critically reflect upon the import of a liberal notion of civil 
society in fragile non-Occidental states. In doing so, it will build an important 
conceptual and analytical bridge between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. In expanding on 
some of the most salient local factors that shape and socially construct beliefs and 
orientations of the civil sphere in (most) sub-Saharan African states, it points to the 
need to shift established modes of thinking when it comes to civil society outside the 
Occidental World.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Conceptualising civil society in the Western and 
sub-Saharan African contexts. 
 
 
‗Any fixed definition of the content of the concept ―civil society‖ would just freeze a 
particular moment in history and privilege the relations of social forces then prevailing. 
Rather than look for clearer definitions, we should try to understand the historical 
variations that have altered the meanings of the concept in the ongoing dialectic of 
concept and reality.‘ (Cox 1999, p. 5) 
 
Chapter 1 established that critics of liberal peacebuilding and development 
endeavours have, until now, failed to suggest alternative ways of approaching the 
concept of civil society outside the Occidental world. Chapter 2 fills in this conceptual 
gap as a necessary and preliminary step to address the thesis‘ overall question of why 
civil society actors in post-conflict environments are at risk of being gradually 
depoliticised. It synthesises theoretical discourses with the purpose of substantiating 
one of the thesis‘ main claims: the cultural matrix and political culture of a society and 
how it differs from liberal idea(l)s should not be overlooked. To be more precise, in 
the attempt to explain the causes and effects of depoliticisation occurring in 
peacebuilding processes in non-Western fragile states (Part II and III of the thesis), the 
political culture and social fabrics of a society can reveal a lot about how political 
activism and agency are socially engineered.  
 
Against this backdrop, Chapter 2 sets up some conceptual parameters for the 
remainder of the thesis. It will put forward a broad definition of the Western usage of 
the term in order to challenge a liberal usage of the concept in post-conflict sub-
Saharan African states. The first section provides a succinct overview of how civil 
society emerged as a concept and intellectual construct in Western philosophical 
thought. It aims to briefly elaborate and delineate why commonly agreed definitions of 
the term remain quite vague in Western political science and philosophy. In doing so, 
it would go beyond the scope of this Chapter to fully engage in the vast number of 
discourses on civil society, which have been summarised in greater detail by so many 
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others21. This section will, nevertheless, attempt to do justice to the main scholarly 
contributions to define the term and find some definitional common ground for 
ensuing discussions. How a liberal notion and understanding of civil society also to a 
great extent shaped the language of international peacebuilding and development 
actors will be delineated in Section 2.2. Building on the definitional and philosophical 
discourses of Section 2.1, it will point out that the international donor community 
increasingly operates based on the philosophical and analytical tradition of 
Tocqueville, as opposed to a Gramcsican notion (c.f. Verkoren and van Leeuwen, 
2013). While Tocquevillean tradition underscores the importance of organised groups 
of citizens in maintaining peaceful social relations and a functioning democracy, the 
intellectual strand informed by Gramsci emphasises the transformative and 
emancipatory role of civil society in which citizens have an active role in shaping the 
character of the state. The last section will then critically examine what Lewis (2001) 
calls the ―usefulness‖ of the concept of civil society in non-Western contexts with a 
special focus on sub-Saharan Africa. It will be argued that civil society as it emerged 
as a philosophical construct of the Occidental world never really matched realities of 
social and political life in equatorial Africa. In setting out some distinct features of 
sub-Saharan African civil societies as they evolved over history, space and time, the 
chapter introduces a matrix of factors that shape the civil sphere in (most) sub-Saharan 
African states. This matrix will serve the thesis as a rough character sketch of the 
political culture operating behind, next to, in interference with, and at times even in 
conjunction with a liberal political culture that informs peacebuilding and 
development process.  
 
2.1. On the Western conceptualisation and understanding of civil society 
In the history of political thought civil society is probably one of the most 
theoretically, rhetorically and semantically contested concepts. Yes, as Kaldor notes 
(2003: p. 2): ―The ambiguity of this term is one of its attractions‖. As the history of 
western political thought has shown, many theoretical and intellectual constructs build 
on different understandings and interpretations of the very idea of civil society. 
Concepts such as democracy, social contract, social capital or political culture (to 
                                                 
21
 Notable and comprehensive contributions on the evolution but also interpretation of the concept were 
made by Cohen and Arato (1994); Hall (1995); Gellner (1994); Keane (1988, 1998); and Chambers and 
Kymlicka (2002).  
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name but a few) would not have emerged in intellectual history without the various 
definitions, approaches and interpretations of the role, purpose and functions of civil 
society. The idea of civil society is based on a broad intellectual consensus that a 
society - and every individual therein – has the ability to liberate oneself from imposed 
political, economic and religious structures. In short, as a product of liberal, political 
but also societal and cultural emancipation, the conceptualisation of civil society 
remains an ongoing process.  
 
One of the first conceptual notions of civil society appeared in Aristotle under 
the term politike koinonia, (political society / community), which was later translated 
in Latin as societas civilis. Politike koinonia stood for a public ethical-political 
community of free and equal citizens under a legally defined system of rules. Law 
itself, however, was strongly interwoven with the perception of the virtues of society 
and the individual as such. It was seen as an expression of an ethos or, in other words, 
a common set of norms and values. The participation of citizens (with the exception of 
women and slaves) was therefore central to political decision-making (‗ruling and 
being ruled‘), further assuming that everyone shares the same set of goals based on a 
single way of life. Although the Aristotelian account did not distinguish between the 
state, market and society, it set in motion the idea that civil society was in and of itself 
a ‗good thing‘. Thus, it was precisely this normative approach and conception of civil 
society that shaped the tradition of European political philosophy and thought (Cohen 
and Arato 1994, pp. 83–86).  
 
The classical understanding that civil society was bound with the state remained 
well into the eighteenth century. To be a member of a civil society meant to be a 
citizen – a member of the state – and thus, obligated to act in accordance with its laws 
and without engaging in acts harmful to other citizens (Keane 1988, p. 35–36). The 
conceptualisation and philosophical usage of civil society experienced its first drastic 
shift during the period of the Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century. John 
Locke, often cited as the transitional figure in the early-modern reorientation of social 
thought, was amongst the first philosophers who understood civil society as an entity 
in its own right, thus co-existent to the state, but not yet as a separate sphere (Seligman 
2002, pp. 14–20). Following this, Enlightenment thinkers (such as Charles de 
Montesquieu, David Hume and Adam Smith) championed the idea of civil society but 
74 
 
dismissed the classical tradition of civic virtue, despite their admiration for its moral 
qualities (Hall 1995, p. 10). Shortly after, in the period from 1750 to 1850, various 
political thinkers (e.g. Kant, Ferguson, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Paine and Tocqueville) 
dwelled upon the subject of civil society and the limits of state action.  
 
The first clear distinction between civil society and the state originated during 
the time of the Scottish Enlightenment, but it also occurred in the Anglo-American 
world against the backdrop of the American Revolution. One of the leading thinkers 
was Thomas Paine, who believed in a naturally self-regulating society. Paine‘s 
Common Sense but also the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, all perceive society as the sole source of legitimate 
authority and juxtapose an individualistic, egalitarian society against government 
(Cohen and Arato 1994, p. 89). Probably one of the most fully developed accounts of 
civil society in this era can be found in Alexis de Tocqueville‘s De la démocratie en 
Amérique (1835 Volume I, 1840 Volume II). Tocqueville saw civil society as a form 
of politically active and independent association22; more precisely, life outside the 
household. Simply put, for Tocqueville these civic associations not only provide an 
opportunity for citizens to exchange views (e.g., free dissemination of news), but also 
serve as an autonomous platform to nurture civic virtue and to keep a close eye on the 
government. More generally, what was of major concern for all social theorists from 
the eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries was the positing of a unified vision of 
the social order that also recognized the legal, moral and economic autonomy of its 
component parts. The idea of civil society emerged at the beginning of this period as 
just such a solution (Seligman 2002, p. 27).   
 
With thinkers such as G.W. Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx – notwithstanding 
their sometimes conflicting philosophical viewpoints – the conceptualisation of civil 
society once more gained a new dimension. For Hegel, civil society cannot exist until 
the peoples have outgrown the Naturzustand (natural impulse), and in The Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right (1820), he argues that the individual gains freedom in the 
state. Seligman (2002, p. 25) interprets Hegel in the sense that he resolves civil society 
into the existent and ethical (universal) entity of the state, as opposed to Marx, who 
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 See in particular: Tocqueville, 1835, Volume 1, Chapter VII (pp. 191–198) and 1840, Volume II, 
Chapter VII (pp. 115–120).  
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resolves it into itself. For Marx, civil society develops only within the bourgeoisie, 
which is largely interlinked with the political society (or superstructure) and 
consequently disregards both. In his essay On the Jewish Question (1844, 234) he 
holds that: 
 
Only when real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an 
individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular 
work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his 
‗force propres‘ as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from 
himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been 
accomplished. 
 
Although known as a follower of Marx, Antonio Gramsci differed from Marxist 
viewpoints and developed his own ideas in his Prison Notebooks. In the ‗Organisation 
of National Societies‘ Gramsci distinguishes political society from civil society by 
explaining the latter as ―[…] the hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, 
exercised through so-called private organizations like the church, trade unions, or 
schools.‖ (p. 383) and continues that: ―it is above all in civil society that intellectuals 
exert their influence‖. As Michael Bratton (1994, p. 55) put it – Gramsci‘s political 
society is the embodiment of force and his civil society is the manufacturer of consent. 
Thus, Gramsci does not, in fact, acknowledge that in reality the political society and 
the civil society often overlap. Nevertheless, he emphasises the transformative, if not 
emancipatory, role of civil society. Rather than providing a balance to the government, 
civil society strives to reform the government to bring about fairer social relations 
(Verkoren and van Leeuwen, 2013, p. 161). 
 
That associations, clubs, churches and also the family can, and in fact do, 
promote antidemocratic and illiberal ideas was the horrible experience in the events 
before, during and after World War II. It was a vibrant and well-organised civil society 
that gave birth to and nurtured the Nazi movement in the Weimar Republic while, 
simultaneously, a high level of associational participation in pre-war Italy bred the 
votes for Mussolini. In challenging neo-Tocquevillean accounts of civil society, Sheri 
Berman discusses in detail how a robust civil society actually helped scuttle the 
twentieth century‘s most critical democratic experiment – Weimar Germany. She 
argues:  
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[…] Weimar‘s rich associational life provided a critical training ground for eventual Nazi 
cadres and a base from which the National Socialist German Workers‘ Party (NSDAP) 
could launch its Machtergreifung (seizure of power). Had German civil society been 
weaker, the Nazis would never have been able to capture so many citizens for their cause 
or eviscerate their opponents so swiftly. (1997, p. 401) 
 
In other words, it was during that time when the concept of civil society 
somewhat lost its idealistic flavour. In the aftermath of World War II, critical theorists 
questioned why people assemble in antidemocratic or even racist groups, as opposed to 
the more conservative or right-wing fraction of thinkers, who focused on how to 
contain such movements within the bounds of the law (Chambers 2002, pp. 100–105). 
It seems that the aftershock of World War II led Western civil societies to a more 
active experience of what it meant to be a member of a society, and not a pure 
ideological envisioning of it. In other words, civil society underwent a process of self-
actualisation, and normative discourses on state–society relations became secondary. 
Supported by the advancement of technology and the growing dissemination of news 
and new media, such civil activism was reflected in the anti-nuclear, anti-Vietnam and 
civil rights movements, as well as in various student protests and the 1968 revolution.  
 
The second major conceptual, as well as more visionary, transformation of the 
notion of civil society was largely due to dissident intellectuals in communist Eastern 
Europe. In an uproar against totalitarian regimes, revisionists, such as Jan Tesař, 
Václav Havel and György Konrád, expressed in various forms that the communist 
project was exhausted and would leave no room for human rights – as famously 
manifested in initiatives like KOR (Polish Workers‘ Defense Committee) or Charter 
77 (Keane 1998, pp. 19–23). Mary Kaldor perfectly summarises all these events by 
describing the conceptual transformation of the term around the year 1989 as: ―[…] a 
radical extension of political and personal rights, which led to the demand for 
autonomy, self-organisation or control over life and consequently arose as a global 
concept‖. (2003, p. 76) 
 
She further argues that these demands for transformation went beyond the state, 
and in that new civil society actors found it necessary and possible to make alliances 
across borders and to address not just the state, but international institutions as well.  
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At the same time, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, discourses on civil society 
were significantly shaped by Jürgen Habermas‘ accounts of communicative power and 
the public sphere. The latter is perceived by Habermas as the mediating sphere 
between the state and society (1986, pp. 231–236). He describes it as the domain of 
social life in which public opinion can be formed. Public opinion originated in places 
like coffee houses and salons or within the bourgeois society in the late eighteenth 
century. During the twentieth century, this free exchange of opinion climaxed through 
the vast dissemination of information in newspapers, periodicals and radio and TV 
programmes (and more recently also the internet). For Habermas, public opinion can 
be formed only if a public that ―engages in rational discussion exists‖ (1986, p. 232). 
Civil society is accordingly composed of more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organisations and movements. These movements are sensitive to societal 
concerns and resonate in the private sphere, to then be extended and transmitted to the 
public sphere (Habermas 1989, pp. 231–236; Habermas 1996, pp. 329–387). 
 
After the fall of communism, the 1990s came to be the golden era for civil 
society movements, associations and organisations, fuelling fruitful and vast debates 
on the role of non-governmental organisations in local, national and global spheres. 
The number, involvement and activities of INGOs (international non-governmental 
organisations) and CSOs expanded worldwide. This can be observed from the rapid 
increase of funds by OECD countries via NGOs. In 1985–1986, the funding provided 
amounted to USD 3.1 billion per year and increased to USD 6.7 billion in 1999 and 
USD 7.1 billion in 2001 (Debiel and Sticht 2005, p. 10). According OECD statistics 
from 2013, funding further increased to USD 19.3 billion in 2011.
23
 Civil society 
became a fashionable but also overused, political, philosophical and 
phenomenological tool-kit for exponents from the new left, to neo-liberal, to more 
conservative strands. The idea of civil society is often posited as a panacea while 
taking on many different meanings related to many different countries or regions.  
 
To sum up, the concept of civil society has attracted much attention in political 
theory and thought. In order to contest and discuss the consequences of applying such 
understandings to sub-Saharan African post-conflict countries, a broad definition of 
                                                 
23
 Data retrieved from OECD: http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-
reviews/Aid%20for%20CSOs%20Final%20for%20WEB.pdf, accessed 03.09.2014. As 
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how the term is presently approached in the West seems necessary. In this regard 
Christoph Spurk‘s (2010) definition is a very useful start as he finds some conceptual 
common ground in a general differentiation from the state/political, economic and 
private spheres. His characterises civil society as (2010, pp. 8–9): 
 
[…] a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and 
economic spheres, keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors 
are often complex and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary 
organizations – competing with each other and oriented to specific interests – that are not 
purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact 
in the public sphere. Thus, civil society is independent from the state and the political 
sphere, but is oriented toward and interacts closely with them.  
 
Seen from this perspective, civil society thus becomes the public realm between 
state, market and family. That this triangular interplay requires a healthy balance is 
one of the central points made by Chris Brown, who holds that (2000, p. 13):  
 
There is very little margin for error here – if the state is too extensive it will strangle civil 
society at birth, too weak and private institutions will compete for its role as provider of 
order; if people are too much involved in each other‘s lives then they will lose the sense of 
distance needed to preserve civility, too little involved and they become part of an 
atomised ―mass society.‖  
 
Hence there is a broad consensus that a suitable definition should draw a line 
between the realms of state, market and civil society, but still leave enough analytical 
and interpretational leeway for the ambiguities inherent in the concept. Above all, 
Lewis reminds us that (2001, p. 12):  
 
The concept of civil society contains within it the seeds of contradiction in being both 
unitary and divisive, and prescriptive and aspirational, but it nevertheless leads us to focus 
on changing structure and process. 
 
In this regard, this thesis will not understand civil society as a static conception 
but rather as a constantly evolving and ever-changing societal progression. That 
further implies that civil society is a process and not a result or endpoint. Such an 
approach helps to acknowledge the ambivalent nature of the term, concept and overall 
intellectual idea. Above all, one has to accept that every society (and in fact 
individual) forms a conglomerate of partly good and partly bad, positive and negative 
or constructive and destructive components or all of them together. This is of 
particular relevance when engaging with post-conflict societies in the context of the 
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many dynamics inherent in, but also caused by, peacebuilding and development 
processes.  
 
Nonetheless, the intention here is not to refrain from a broad and general 
working definition. On the contrary, some conceptual common ground is essential for 
the remainder of the thesis whose aim it is to examine the consequences of applying a 
liberal notion of civil society in the sub-Saharan African context. In reflection of the 
definitions and conceptual discourses delineated above, the concept of civil society as 
it emerged as an intellectual construct and idea of Western Enlightenment thought will 
be broadly defined and understood as: 
 
Independent from the state, political, private, and economic spheres but in 
close interaction with them; a domain of social life in which public opinion 
can be formed; and as a process and not an event.  
 
2.2. Definitional framings of civil society by the international community 
The above-depicted liberal notion and understanding of civil society shaped to a 
great extent the language of international peacebuilding and development actors in 
their attempts and efforts to strengthen and support the civil sphere. More generally, 
the events in and around 1989 have had not only a great impact on civil society 
formation and organisation - globally and locally - but also intensified civil society 
interactions with international fora, institutions and organisations. Initiatives like the 
World Alliance for Civic Participation (CIVICUS) serve as a case in point with 
respect to their global efforts to reinforce and support the ―virtual expansion of citizen 
participation in every region of the globe.‖24 Clearly, the growing dialogue with civil 
society actors but also their increased involvement led to a gradual norm diffusion of 
what and who civil society ought to be and do, be it within the boundaries of a single 
state or worldwide. Chapter 1 alluded to the promotion of a specific civil society 
landscape (based on the values of liberalism) by the international community in fragile 
states. Chapter 3 will further advance these arguments and critically reflect upon the 
specific instruments and frameworks that were put in place to strengthen, support, 
                                                 
24
 The overall idea behind CIVICUS is to create a global alliance of individuals and organisations which 
might strengthen civil society institutions, advocate for the cause of civil society among the world‘s 
decision-makers and stimulate dialogue among civil society organisations and across the non-profit 
business and public sectors. For more detailed information about the work and purpose of CIVICUS 
access: https://civicus.org/about-us-125/brief-history, last visit 21.01.2014. 
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evaluate and monitor civil society in fragile states. Beforehand, it is necessary to 
delineate and critically reflect upon how the concept is currently used and engrained in 
the language of the international (donor) community. Hence, this section will briefly 
outline how civil society is defined by some of the most central international actors 
engaged in peacebuilding and development processes within fragile states. 
 
Recently, many international organisations (and their respective policy and 
research departments) have started to build a bridge between scholarly research and 
policy-oriented analysis (as did universities with IOs). The World Bank, for instance, 
adopted a definition of civil society developed and disseminated by leading research 
institutes.25 As a result the Bank defines civil society as:  
 
(T)he wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, 
based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: 
community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous 
groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and 
foundations. 
 
The UNDP‘s Strategy on Civil Society and Civic Engagement uses a similar 
definition but explicitly stresses that civil society also constitutes citizens acting 
individually and collectively. Thus, by contrast to the World Bank‘s definition, civil 
society is not restricted to civic associations alone. In the same way, DfID‘s Civil 
Society Department emphasises that civil society is more than just NGOs and includes 
a wide range of actors (thereby listing more or less the same set of actors as we can 
find it in the World Bank‘s definition). Interestingly, CIVICUS‘ working definition is 
less detailed and perceives civil society as ―the arena, outside of the family, the state, 
and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations 
and institutions to advance shared interests. (…) citizen action should be voluntary, 
rather than through compulsion‖ (2013, p. 10). 
 
                                                 
25
 The Bank‘s website lists: University of California, University of Sussex, John Hopkins University, 
London School of Economics, CIVICUS, One World Network and Development Gateway, see: World 
Bank, Defining Civil Society, online source: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:24
4752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html, accessed 21.01.2014 
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All definitions, no matter how precise, extensive or vague, apply a liberal 
understanding of the concept. As the previous section has shown, liberalism is far 
from being monolithic in its philosophical positions and how civil society is 
understood and approached therein. Verkoren and van Leeuwen‘s (2013) critical 
discourse on civil society in contemporary peacebuilding perfectly illustrates this 
point. The authors identify two main analytical traditions with regards to how donors 
approach the civil sphere. The first one builds on the classical work of Tocqueville 
which, as outlined already in Section 2.1, underscores the importance of organised 
groups of citizens in maintaining peaceful social relations and a functioning 
democracy. In placing strong emphasis on the right to form civic associations, civil 
society is approached through the lens of associational life. Civil society serves as a 
watchdog but also strengthens democracy and thwarts any form of tyranny. The 
second one builds on more European-oriented traditions, reflecting the work of 
Gramsci and to a larger extent also Habermas in emphasising the transformative role 
of civil society and the active role citizens may have in shaping the character of their 
state. The main focus is on emancipating citizens in any given environment. For 
Verkoren and van Leeuwen, European institutions give more emphasis to 
emancipatory perspectives than American ones, although recently the American 
tradition has started to gain prominence in Europe as well (p. 161 et seq.). Their 
distinction seems to have a degree of traction. The World Bank, (perceived here as a 
donor based on an American intellectual model considering the dominant role of the 
US government therein), refers indeed mainly to organisational or associational forms 
of the civil sphere. By contrast, DfID‘s Civil Society Department‘s Operational Plan 
2011-2015 embraces both Tocqueville‘s and Gramsci‘s notions of civil society.. The 
plan states ―for lasting development and change, the UK Government recognises the 
value of a vibrant and active civil society‖ (2012, p. 2). The document highlights the 
words ―vibrant‖ and ―active‖ in bold which can be easily interpreted in two ways. For 
some, it may well resonate with an emancipatory notion of civil society in equating 
vibrant with transformative features. For others, civic associations (in Tocqueville‘s 
tradition) need to be active and vibrant in their role to represent civil interests and 
check on government actions. The UNDP‘s definition can be also characterised as  in 
between both intellectual traditions. Even though the focus is mainly on the various 
organisational forms civil society can take, their definition still leaves enough leeway 
for the individual being both part of and within the civil sphere. However, contrasting 
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definitional rhetoric with practical implementation, Chapter 3 and Parts II and III will 
make it more evident how donor language and funding allocations diverge. External 
support mainly targets more formalised actors i.e. CSOs or CBOs, thereby boosting 
instrumentalisation as well as depoliticisation processes affecting the civil sphere. This 
additionally explains why enthusiastic – yet often vague - donor language and 
definition do not always meet the expectations of proponents of a more transformative 
and emancipatory approach, in particular the alternative discourse school.  
 
2.3. Civil society in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Civil society as it evolved as an intellectual construct of the Occidental world, 
never really matched the realities of social and political life in equatorial Africa. The 
daily lives of Africans are informed by three distinct legacies: precolonial traditions 
and institutions; colonial economic, social, and administrative structures; and 
frameworks designed during the anticolonial struggle (Chazan 1993, pp.67 - 105). 
When compared to other non-Western regions (Asia, Latin America or the Middle 
East), the concept of civil society gains many additional complex layers from the 
impact of historical, political, cultural and economic characteristics and developments. 
In this sense, a descriptive and prescriptive focus on the potentials or promises of civil 
society in peacebuilding and development processes of sub-Saharan Africa risks a 
disregard for both the continuing stigmatisation of a century-long slave trade and the 
effects of colonial rule. In the case of West Africa, for instance, Hahonou and 
Pelckmans (2011) find that the legacy of slavery continues to shape present everyday 
lives of millions of citizens, as well as the political landscape in countries such as 
Benin, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria or Burkina Faso. 
Evoking slavery, they argue, brings shame and in some instances even leads to societal 
marginalisation. The quasi silence surrounding the issue of slavery and the impact it 
has had on contemporary state and society relations was also neglected by colonial 
administrations and by most postcolonial governments (pp. 144-145). During colonial 
rule, African societies were once again bereft of their own, self-created or ‗African‘ 
way of socio-cultural evolution. In Howell and Pearce's words (2002, p. 179): 
 
By carving up territory into distinct spheres of influence and subjugating diverse societies 
to external political domination, colonial powers were able to fragment and reconstitute 
the fabrics of pre-existing societies and reconstruct the physical boundaries of political 
order. The colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa sought to justify its rule through a 
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paternalistic discourse of civilizing modernization and racial superiority. Using 
missionaries and anthropologists to invent and classify ethnic categories and unify 
languages, the colonial rulers not only extended their hegemonic control but also reshaped 
the structure and consciousness of African society.  
 
Ethnic divisions, tribalism, clientilism and patrimonialism were fuelled and 
impelled by colonialism and consequently led to a severe fragmentation but also 
impoverishment of local societies. In turn, decolonisation resulted in more civil wars 
than ‗civil‘ societies. As initially argued by Mamdani (1996), upon independence, sub-
Saharan African societies continued to struggle with racial or ethnical privileges and 
unequal patterns of power and resource allocation as well as little tolerance for 
political opposition. Independence, in Mamdani‘s view, deracialised the state and its 
institutions but, surprisingly, not civil society. The latter, he argues, continued to be 
socially constructed based on racial and ethnic categories. Historically accumulated 
privileges, an urban / rural divide, and direct and indirect (customary) rule and law not 
only challenged democratisation processes later on but also fuelled ethnic tensions (pp. 
13-34).  
 
Strikingly, in post-conflict sub-Saharan Africa, most externally-steered efforts to 
bring about peace, democratisation and development in the region only marginally 
question the effects of century-long oppression when it comes to the (re)-construction 
and formation of local civil societies. Current societal configurations, as well as state-
society relations, are often not consistent with a Western notion of civil society that – 
ideally – contributes to a country‘s peacebuilding and development efforts by liberal 
means.  
 
With the risk of repeating what has already been stated in Chapter 1, it seems 
that the majority of peacebuilding and development literature (in both scholarly and 
practitioners‘ circles) studying the relationship between civil society and 
peacebuilding and development processes is detached from a considerable body of 
literature that generally questions the appropriation of the concept of civil society in 
non-Western environments (e.g.: Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chatterjee, 2004; Comaroff 
and Comaroff, 1999; Ferguson, 2006; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Harbeson, 
Rothschild and Chazan, 1994; Ikelegbe, 2001; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001; Lewis, 
2001; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005; Mamdani, 1996; Orvis, 2001). In alignment with 
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Mamdani, there is a continuous need in current practice and scholarship for an analysis 
of civil society (and in fact empirical enquiry) that allows understanding it in its actual 
formation, rather than as a promised agenda for change (1996, p. 19). With that said, 
the succeeding paragraphs critically review some of the main scholarly contributions 
as to how civil society in sub-Saharan Africa is conceptually approached. 
Subsequently, a matrix of local factors that shape and socially construct the civil 
sphere in (most) sub-Saharan will be introduced. This matrix will be of particular use 
in Parts II and III in order to explain how the social fabric and political culture of a 
country can aggravate depoliticisation effects during peacebuilding processes as well.  
 
Lewis‘ (2001) discussion on the usefulness of the term is a good starting point in 
recapitulating approaches towards civil society in the sub-Saharan African state. He is 
one of the few who dismantles and analyses civil society from four distinctive 
viewpoints in the African context. The first one approaches civil society as 
―prescriptive universalism‖ in that civil society serves as a normative idea aiming at 
strengthening and building democracies around the world. The second one describes 
civil society as a ―Western exceptionalism‖ and asserts that the concept emerged at a 
distinctive moment in European history and thus cannot be applied in the postcolonial 
African context. The third notion perceives civil society as an ―adaptive prescription‖, 
as the idea is potentially relevant to non-Western contexts but has to take on different 
meanings at the local level and should not, therefore, be applied too rigidly. The fourth 
position puts the whole debate into question and even goes so far as to cast doubt on 
its relevancy because of its use as an organising principle by colonial administrations. 
He concludes that civil society can have so many multiple meanings, ranging from an 
―all-purpose placeholder‖ to emerging aspirations of local level activists. His article 
therefore argues for an analysis of civil society as it actually exists, in order to 
understand its real characteristics and structures rather than prescribing them. His 
understanding clearly relates to a civil society in as opposed to a civil society for 
Africa model (see World Bank 2007), and it is here where the matrix of local factors 
will further advance this approach.  
 
By contrast, for other scholars civil society is simply non-existent in the sub-
Saharan African context. To give a few examples, in the early 1990s Harbeson et al., 
(1994, pp. 1–2) built on the hypothesis that:  
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(…) civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states 
and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy 
relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African 
governments a generation ago.  
 
Quite similarly, Chabal and Daloz (1999, p. 21) perceive civil society as an 
―illusion‖ in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa and argue that the state is so poorly 
institutionalised, so weakly emancipated from society, that there is very little scope for 
conceptualising politics as a contest between a functionally strong state and a 
homogeneously coherent civil society. By drawing on the examples of Kenya and 
Zambia, Bratton (1994, pp. 64–71) considers civil society as necessary for political 
transitions in sub-Saharan Africa. He nevertheless concludes on a less positive note by 
stating that (1994, p. 71): 
 
[T]here is a strong likelihood that political regimes will re-emerge in African countries in 
which inter elite dynamics drive decision-making and in which popular forces and 
organizations are again systematically excluded. The ascendancy of civil society may 
prove to be short-lived, and any popular upsurge may be followed quickly by widespread 
citizen disillusionment with the return of politics as usual.  
 
Even if unintentionally, all these accounts indirectly contrast the regulation of 
social and political life in postcolonial Africa with state society relations as we 
encounter them in the West, thereby mirroring what Lewis (2001) categorized as the 
prescriptive approach. In this perspective, civil society is once again understood as a 
normative, if not even hypothetical, construct that ought to achieve or contribute to 
something. This is unfortunate, as ―different circumstances produce different 
meanings‖ (Jenkins 2001, p. 251). Next to the essential question of whether civil 
society exists in sub-Saharan Africa (or whether it is a missing key, illusion or non-
existent), it is equally important to ask what being an African citizen in the twenty-
first century actually means and involves. This goes hand in hand with Allen‘s 
observation, who finds that civil society in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be merely an 
ideological construct (1997, p 337): 
 
[A]part from the grant-seeking NGOs and the academic, it is proponents of the ‗liberal 
project‘ who need civil society: western governments, their associated agencies, 
multinationals, and IFIs. Africanists can dispense with it: ‗civil society‘ forms part of a 
large body of general concepts that have appeared briefly to illuminate analysis but which 
are too diffuse, inclusive and ideologically laden to sustain illumination: nation building, 
modernisation, elite, dependency, disengagement – even, perhaps, ethnicity.  
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Allen‘s statement gives rise to certain questions; for example, to what extent is 
civil society artificially constructed or instrumentalised by external actors through 
specific funding schemes, capacity building programmes or training targeting local 
civic associations/organisations (see Chapter 3 of the thesis)? To what degree does 
civil society emerge organically – that is to say, in its own formation, manner and pace 
(see Chapter 7 of the thesis)?  
 
It seems important to note at this point, however, that local actors do not 
necessarily disregard external influence and support for CSOs. Thus, recalling Lewis‘ 
(2001) adaptive approach, appropriating a Westernised concept of civil society is not 
necessarily perceived negatively among local actors. To give an example, during a 
workshop organised by the International Peace Institute (IPI), seven civil society 
activists from the Great Lakes Region raised the concern that: 
 
Many governments in the Great Lakes Region view the work of CSOs with suspicion and 
sometimes subject civil society leaders to severe harassment and intimidation. States often 
create barriers by constructing laws to insulate their actions from scrutiny or to curtail 
CSO activities. In some cases, civil society leaders are labelled agents of foreign interests 
or proxies of political opposition in order to justify hostile action from the government. 
(2004, p 1) 
 
It is worth noting that local CSOs also sometimes disregard national elites or 
governments for following and implementing Westernised agendas or priority plans - 
frequently with regards to economic revitalisation and natural resources management. 
Lumumba-Kasongo (2005) further contends that it is not that Africans would not 
appreciate the ideas or principles of liberal democracies, but it‘s that the process of 
creating rules, norms and institutionalisation has been hijacked by the political elite. In 
his view, this democracy and its processes have not been able to address the core 
issues of African societies, such as the equitable distribution of resources, social 
justice, employment, gender equality and individual and collective rights (2005, p. 
202). This has led to a new form of imperialism and, ironically, in some instances even 
resulted in a nostalgia about colonial rule. The exact same observation has also been 
made by Easterly (2007, p. 237), who refers to a comparable nostalgia with regards to 
minority white regimes in Zimbabwe.  
 
Lastly, the triple legacy of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial times severely 
shaped the dynamics and formation of local political culture, which in turn challenges 
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democratic transitions after independence. Recalling Chapter 1‘s definition of the 
concept, political culture is understood here as a people‘s predominant beliefs, values, 
ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the 
role of the self in that system (Almond and Verba 1963, Diamond 1994). Moreover, 
political culture - like identity - has to be approached in the plural. In the absence of 
examples of genuine state consolidation in the sub-Saharan African context, political 
culture patterns have come to reflect differing degrees of stateness over history, space 
and time. This has further resulted in various forms of state society-relations in the 
region (Chazan, 1993, pp. 67 - 105). Seen from this perspective, Ekeh‘s (1975) famous 
two publics of the bifurcated state are still very much alive (see also Chapter 4). In his 
influential essay ―Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement‖ he presents the argument that colonialism led to the creation of two distinct 
publics – the primordial and the civic. Their dialectic relationship shaped the civil 
sphere of colonial and later on also post-colonial African states. It is worth repeating, 
that Ekeh associates the primordial public with a pre-colonial societal order, values, 
traditions and belief systems. The civic public, on the other hand, refers to the societal 
order introduced by colonial administration and ideologies. Thus, the bifurcated state 
emerged out of the complex relationship between the two publics in that ―colonial 
ideologies of legitimation denigrated African societies and cultures and glorified 
European colonial rule, while African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation accepted 
colonial ideas and principles to justify the leadership of the elites in the fight against 
colonialism and the inheritance of the postcolonial state‖ (Mentan 2010, p. 187). 
Contemporary sub-Saharan Africa sustains a variety of political cultures while 
struggling to establish a public and political realm based on the liberal societal 
moralities of the West. In other words, present attempts to restructure the foundations 
of the relationship of official organs and institutions and the civil (legitimising) sphere 
in peacebuilding and development processes face at least two distinct political cultures 
on the ground. The first one can be described as a ‗still to be constructed‘ liberal 
political culture through the institutional reformation processes based on liberal ideals. 
It is the political culture of the future - a normative and constantly evolving construct, 
to be instituted and socially engrained in the course of the peacebuilding and 
development process. The second one is a persisting (in some instances, however, 
slowly fading) political culture - a (by)-product of precolonial and colonial times. It is 
shaped by the cultural matrix of the civil sphere in present sub-Saharan Africa as it 
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emerged over the past centuries. As a result peacebuilding and development efforts are 
confronted with several points of intersection of different political cultures within the 
realm of the civil sphere. It remains to be further explored in the scope of the thesis, 
what kind of frictions or new opportunities these intersections create for local post-
conflict societies? Chapter 7 will revert to this point.  
 
To summarise, it has been argued that civil society in sub-Saharan African post-
conflict countries represents much more than a normative and terminological fad. 
Chapters 1 and 2, but also later-presented findings from interviews conducted in Sierra 
Leone which are assessed and discussed at length in Parts II and III, informed the 
following matrix of factors to better approach and contextualise (most) sub-Saharan 
African civil societies. These include26:  
 Slave trade and colonial legacy 
 Urban versus rural areas 
 Local versus elite ownership  
 Influence and support of IOs and INGOs 
 Neo-patrimonial networks and chiefdom systems 
 Ethnic and religious organisation and religious leaders (including belief 
systems and magic) 
 Intergenerational power imbalances 
 Gender relations and equality  
 Cultural identities 
 Life circumstances (e.g. living conditions, health, nutrition, education) 
 
The above list represents a matrix of local factors that shape and socially 
construct the values, beliefs and orientations of the civil sphere in (most) sub-Saharan 
African states. In essence, it can uncover a lot about the political culture operating 
behind, next to, in opposition to and at times even in conjunction with a liberal 
political culture that informs peacebuilding and development process. All of the above 
listed factors will inform the historical and empirical discussions of Parts II and III of 
                                                 
26
 This list is, of course, far from being extensive and the author does not exclude the fact that there is 
room for improvement. Hence this chapter reserves the rights to further amend these factors in the 
course of future research projects and critical examinations.  
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the thesis. They are essential aspects to consider in illuminating how political voice 
(from the civil sphere) is socially engineered but often not articulated via more 
traditional forms of civil society formation and civic association in a Tocqueville 
tradition - that is, a constantly growing political associational life or CSO landscape. 
Section 3.1 in Chapter 3 and Part II will further expand on this point and elaborate 
how in Sierra Leone CSOs have become instrumentalised, if not depoliticised, to serve 
a broader liberal peacebuilding and development agenda. At the same time, it is 
expected that the matrix helps avoiding a too deterministic perception of Sierra 
Leone‘s civil society, which can vary across the country and ethnicities. It basically 
lays the groundwork in the search for alternatives to advance our understanding of 
post-conflict civil societies in the sub-Saharan African region, while still leaving 
enough leeway for local and cultural particularism (be it at village, community, district 
or country level).  
 
Conclusion 
While Chapter 1 highlighted some of the most recurring theoretical problems 
and challenges in strengthening the civil sphere in non-Western fragile states, this 
chapter sought to fill in a conceptual gap in current peacebuilding and development 
literature: It expounded why a classical Western liberal-individualist model of civil 
society is continuously challenged by cultural particularism within fragile states 
outside the Occidental world. Any theoretical (mis-) usage, so it was suggested, has to 
be carefully questioned and re-examined. The argument that the nature of civil society 
in post-war sub-Saharan Africa can be understood only through a local lens is of 
course not entirely new (e.g.: Ferguson 2006; Jenkins 2001; Lewis 2001, Mamdani 
1996). By contrast, the positive but also negative effects as well as consequences of 
appropriating westernised/liberal, normative and/or prescriptive notions of civil 
society to the region remain less explored – in peacebuilding and development theory 
as well as in practice (Datzberger 2015a, forthcoming).  
 
Correspondingly, the chapter highlighted how the diffusion of norms, that is to 
say, how a liberal interpretation of the concept of civil society, became the operational 
and definitional baseline for many leading IOs and other international actors engaging 
in the rebuilding or fragile states. Yet, as the last section of this chapter pointed out, 
there is clearly a need to shift settled modes of thinking and acknowledge that 
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constantly changing meanings of civil society have to be placed in a historical, 
contemporary and local context. This highlights the need to take into account local 
characteristics that are already part of, and grounded in, existing experiences. Even 
though some scholars find the concept of civil society rather inaccurate for the sub-
Saharan African region, the thesis holds that civil society does exist, though in its own 
specific societal configurations and organisational (and political) formations. Such an 
approach requires respect for historical, cultural, structural and ideological 
characteristics. It also recognises that civil society encompasses much more than an 
institutionalised, officially registered associational life in a Tocqueville understanding 
and tradition (e.g. CSOs or NGOs often in collaboration with INGOs or other external 
actors). It not only opens up the space for alternative approaches but also gives rise to 
several new questions. For instance, how has the war and peacebuilding and 
development process changed the concept/formation of civil society in Sierra Leone 
(see Chapters 5 and 6)? How is civil society ―artificially‖ (re-)constructed if not 
instrumentalised by external peacebuilding and development actors (see Chapter 6)? 
Does it merge or further deepen the gaps of a bifurcated political culture of the civil 
sphere (see Chapter 7)? Either way, how is political voice socially engineered at the 
local level (see Chapters 6 and 7)? How can these voices be better heard and reflected 
in the peacebuilding, democratisation and development process of a country as a 
whole? All these questions will be addressed in Parts II and III of the thesis. They are 
concomitant with the empirical puzzle of the thesis to examine the paradox of why the 
Sierra Leonean civil society landscape (in the form of CSOs) seems to be gradually 
depoliticised - despite numerous efforts by the international community to actually 
strengthen it. To further substantiate this claim, Chapter 3 will depict some of the 
technical and practical dimensions of present peacebuilding and development to 
engage with the civil sphere. After a critical assessment of international frameworks to 
support civil societies in fragile states, it will outline how the thesis attempts to 
analytically and methodologically explain the depoliticisation effects of a liberal 
peacebuilding and development agenda in the case of Sierra Leone.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Civil society actors and functions 
in peacebuilding and development practice 
 
 
In setting out the theoretical scene for the empirical Part II, Chapter 1 identified 
the issue of depoliticisation as an under-researched and assessed phenomenon when it 
comes to studies about civil society in peacebuilding and development processes. 
Chapter 2 then argued that a westernised usage of civil society needs to be re-
negotiated in the non-Occidental world. It elaborated how the cultural matrix and 
socio-historical fabrics of a society differ from liberal idea(l)s and why this should not 
be overlooked when it comes to assess why the Sierra Leonean civil society landscape 
is at risk to of being gradually depoliticised. Chapter 3 sets out how the thesis will 
analytically and methodologically examine this phenomenon in Part II.  
 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will first provide an overview of the technical and practical 
dimensions in strengthening the civil sphere. In charting the most prominent 
international engagement mechanisms targeting civil societies in fragile states these 
sections will put forward one central point. Namely, in the realms of peacebuilding 
and development, civil society emerged as an output (= an actor to be strengthened) 
thereby serving a particular outcome (= function e.g.: democratisation, mainstreaming 
gender equality and human rights or sustainable development). Civil society not only 
became a partner to be taken seriously by the international donor community, but also 
surfaced as an indicator to measure the ―effectiveness‖ of peacebuilding and 
development interventions on the ground. Externally introduced monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) mechanisms increasingly impact and shape the formation of local 
civil society landscapes in fragile states. Over time, civil society has become an object 
of reconstruction based on a liberal agenda for development and peace (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1). This has led to a gradual conversion of the civil sphere into an 
operational baseline for externally steered objectives and interventions. As Howell and 
Pearce put it (2001, p.117): ―Civil society strengthening programs, civil society units, 
advisers, partnership projects – all these attempts to operationalize and put into 
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practice civil society – reflect the underlying ‗instrumentalization‘ of civil society.‖ In 
other words, Chapter 3 expounds how local civil society actors became a means to an 
end in being strengthened and capacitated to ultimately provide functions that serve a 
national (but not necessarily local) peacebuilding and development agenda in fragile 
states. Against this backdrop, Section 3.3 will elaborate on two simple yet important 
questions for the remainder of the thesis. Firstly, which actors is it exactly who ought 
to be strengthened, (re-)built or (re-)constructed based on a Western and liberal notion 
of civil society? Secondly, what functions, activities and tasks are these actors usually 
expected (and funded) to carry out and perform? In addressing these questions, it is the 
overall objective of this chapter to explain and outline how actors- and functional-
oriented approaches are combined, used and applied to examine the thesis research 
question in the case of Sierra Leone. 
 
3.1. International frameworks to support civil society in peacebuilding and 
development practice 
Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 advanced the argument that civil societies in non-
Western fragile states are subject 
to (re-)construction based on the 
values of liberalism. At the same 
time the peacebuilding and 
development (policy and 
research) community reached a 
broad consensus that civil 
society is an important key actor 
in the transition from fragility to 
peace and prosperity. The 
constantly increasing attention 
towards the civil sphere is also noticeable in the concomitant amounts of funds from 
institutions like the World Bank, U.N. or DfID (see Section 1.1). The OECD-DAC 
Graph (2011) on the above reinforces the earlier figures in illustrating how funding 
channelled through CSOs increased by proverbial leaps and bounds from 2001-2009.  
 
At the international level, the space for civil society in fragile states was 
widened significantly within donor policy and practice after the High Level Aid 
Graph 1:  
93 
 
Effectiveness forum in Paris (2005) and subsequent meetings in Accra (2008) and 
Busan (2011). The first two outcome documents are known as the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the AAA - Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Currently 
there are 137 countries (incl. territories) and 28 International Organisations27 adhering 
to the Paris Declaration and AAA. In total, 14 INGOs or CSOs28 were present at the 
high level forum in Paris. In the main, these instruments can be seen as guiding 
principles for the majority of donors and institutions in their peacebuilding and 
development assistance. Although both stress the need to strengthen the engagement 
with CSOs, the OECD was not satisfied with this vague approach and further pushed 
the issue. In critiquing the Paris Declaration, as well as the AAA, for not fully 
recognising the potential of the civil sphere in developmental processes, it responded 
to this void with an extensive volume entitled Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness 
(2009). In one of its recommendations, the OECD urges the multi-stakeholder 
community to ensure that CSOs are as effective as possible at what they do, both as 
development actors and as aid actors more specifically. In order to achieve a certain 
degree of effectiveness it emphasises the need for ‗recognition and voice‘ in the view 
that CSOs are frequently not perceived as (2009, p. 13): 
 
(…) development actors in their own right, with their own priorities, programmes and 
partnership arrangements. It [the Paris Declaration & AAA] thus failed to take into 
account the rich diversity of players in a democratic society and failed to recognise the 
full range of roles played by CSOs as development actors and change agents. 
 
The OECD report was successful to some extent. Next to other (non-OECD) 
initiatives, it influenced the agenda of the 4
th
 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
                                                 
27
 These include: African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest, Economic Commission for Africa, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
GAVI Alliance, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Organisation of the 
Francophonie, Millenium Campaign, Nordic Development Fund, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, OPEC Fund for International Development, United Nations 
Development Group, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
Council of Europe Development Bank, Education for All Fast Track Initiative, European Investment 
Bank, Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Inter-American Development Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, New Partnership for Africa‘s Development, 
Organization of American States, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, World Bank; 
28
 These include: Africa Humanitarian Actions, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Comité catholique 
contre la faim et pour le développement, Comisión Económia (Nicaragua), EURODAD, Japan NGO 
Center for International Cooperation, Tanzania Social and Economic Trust, AFRODAD, Canadian 
Council for International Cooperation, Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la 
Solidarité, ENDA Tiers Monde, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
Reality of Aid Network, and UK Aid Network.  
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(HLF-4), which took place between 29 November - 1 December 2011, in Busan, South 
Korea. In an initial draft of the outcome document, it was stated under point 19 
(OECD 2011, p 9):  
 
a) Civil society organisations play a vital role in shaping development policies and 
new partnerships, overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in 
areas that are complementary to or go beyond those provided for by states. 
Recognising this, we will:  
b) Implement fully our respective commitments to enable civil society organisations 
to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus 
on an enabling environment that maximises the contributions of CSOs to 
development.  
c) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their own effectiveness, 
accountability and contribution to development results, guided by the Istanbul 
CSO Development Effectiveness Principles.  
 
Interestingly, the final version of the outcome document, known as the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (1.12.2013), did not include point 
19. Nonetheless, CSOs are for the first time officially recognised as full and equal 
participants next to traditional donors, governments or South-South co-operations, 
BRICS or private actors. In particular, paragraph 16 states: ―A growing range of actors 
– including middle-income countries, partners of South-South and triangular co-
operation and civil society organisations – have joined others to forge a broader, more 
inclusive agenda since Paris and Accra, embracing their respective and different 
commitments alongside shared principles.‖ Besides, as Weijer and Kilnes (2012, p.4) 
highlight, the acknowledgment of an increased role for CSOs was also heavily lobbied 
for by civil society itself.  
 
It is noteworthy, that the HLF-4 in Busan officially created more potential space 
for civil society in the context of fragile states. A new partnership, the New Deal, was 
established by an inclusive coalition of fragile states, donor countries and civil society 
(in total over 40 countries and organisations are part of the New Deal‟s ‗International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding‘). Despite already existing commitments 
through the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the 
New Deal emerged out of the recognition that current ways of working in the specific 
context of fragile states need improvement. In 2013, one in four people in the world 
still live in countries affected by conflict, fragility and/or violence. It is estimated that, 
by 2015, half of the world‘s people living on less than USD 1.25 a day will live in 
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fragile states (The Washington Communiqué on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 
19.04.2013). The initiative‘s own website describes the New Deal as ―an innovative 
framework that identifies key peace- and statebuilding priorities and supports country 
owned and country led transitions from fragility and conflict to peace and 
development‖.29 As for civil society, the New Deal‟s key document recognises that ―an 
engaged public and civil society, which constructively monitors decision-making, is 
important to ensure accountability‖ (p. 2). It further stresses the need for capacity 
building of civil society and promotes a country-owned vision and plan in close 
consultation with civil society actors.30  
 
Upon closer examination it is evident that the New Deal re-invents the wheel as 
opposed to offering a novel approach towards the civil sphere in fragile states. Its 
specific focus on conflict-affected countries notwithstanding, it does not differ from 
earlier instruments for engagement with civil societies in peacebuilding and 
development processes, as promoted inter alia by the U.N., the OECD, DfID or the 
World Bank. To give an example, point II (p.2) of the key outcome document 
stipulates that there should be one national vision and one plan to transition out of 
fragility. ―This vision and plan will be country-owned and –led, developed in 
consultation with civil society and based on inputs from the fragility assessment.‖31 
Language promoting inclusiveness can also be found in much earlier frameworks such 
as the IMF‘s and World Bank‘s PRSPs or in the strategic frameworks for 
peacebuilding of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Taking into account 
its fairly recent launch, it remains to be seen how and whether the New Deal will make 
an impact on strengthening the civil sphere in fragile states.32  
 
3.2. Measuring civil society’s effectiveness in peacebuilding and development 
practice  
Taken as a whole, international frameworks engaging with civil society in 
fragile states are generally occupied with three main aspects: inclusiveness; capacity 
                                                 
29
 See: www.newdeal4peace.org, last visit 26.11.2013 
30
 The document can be downloaded at: http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-
content/themes/newdeal/docs/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf, last visit 26.11.2013 
31
 See: http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/themes/newdeal/docs/new-deal-for-engagement-in-
fragile-states-en.pdf, last visit 30. 11. 2013 
32
 See also Weijer and Klines (2012, pp. 4-5) for critical reflection of how civil society is approached in 
the scope of the New Deal. 
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building; and effectiveness. While operating on a liberal paradigm as to how civil 
societies ought to be (re-)constructed and strengthened, all three aspects are also 
deeply intertwined. Inclusiveness (or as the OECD put it ―recognition and voice‖) 
depends largely on the capacity of civil society thereby impinging on the effectiveness 
of these actors on the ground. Peacebuilding and development practice of the past 
three decades has shown, however, that this is much easier said than done. Despite 
international aid-effectiveness frameworks, experts within and outside the 
development community are still frequently complaining about how inefficiently and 
inadequately donor money is eventually spent (e.g.: Easterly, 2007; Hanlon et.al., 
2010; Moyo, 2009; Pollman, 2010a, 2010b, ). The Busan HLF-4 talks partly addressed 
these criticisms and focused, in one of their numerous thematic issue sessions, 
exclusively on accountability and ownership.33 However, the devil often lies in the 
detail and in the particular case of the HLFs (from Paris to Accra and Busan) the detail 
is in the word ―effectiveness‖. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term 
effectiveness as ―the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired 
result‖.34 The crunch question, though, is: what is a desired result and for whom? As 
for now, almost all Western donors, institutions or agencies measure effectiveness 
through key variables relating to outputs and outcomes which are expected to lead to a 
desired impact (again, mainly based on a liberal agenda). UNDEF (United Nations 
Democracy Fund), for instance, operates with a logical framework mapping the logical 
path from activities (=outputs) through intended objectives (=outcomes) to anticipated 
impacts (medium and long term). Their approach is similar to other U.N. funds (e.g. 
UNPBF) and leading development assistance institutions or INGOs. In the realm of 
civil society in fragile states, the outputs (meaning project or programme activities), 
can range from capacity building, to various training sessions or in-country 
consultation events, among others. It is noteworthy that M&E frameworks already 
surfaced long before the Busan HLF-4. M&E was promoted since the early 1990s, as a 
new domain and toolkit to measure the effectiveness of donors, their implementation 
partners and beneficiaries‘ activities alike. According to the UNDP Handbook for 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results (2009, p.181):  
 
                                                 
33
 The practical as well as theoretical contradictions of local ownership were already pointed out in 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.2) and shall therefore not be further subject to debate. 
34
 See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/effectiveness, last visit 2.12.2013 
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Each monitoring and evaluation activity has a purpose. UNDP places great importance on 
monitoring and evaluation because, when done and used correctly, they strengthen the basis for 
managing for results, foster learning and knowledge generation in the organization as well as the 
broader development and evaluation community, and support the public accountability of UNDP. 
(Emphasis in original) 
 
In this light, civil society too has become part of the log-frame and emerged as 
an object of measurement based on predetermined outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
After the HLF-3 in Accra, an Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness was set 
up in September 2010 with the intention to (outcome document, 2011, p 2):  
 
(…) create a shared framework of principles that defines effective CSO development 
practice and elaborates the minimum standards for an enabling environment for CSOs, 
while at the same time promoting civil society‘s essential role in the international 
development system. 
 
The final version, officially known as The 8 Principles for CSO Development 
Effectiveness, provides the foundation for the International Framework for CSO 
Development Effectiveness, which was endorsed in June 2011 at the 2
nd
 Global 
Assembly of the Open Forum in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The 8 Principles are the result 
of an extensive worldwide consultation process with thousands of civil society 
organisations (national, regional and thematic consultations), undertaken by civil 
society itself.35 According to the Istanbul Principles for CSO development 
effectiveness (2010), CSOs are effective as development actors when they:  
 
a) Respect and promote human rights and social justice 
b) Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women‘s and girl‘s rights 
c) Focus on people‘s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation 
d) Promote environmental sustainability 
e) Practice transparency and accountability 
f) Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity 
g) Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning 
h) Commit to realizing positive sustainable change  
 
The Istanbul Principles, as well as the OECD (2009, p.16), further hold that the 
effectiveness of civil society depends largely on the enabling environment and 
policies. For the OECD, particular elements worthy of attention include: the regulatory 
and legislative environment; the openness of government and donors to engaging with 
CSOs, the transparency and accountability with which information is shared; and the 
                                                 
35
 For more detailed information access the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness website: 
http://cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles,067, last visit 2.12.2013 
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CSO community‘s own collective mechanisms for self-monitoring, accountability and 
collaboration (ibid. p.16). Clearly, the Istanbul Principles as well as the OECD operate 
on a Western and liberal notion of civil society. They target civil society as actors who 
ought to contribute, and manifest pre-determined long-term impacts based on a liberal 
agenda frequently implemented in non-Occidental fragile states.  
 
On the positive side, M&E frameworks or principles to measure the 
effectiveness of civil society enhance the transparency of interventions to re-build or 
strengthen the civil sphere. What is probably even more important for researchers and 
analysts alike, they also generate new knowledge about peacebuilding and 
development processes and the role of civil society therein. Greater accountability in 
the form of M&E frameworks or principles of effectiveness comes at a price, however. 
In the case of peacebuilding and development assistance the costs are amplified 
technocracy and bureaucracy. Chapter 6 illuminates in greater detail how in the case of 
Sierra Leone many local CSOs are repeatedly challenged by external bureaucratic 
structures, log-frames and administrative procedures. In most cases these also differ 
from donor to donor. In addition, evaluation mechanisms promote a specific landscape 
of and for civil society with little leeway for a more organic and culturally embedded 
progression stemming from the local civil sphere. In order to ensure their very own 
survival and continued existence, local CSOs are expected to generate specific 
outcomes in order to obtain funding for future projects. This not only creates a great 
deal of pressure but also pushes CSOs towards a more strategic approach in their 
activities and areas of engagement. Frequently, this occurs at the cost of greater 
flexibility in their agenda setting, local political culture and daily procedures.  
 
Despite the creation of universal frameworks on the effectiveness of CSOs in 
fragile states, donor organisations still vary in their enthusiasm for civil society and in 
their purposes for which they use the concept. In contrasting the approaches of donors 
such as USAID, World Bank, UNDP, DfID, and the INGO CIVICUS, Howell and 
Pearce (2001, pp. 89-122) discuss at length how civil society is ―manufactured‖ from 
the outside. Each donor, they contend, has its own route towards engaging with the 
civil sphere thereby creating its own politics. Even though donor agencies differ in 
their strategies and in the breadth of actors with which they operate, ―they all tend to 
define civil society in terms of long or short lists of organizations that have the effect 
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of depoliticizing, sanitizing, and technicising the arena of association‖ (p. 113). They 
further hold, ―for most donors civil society is a means to an end – be that 
democratization, economic growth, or sustainable development – rather than an end in 
itself. It is thus reduced to a technical exercise of coordination, cooperation, and joint 
effort, depoliticised and neutralized‖ (p. 117).  
 
To recapitulate, Sections 3.1 – 3.2 as well as Chapter 1, have elaborated that 
depoliticisation effects can occur as a consequence of liberal peacebuilding and 
development practice and engagement with civil society. They further explained how 
M&E mechanisms and pre-determined outputs and outcomes can reinforce this effect. 
This is still a marginalised topic in current research and only a few authors have 
started to push the issue of depoliticisation to the fore (i.e. Goetschel and Hagmann, 
2009; Howell and Pearce, 2002; Verkoren and van Leeuwen, 2012). However, apart 
from locating causal explanations in the effects of external interventionism and in the 
way the international community approaches the civil sphere, there is no further 
exploration of how local factors that may further aggravate this phenomenon. This is 
surprising. Findings from interviews in Sierra Leone revealed (see Chapters 5 and 6), 
the issue of depoliticisation is far more complex than being caused by external 
interventionism alone. Concretely, the social fabrics, the history of state formation and 
above all the political culture should not be overlooked. Section 3.3 of this Chapter 
will therefore suggest an analytical and methodological framework (to be later applied 
in the exploratory case study of Sierra Leone in Part II) in order to identify and 
elaborate on locally and socio-historically rooted factors that additionally fortify the 
depoliticisation of the civil sphere. In short, Section 3.3 introduces an actor- and 
functional oriented framework to assess the depoliticisation effects that occur in the 
scope of peacebuilding and development processes in fragile states. Ultimately, this is 
done in the search for alternative approaches and entry points to strengthen and 
support civil societies in non-Occidental fragile states. It is also expected to provide 
insights into how political voice and influence stemming from the civil sphere is 
socially and locally constituted.  
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3.3. Civil society actors and functions in current peacebuilding and development 
practice 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 pointed out that civil society is generally assessed as an 
actor (beyond and including CSOs), carrying out specific functions in the 
peacebuilding and development process of a country, be it to evaluate their 
effectiveness, or their potential to build peace and sustain development. It seems worth 
repeating that the thesis‘ focus is not on the effectiveness or what civil society has to 
contribute to peace and development of a country as a whole. Instead, it looks at how 
civil society is currently (re)constructed or ―manufactured‖ (Howell and Pearce, 2001) 
in post-conflict countries and to what kind of unintended consequences this may lead. 
Ironically, in the quest for alternative approaches towards re-building civil societies in 
sub-Saharan African fragile states, the thesis cannot refrain from actor-oriented and 
functional approaches either. Both perspectives are required to examine how and why 
the civil society landscape is at risk of being gradually de-politicised in the 
peacebuilding and development process of Sierra Leone. With the discussions of 
Chapter 2 in mind, it is essential to get a firm grasp of which actors ought to be 
strengthened, (re)built or (re)constructed based on a Western and liberal notion of civil 
society. In other words, who are the typical actors and partners in crime for the 
international donor community? Moreover, what functions, activities and tasks are 
these actors carrying out and why? This is not to suggest that an actors and functional 
oriented approach is not limited in one way or another. For this reason the ensuing 
sections will briefly develop the following:  
 How actor‘s and functional approaches emerged in sociology and influenced 
peacebuilding and development research and practice 
 The strengths and weaknesses of both approaches 
 How they are going to inform, methodologically and analytically, Part II and 
Part III of the thesis.   
 
Broadly speaking, actor-oriented frameworks enhance the understanding of the 
characteristics of civil society in fragile states, whereas functional approaches are 
useful in the attempt to classify their activities during the peacebuilding and 
development process. If combined, both perspectives can inform in much greater detail 
a ‗civil society in Africa model‘ as opposed to ‗a civil society for Africa model‘ (see 
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for instance World Bank, 2007) and consequently examine the real characteristics and 
structures of local civil societies rather than prescribing them. They help us to 
understand several central aspects of social phenomena inherent in peacebuilding and 
development processes. On the one hand, an actor-oriented perspective opens up the 
space for local voice but also the question of who it actually is that belongs to civil 
society (formally and informally). Hence, it offers a more thorough understanding of 
the how characteristics differ from a Western idea(l) of civil society. The functional 
perspective, on the other hand, enables us to identify the various areas of engagement 
of civil society actors. Here it is interesting to further look at the extent to which these 
activities are navigated (or not) by the international donor community and INGOs and 
how they shape present civil society landscapes and their political culture. It should be 
noted at this juncture, that within the various subfields of social science, actors- and 
functional oriented approaches are explained, understood, used and interpreted 
differently. Both perspectives can serve a wide range of epistemological interests and 
also differ in the way they are methodologically operationalised. For instance, in 
sociology, an actor- and functional oriented perspective could be applied to shed light 
on the interplay of how religion (as a function) can strengthen social bonds among 
individuals and collectives (as actors) in a society. In the scope of the thesis, a 
combination of both approaches is used to explain and better understand the complex 
process of rebuilding and strengthening conflict-shattered civil societies. The 
subsequent Sections 3.4.1 – 3.4.6 dwell upon how actors- and functional approaches 
are going to inform the analytical framework of Part II and why it is necessary to 
highlight, identify and critically reflect upon some of the unintended consequences 
that occur in ongoing efforts to re-build civil spheres in fragile states.  
 
3.3.1. An actor-oriented perspective of civil society in peacebuilding and 
development processes. 
The roots of an actor-oriented analysis stretch back to Max Weber‘s 
characterisation of social action examining smaller groups within society. The 
utilisation of actors-oriented frameworks is applied in a diverse range of fields, 
including anthropology, sociology, psychology, literary criticism, political science or 
international relations. In development research, proponents (e.g. Long 1990, 2004, or 
Biggs and Matsaert, 2004) of an actor-oriented approach perceive society as a product 
of human agency, human activity and self-organising processes. It is concerned 
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principally with social action and how social action is generated, hindered or 
constrained. For development sociologist Long (1990, p. 6): 
 
Underpinning (either explicitly or implicitly) this interest in social actors is the conviction 
that, although it may be true that certain important structural changes result from the 
impact of outside forces (due to encroachment by the market or the state), it is 
theoretically unsatisfactory to base one‘s analysis on the concept of external 
determination. All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds 
of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and 
transformed by these same actors and structures. 
 
There is a wide array as to how actor-oriented approaches are applied in social 
sciences; ranging from anthropological-ethnographic to economic input and output 
models to stakeholder analysis or behavioural research. For instance, Biggs and 
Matsaert (2004) use an actor-oriented approach to study how poverty reduction 
programmes could be further strengthened in the case of Nepal and Bangladesh. For 
the authors, actor-oriented tools provide practical ways to monitor, document, and 
assess, and thus legitimise, crucial institutional strengthening activities. They further 
contend that the use of actor-oriented approaches can change perceptions of 
development actors, encouraging them to engage with the social and political context 
of their activities in a productive way. In addition, actor-oriented approaches can also 
relate to, and in fact often borrow from, social constructivism. Reality is perceived as 
being constructed through human activity. Social change is consequently the result of 
the action and interaction of individuals and collectives. A function, policy, institution, 
strategy, etc. only exists because it is socially constructed by one or more actors. 
Within a society, actors can be individuals but also formal or informal collectives such 
as: clubs, secret societies, sodalities, associations, communities, organisations or 
institutions – to give a few examples.  
Against this backdrop, the thesis follows Long (1990, p.16) in applying an actor-
oriented approach to determine ―the degree to which specific actors‘ life worlds, 
organising practices and cultural perceptions are relatively autonomous of, or 
‗colonised‘ by wider ideological, institutional and power frames‖. At the same time, it 
is used to facilitate an assessment of how and why the civil society landscape is 
currently composed (formally and informally) in the way in which we encounter it in 
present-day Sierra Leone. In doing so, it will refer back to the earlier critical 
discourses about liberal ideas versus cultural particularism or political culture in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Methodologically, this requires an ethnographic understanding of 
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everyday life and the processes by which ―images, identities and social practices are 
shared, contested, negotiated, and sometimes rejected by the various actors involved‖ 
(Long, 2004 p. 16). Accordingly, social realities are understood in the scope of the 
thesis as individual and collective perceptions informed by processes of negotiation at 
several levels and stages in history and time. And it is precisely here where actors-
oriented approaches can become ―battlefields of knowledge‖ (ibid. p.15) in that 
contested understandings, interests and values are pitched against each other.  
 
3.3.2. Limitations and usage of the actor-oriented approach. 
The main challenge and, simultaneously, limitation of an actor-oriented 
approach is that it is of course impossible to capture and match the voices of all actors 
that are affected in one way or another by the peacebuilding and development process 
of a country. To the extent possible, the thesis can circumvent this limitation by 
combining and drawing on qualitative and quantitative methodological tools. More 
precisely, it provides an excerpt of perspectives, voices and local understandings 
gathered in the past 4 years. As outlined at length in the introduction and appendix, 
qualitative data was obtained through interviews with formal and informal civil 
society members, as well as group observations in Sierra Leone in 2011 and 2012. 
Apart from that, quantitative data will be presented and assessed in Chapter 5 in the 
form of an extensive mapping analysis of formally registered CSOs and their areas of 
engagement. In applying and combining these qualitative as well as quantitative 
methodological tools, it is expected that an actor‘s-centred approach, despite its 
limitations, will still contribute significantly in the attempt to critically examine how 
civil society is currently (re-)constructed in post conflict countries and how this affects 
the political voice and influence of the local civil sphere.  
 
3.3.3. Who is a civil society actor? Formal and informal categorisations of civil 
society. 
Not only is there a considerable debate about the meanings and conceptual usage 
of civil society (see Chapter 2) but there are also several discourses about the distinct 
categories of civil society. In laying the conceptual groundwork for the thesis, Chapter 
2 defined the Western notion of civil society as: ―independent from the state, political, 
private, and economic spheres but in close interaction with them, a domain of social 
life in which public opinion can be formed, and a process and not an event‖. In a 
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sense, all of us are civil society and the boundaries between the state, society and the 
market are hazy and blurred. A government official can also be part of several 
voluntary clubs and associations. Assuming the same official finds enough courage, 
hypothetically, he/she can even raise his/her voice and demonstrate against an 
oppressive regime he/she might be working for. In this regard it is not only the actor 
that matters but also his/her function and action in a certain context, setting and time. 
Above all, Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) also highlighted that civil society as it evolved as 
an intellectual construct of the Occidental World, never really matched the realities of 
social and political life in equatorial Africa. Clayton accurately reminds us (1996, p. 
43): 
 
Many African colonial and post-independence states attempted to modernise and to 
replace traditional hierarchies with a new system of government. In this they never 
entirely succeeded, and in most African states power is shared or interwoven between the 
central government and its local representatives and a traditional, ‗tribal‘ system; civil 
society has to find a place in a society which in some ways is more complex than 
European ones, as the older states have had longer time either to suppress or integrate 
traditional powers.  
 
Reading between the lines, Clayton clearly echoes Mamdani‘s (1996) call for 
analysing more thoroughly the historical processes which have shaped civil society in 
Africa and the forms these have taken. Therefore, Chapter 2 further suggested that 
civil society in sub-Saharan Africa, cannot be understood without giving firm 
consideration to the following factors: the slave trade and colonial legacy, urban 
versus rural areas, local versus elite ownership, influence and support of INGOs, neo-
patrimonial networks and chiefdom systems, intergenerational power imbalances, 
ethnic and religious organisation and religious leaders, gender relations and equality, 
cultural identities, life circumstances (e.g. living conditions, health, nutrition, 
education). Part II of the thesis will elaborate on each of these characteristics at length. 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting, that a few leading development institutions active in 
non-Western fragile states (e.g. UNDP or World Bank), started to acknowledge the 
different genetics and fabrics of civil society in their respective country studies (see, 
for instance, the World Bank‘s very useful study on ―The Civil Society Landscape in 
Sierra Leone‖, 2007). Strikingly, in their peacebuilding and development practice, it is 
still the ―formal western type of civil society groups‖ (Ibid., p. 10) which gets the most 
attention. This probably also explains how civil society is officially defined by those 
institutions (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). Besides, considering the multitude of actors 
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involved, supporting civil society has become more and more complex due to the ever-
increasing number and type of donors and civil society initiatives (Weijer and Klines 
2012). Bearing in mind the earlier-depicted assessment mechanisms and M&E 
instruments on the ―effectiveness‖ of civil society as well as the growing pressure with 
regards to accountability, it is apparent why donors generally prefer to support more 
organised and formalised versions of civil society. Loose, non-registered or ―local‖ 
traditional forms of civil society are, in the main, the beneficiaries of the work done by 
those officially registered and M&E checked and audited CSOs. This clearly fosters 
the creation of an externally manufactured rather than a more organic formation of a 
civil society landscape that advocates for locally identified concerns and needs. An 
actor-oriented perspective can therefore not refrain from an assessment of what kind of 
actors are usually supported and strengthened by the international donor community. 
Against this backdrop, the thesis comprehends formal versions of civil society as: 
INGOs (which can be implementing partners but also donors), NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, 
Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), unions, youth clubs, sports clubs, associations, 
artists, formal self-help groups.  
 
Actors that belong to the informal civil (public) sphere and are usually (with 
exceptions to the rule) not direct implementing partners include: Individuals, informal 
social movements, sodalities and secret societies, “invisible” actors such as informal 
street clubs, informal associations, youth groups, women‟s groups or self-help groups. 
 
Both formal as well as informal versions of civil society in Sierra Leone will be 
the object of study in the remainder of the thesis. For methodological and analytical 
reasons, the thesis will make no distinction between the terms NGO and CSO. This 
decision was made on the basis of ―A note on NGO-CSO terminology”, published by 
the OECD (2011), in which the organisation convincingly specifies, that: 
 
Although DAC members have traditionally used the term NGO, more are now using the 
term CSO. (…) In reporting Official development assistance (ODA) provided to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) DAC members use the OECD statistical reporting 
directive definition of NGOs as ‗any non-profit entity… without significant government 
participation or representation.‘ This definition is narrower than the now more commonly 
used term civil society organisation (CSO), which includes non-governmental 
organisations among a variety of other organisations.  
 
106 
 
Similarly, it is important to stress that less formal versions of civil society, e.g. 
civic associations can differ in social stratification, structure and style. At community 
level, Haider‘s work (2009) provides a very useful distinction between five different 
types of institutions, these are: association, cooperative, civic association, CBOs and 
village leadership. The focus of the thesis will be mainly on CBOs and associations. 
Furthermore, civic associations are approached and perceived as (Colletta and Cullen, 
2000 in Haider 2009 p.6):  
 
A group of people, frequently from differing kin groups, who work together for a 
common purpose and have a visible identity mainly through sectors (e.g. farmers‘, youth, 
widows, parent-teach associations). Associations facilitate self-help, mutual help, 
solidarity, and cooperation. They usually have clearly delineated structures, roles, and 
rules within which group members operate.  
 
By contrast, CBOs are understood as (Ibid. p.6):  
 
(…) an organisation that should ideally be representative of the community i.e. 
membership-based but consequently tending to vary dramatically in size and focus. CBOs 
may focus on a specific sector (e.g. Village Water Supply and Sanitation Committees) or 
multiple sectors (e.g. Community Development Councils). CBOs can also comprise the 
local arm of non-governmental organisations.  
 
In addition to the above definition, the thesis defines CBOs as organisations that 
operate in urban and rural areas. In many sub-Saharan African countries CBOs are 
equally as active in cities as they are in villages and can even serve as a stepping stone 
on the way to becoming a CSO. In some instances, one can also observe the reverse 
effect and CSOs regress to the status of a CBO due to lack of funding and capacities.  
 
Lastly, INGOs will be not approached as local civil society actors but as actors 
that influence and shape the local civil sphere in fragile states (see Section 2.1 of 
Chapter 2). This is not to imply that INGOs are purely external actors from the 
outside. Field research revealed that INGOs tend to cooperate more intensively with 
local CSOs than with the GoSL (Government of Sierra Leone) or IOs. Moreover, 
INGOs are also in closer interaction with locals. Many INGOs hire locals and a large 
part of INGOs offices on the ground consist of local staff only. It thus appeared that 
they are far better integrated and in greater interaction with the local sphere than 
funding programmes led by IOs.  
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3.3.4. Civil society from a functional-oriented perspective in peacebuilding and 
development processes.  
Functional approaches find their origins in the thought and work of Comte, 
Spencer and Durkheim, as well as in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century anthropology, notably the writings of Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and 
Malinowski (1884-1942) (Swingewood 2000, pp. 137 – 160). It is Durkheim, 
however, who is generally cited as the founding father of sociological functionalism. 
Society is defined by Durkheim as a social fact, an organic whole which is at the same 
time also moral reality. In its function as a moral structure, society dominates the 
individual and consequently its various parts function in relation to the whole and not 
the individual (Swingewood 2000, p. 77). In studying social phenomena, Durkheim 
was in particular interested in two questions. Firstly, why do societies remain 
relatively stable? Secondly, how is or can we make social order possible? His way of 
tackling these issues was to analyse social processes and institutions in terms of their 
relevant functions for the needs of the system. For Durkheim, social institutions exist 
merely to fulfil specific social needs (functions). In his book The Rules of Sociological 
Method (1895/1982), Durkheim argues that social phenomena can be explained if we 
separate the ―efficient cause‖ which produces it from the ―function it fulfils‖. 
Correspondingly, he further specifies that he uses the word ―function‖ in preference to 
―end‖ or ―purpose‖, because social phenomena do not generally exist for the useful 
results they produce. Hence, for Durkheim it is essential to determine whether there is 
a correspondence between the fact under consideration and the general needs of the 
social organism. The intentions behind these correspondences are only secondary and 
the focus should be on the correspondences as such. In his words (1895/1982, p.97):  
 
The determination of function is … necessary for the complete explanation of the 
phenomena…. To explain a social fact it is not enough to show the cause on which it 
depends; we must also, at least in most cases, show its function in the establishment of 
social order. 
 
While Durkheim clearly distinguishes between a functional and historical 
analysis, he still acknowledges that a holistic approach of a society requires both. 
Influenced by Durkheim, subsequent writings of Talcott Parsons or his student and 
later colleague Robert K. Merton, led to an immense popularity of functionalist 
approaches among American sociologists in the 1940s and 1950s. Functionalism 
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simply emerged as the sociological method. Its critics, like Gouldner or Mills, accuse 
sociological functionalism for being an expression of conservative ideology, which 
fails to provide adequate analysis of social change and social conflict. A functionalist 
perspective, it is argued, disregards society as a historical and ever progressing 
process. Social structure, it is further critiqued, is assimilated to a static concept of 
social solidarity and social consensus. It is precisely this stagnant view of society 
which probably challenges ongoing discourses on the value of sociological 
functionalism the most. This is also the case in the realm of peacebuilding and 
development studies. It is worth repeating that the thesis does not understand civil 
society as a static phenomenon either. Recalling section 2.1. of Chapter 2, (civil) 
society is defined as a constantly evolving and ever changing societal progression and 
consequently approached as a process and not in a Durkheimian sense as a result or 
endpoint. Merton would have probably counter-argued that sociological functionalism 
is far from embodying a conservative ideology and that it can be radical and critical at 
the same time. As a method and approach, according to Merton, sociological 
functionalism can help us to identify the main weaknesses and ―malfunctioning‖ of 
specific institutions for satisfying the collective needs of a society (Swingewood 2000, 
pp. 140 - 141). And it is exactly this aspect of a functional-oriented approach which is 
useful for the remainder of the thesis. Merton‘s epistemological argument also 
indirectly shaped and influenced policy-oriented research as well as various M&E 
frameworks, studies and practices. As outlined in Section 3.2., in order to measure the 
effectiveness of civil society, its ―functions‖ (outputs) are usually matched against a 
broader outcome. Needless to say that pre-determined outcomes or impacts in M&E 
frameworks have to rely on fixed indicators and a more or less static perception, if the 
ultimate objective is to measure a project‘s or programme‘s failure or success. To give 
an example, if the outcome is to enhance gender equality in fragile states, one can 
potentially measure this objective by means of indicators such as the number of 
workshops conducted, campaigns launched, or females in parliament, schools or other 
institutions. Now the challenge for achieving a long-term impact lies in the extent to 
which these norms or standards are really engrained in all of the people‘s minds and 
hearts. Instituting gender equality is a long-term goal (or impact) requiring societal 
progression that can turn in one direction or another at any time, caused by various 
scenarios or circumstances (e.g. sudden re-emergence of religious fundamentalism). 
Moreover, when it comes to strengthening civil society in fragile states, thorough 
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assessments that look beyond the first few years of project implementation are often 
scarce. Functionalist approaches are indisputably useful in determining current gaps or 
immediate as well as long-term needs, but they still fall short in examining how other 
aspects such as political will, political culture, cultural particularism or any other 
internal and external influences can potentially affect long-term impacts and 
developments. Researchers and practitioners nevertheless use both its flaws as well as 
its methodological assets to their own advantage. Without a conservative or static 
ideology (e.g.: liberalisation based on modernisation models; see Section 1.2, Chapter 
1) sociological functionalism would lose its methodological ability to discover the 
weaknesses and strengths of specific actors – thus, providing a snapshot of the status 
quo. In other words, functionalist approaches serve particular purposes (e.g. 
identifying immediate or long-term needs or funding gaps) while operating on a more 
or less linear theory of modernity - the liberal paradigm. In the attempt to assist fragile 
states to prosper and develop like the peaceful, liberal and rich west, functionalist 
approaches towards peace and development are therefore quite assimilative in 
character. For instance, the term ―capacity building‖ has become a key component in 
any peacebuilding and development agenda. In this regard, capacity building draws 
not only on a modernisation assumption, but also implies that impoverished societies 
lack the function (= capacity) to fully manage modern systems or integrate into 
modern systems in some way (Jantzi and Jantzi 2009). The same can be said about the 
usage of the term ‗failed states‘. Poverty, it is assumed, exists since some societies 
lack the capacities (= functions) to manage modern systems because of mal-functions 
such as, corruption, incompatible cultural or social values, or a lack of expertise. For 
Jantzi and Jantzi (2009), it appears that many of the peacebuilding theorists and 
practice models are correlated with modernisation frameworks in development. These 
modernisation-based or growth-with-equity peacebuilding and development models, 
they reason, are essentially assimilative in nature. Drawing on a Durkheimian 
intellectual tradition, assimilation is understood as an endeavour to spread and induce 
shared understandings of social norms and beliefs. In Jantzi and Jantzi‘s words: 
―Development or peacebuilding is implicitly assumed to be a process of assimilating 
marginalised groups into existing societal structures‖ (p. 73). In the case of civil 
society, international frameworks like the Istanbul Principles, attribute civil actors 
with certain functions (e.g.: promote human rights, embody gender quality, create and 
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share knowledge etc.) in order to assess their contributions towards a broader 
peacebuilding and / or development agenda.  
 
In sum, functional approaches, even if not always officially termed as such 
within practitioners‘ circles, have gained considerable prominence in current 
peacebuilding and development practices. Indeed, peacebuilding and development 
scholars like Paffenholz opted for the functional approach as ―it provides the 
opportunity to identify what is needed prior to an analysis of who has the potential to 
fulfil these functions in the short, medium, and long terms. It also helps enhance 
cooperation with existing partners‖ (2010, p. 429). In scholarship as in practice, 
functional-oriented approaches emerged as a useful tool for policy-oriented research to 
identify marginalised areas which deserve greater attention in the realms of 
peacebuilding and development.  
 
3.3.5. Limitations and usage of the functional approach. 
Even Paffenholz, who builds an entire book around a systematic functional-
oriented analysis applied to 11 case studies, admits that, general support for civil 
society and their peacebuilding and development functions cannot replace political 
action (p.430). As highlighted above, the limitations of the functional approach are 
obvious. Because of its static view, it disregards the active role played by actors 
(individual or collective) in the making of the various forms of social solidarity and 
patterns of social change over time. Although functional models facilitate needs-based 
assessments for short- and long-term needs, epistemologically, they cannot explain 
how and why moral values or norms, which supposedly hold society together, are 
created and by whom (c.f. Swingewood 2000, p. 77-80). Why, despite its 
epistemological limitations, does the thesis still make use of a functional-oriented 
approach at all? It is the analytical aspect that is of value in the attempt to characterise 
the Sierra Leonean civil society landscape as we encounter it today. A characterisation 
of the past and current functions of civil society is necessary to further substantiate the 
claim that civil society is at risk of being gradually depoliticised. In other words, civil 
society is being assigned a role to play within a liberal peacebuilding and development 
paradigm (or modernisation project).  As a result of current practices and frameworks 
to strengthen the civil sphere in fragile states, civil society actors emerged as 
contractors to implement specific functions such as complementing government 
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programmes, or as ―watchdogs‖ to monitor implementation of these programmes. In 
many instances (not only in Sierra Leone), local CSOs substitute for government 
agents in fragile states as a way to broaden participation in national development 
planning (c.f. Weijers and Klines, 2008; Giffen and Judge, 2010).  
 
Methodologically, a functional-oriented approach will be implemented through 
an extensive mapping analysis (see Chapter 6) listing the areas of engagement 
(functions) of presently registered INGOs and CSOs in the country. A quantitative and 
functional-inspired assessment is expected to provide an overview of the functions 
currently undertaken by local and international CSOs. It shall illustrate how the civil 
sphere became a service provider as opposed to being a co-creator of a new post-war 
political agenda in Sierra Leone.  
 
3.3.6. What donors support: Typical civil society functions in current 
peacebuilding and development processes 
The majority of fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa exhibit two distinct features. 
First, they are marked by abject poverty and underdevelopment. Second, most of the 
conflicts in the region are, or were, civil wars. Not surprisingly a big chunk of aid 
money for the civil sphere flows into humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation, 
sustainable development projects, or service delivery as opposed to providing funds 
for civic or political activism at the grassroots level. Donors are required to be neutral 
actors in their efforts to bring about peace and foster development. Funding allocations 
for political activities (e.g. opposition to a corrupt government) clearly risk supporting 
potential peace spoilers. Yet, donors‘ rhetoric still acknowledges, supports and 
perceives civil society as the democratising force necessary for prosperity and peace. 
On paper, civil society is generally associated with functions of creation, or promotion 
of political space next to or in interaction with the government. In practice, however, 
(as it will be illustrated in the case of Sierra Leone), the largest amount of aid money is 
allocated to CSOs engaging in service delivery and social development. This is a clear 
contradiction as to how donors usually portray the functions of civil society in the 
development process of a fragile state and for which ―functions‖ the money is then 
eventually spent. In this regard, it is worthwhile to briefly review the various sets of 
activities and functions ascribed to civil society by some of the most prominent 
international institutions and policy-oriented researchers. 
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Being one of the leading institutions advocating for the effectiveness of CSOs, 
the OECD (2009, p18) lists the following main roles of civil society actors in the 
development process of a (fragile) country: the creation of space for civil engagement 
through democratisation, social mobilisation, advocacy, public education, and 
research, service delivery, self-help, and innovation, humanitarian assistance; and the 
roles that they play as aid donors, channels, and recipients. Similarly, though a bit 
more elaborately, the World Bank (2013) highlights the following benefits (or 
functions) that civil society can bring to development efforts36:  
 
 Give voice to stakeholders – particularly poor and marginalized populations – and help 
ensure that their views are factored into policy and program decisions. 
 Promote public sector transparency and accountability as well as contributing to the 
enabling environment for good governance. 
 Promote public consensus and local ownership for reforms, national poverty reduction, 
and development strategies by building common ground for understanding and 
encouraging public-private cooperation. 
 Bring innovative ideas and solutions, as well as participatory approaches to solve local 
problems. 
 Strengthen and leverage development programs by providing local knowledge, targeting 
assistance, and generating social capital at the community level.  
 Provide professional expertise and increasing capacity for effective service delivery, 
especially in environments with weak public sector capacity or in post-conflict contexts 
 
The UNDP (2013) similarly identifies collaborating with civil society, at the 
global, regional and local levels with regards to fighting poverty, building democratic 
societies, preventing crisis and enabling recovery, protecting the environment, halting 
and reversing HIV/AIDS, empowering women, fostering knowledge, innovation and 
capacity development.37 
 
Broadly speaking, all three organisations, OECD, World Bank and UNDP, put 
emphasis on service delivery, social development and poverty alleviation while 
simultaneously stressing political emancipation as well as strengthening the political 
influence and voice of the civil sphere. However, as Chapters 5 and 6 will illuminate, 
                                                 
36
 The World Bank‘s approaches towards civil society are summarised at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093200~menuPK:22
0424~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html, last visit 25.11.2013 
37
 The UNDP‘s approaches towards civil society are summarized at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/fast-facts/english/FF-Civil-
Society_EN_2013.pdf, last visit 25.11.2013 
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in the case of Sierra Leone, the functions of civil society actors that received the most 
financial support belonged to the category of service delivery and social and 
communal development. In conducting an extensive mapping analysis encompassing 
the peacebuilding and development functions undertaken by Sierra Leone‘s CSOs, the 
thesis aim is to quantitatively strengthen the claim that civil society actors are in the 
main complementing service delivery that the Sierra Leonean state or the donor 
community are unable or unwilling to provide. In other words, the mapping is 
expected to provide a general idea of the functions currently undertaken by local and 
international CSOs. It shall illustrate how funding allocations, among other factors, 
transformed the civil sphere to a service provider as opposed to giving those civil 
society actors a political voice and space that influences and actively shapes a new 
post-war political agenda in Sierra Leone.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter first provided an overview of the main mechanisms that support but 
also evaluate the effectiveness of civil society in developing countries and fragile 
states. In doing so, it argued that external support fortifies the depoliticisation of the 
civil sphere in fragile states. While it still remains to be seen what kind of impact the 
HLF-4 in Busan as well as the New Deal will have on the ground, they encouraged 
donors to increasingly apply M&E frameworks as a tool to measure success and 
failure and, consequently, effectiveness. Accordingly, the chapter reasoned that aid has 
become a de-personalised and de-contextualised set of indicators. This not only creates 
a great deal of pressure but also pushes CSOs towards a more strategic approach in 
their activities and areas of engagement. That this may also occur at the cost of greater 
flexibility in their agenda setting and therefore hamper their political influence and 
voice will be a subject of discussion in Parts II and III.  
 
On a more positive note, assessments of the outputs and outcomes of civil 
society in fragile states do enhance the transparency of interventions and also generate 
new knowledge about peacebuilding and development processes and the role of civil 
society therein. Still, universal frameworks and their often highly technocratic M&E 
mechanisms come at a price. They encourage the creation of a specific civil society 
landscape in targeting which kind of activities, or functions, local CSOs or CBOs are 
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to undertake. In a way this has led to an instrumentalisation of the local civil sphere, if 
not to the creation of a civil society landscape, which is not attuned to cultural 
particularisms or the socio-historical fabrics and political culture of the society in 
question. In this regard, international frameworks tend to overlook how multifaceted 
transitional societies are in their claims, needs and idea(l)s. Neither can post-conflict 
societies be re-created externally, nor can one assume that every individual of the civil 
sphere coherently aims at achieving long-lasting peace and development in the same 
manner and pace.  
Equally importantly, the chapter hinted at a salient paradox. On paper (or in 
theory), civil society is frequently recognised as an independent (and necessary) 
political actor in the reconstruction process of a fragile state (see also Section 1.1 of 
Chapter 1). In the same vein, the international donor community as well as research 
repeatedly ascribes political functions to local civil society actors, such as: democracy 
promotion, fostering conflict resolution and political dialogue, enhancing participatory 
approaches or promoting public consensus and local ownership for reforms. Kaldor 
(2003), for instance, argues that civil society is not a magic formula for successful 
peacebuilding endeavours, but rather perceives the role (function) of civil society in 
addressing the problems of conflict, debating and arguing about it and discussing and 
pressing for possible solutions or alternatives. However, in practice, and this will be 
debated and analysed in Parts II and III, funding allocations usually do not risk 
supporting local political activism and voice. Instead, donors tend to provide more 
resources for training purposes thereby promoting a societal morality of the liberal 
West (e.g.: human rights). Such an approach does not come as a surprise. Clearly, 
backing local political activities of any kind could potentially threaten the 
peacebuilding and development process of a fragile state. Likewise, donors ought to be 
neutral actors in their attempt to strengthen the civil sphere. Yet it is exactly at this 
juncture where alternative approaches towards strengthening civil society in fragile 
states are still scarce. Despite several international and local frameworks and 
evaluations of civil society actors and their functions, we actually do not know much 
about how the political culture of civil society is de- and re-constructed in the course 
of rebuilding failed states and to what kind of long-term consequences (such as 
depoliticisation) this may lead – in the developmental as well as peacebuilding 
process. This not only remains a scarcely researched terrain but in bridging theory 
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with practice, policy-oriented researchers and practitioners usually assess civil society 
as an actor carrying out specific functions in the peacebuilding and development 
process of a country (with the exception of critical peace and development research). 
While the thesis does not flesh out policy-oriented recommendations on the 
effectiveness of civil society actors, or what civil society has to or should contribute to 
peace and development of a fragile state, it will make use of both perspectives in its 
own distinct way. Actor-oriented frameworks are used to facilitate an understanding of 
the characteristics of civil society while simultaneously widening the space for voices 
from below. Functional approaches, on the other hand, are applied to classify and 
characterise their activities over history and time. A combination of both approaches 
will be used as a methodological tool to assess and explain why civil society actors in 
Sierra Leone are at risk of being depoliticised through the functions they carry out.  
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PART II 
 
Civil society in Sierra Leone 
Exploratory Case Study 
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Chapter Four 
 
Sierra Leone’s Society Before and During Colonial Rule 
 
 
If yu no no sai yu de go yu fo no usai yu comoo‟ 
 
You must be certain of from where you come  
even if you are uncertain of where you will go. (Krio Proverb)
38
 
 
Part I of the thesis examined the multiple dimensions, conceptions, and 
intellectual meanings and interpretations of civil society and how they are applied, 
assessed and appropriated. Any firm understanding of contemporary notions of civil 
society, it was argued, is deeply entrenched in past events and the historical context. 
As Ekeh notes: ―If we are to capture the spirit of African politics we must seek what is 
unique in them. I am persuaded that the colonial experience provides that uniqueness‖ 
(1975, p. 111). The same applies to the spirit of the civil sphere. Despite a few 
sceptical voices (e.g. Harbeson et.al., 1994; Chabal and Daloz, 1999) doubting 
whether the concept of civil society is even accurate or applicable in the sub-Saharan 
African region, Chapter 2 asserted that civil society does exist, though in its own 
specific societal configurations and organisational (and political) formations. Such an 
approach, however, requires that due respect to be paid to historical, cultural, 
structural and ideological characteristics. A matrix of social and cultural factors was 
presented in order to better approach and contextualise civil society formation in 
Sierra Leone. Chapter 4 will now fill in the historical blanks. The empirical Part II of 
the thesis thus commences with a short depiction of Sierra Leone‘s precolonial and 
colonial characteristics of the civil sphere. The intention is to place the thesis‘ research 
question into a historical context in order to substantiate one of the main arguments 
made in Chapters 6 and 7. Briefly, in present-day Sierra Leone, the legacies of slavery 
and colonialism continue to impinge upon the civil society landscape, its political 
culture, influence, agency and voice.  
 
In exploring the pre-colonial and colonial environment of Sierra Leone from the 
perspective of the civil sphere, this chapter chronologically demarcates the 
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characteristics of society and the political climate it was surrounded by until 
independence in 1961. Such a journey through time is expected to further our 
understanding of how colonial administration effectively created two public spheres, a 
primordial and a civic (Ekeh 1975), in the same land. Decades-long separation of the 
Province of Freetown and the hinterland fuelled ethnic divisions, tribalism, clientelism 
and patrimonialism. The fragmentation between the rural and urban areas fostered 
historically-accumulated privileges, manifested in the contemporary political and civil 
society landscape of Sierra Leone.  
 
It should be noted that Chapter 4 is not an all-encompassing and historically 
detailed retrospective of Sierra Leone‘s centuries-long reconfiguration of state-society 
relations. Extensive and factually rich accounts are provided inter alia by Conteh-
Morgan and Dixon-Fyle (1999), Fyfe (1967), Harris (2013), Joe A.D. Alie (1990) and 
Pham (2006). In this regard, Chapter 4 will merely outline how the civil sphere was 
influenced, shaped and affected by the most salient past events to inform discussion 
and analysis in later chapters.  
 
With that said, Section 4.1 starts off with a short introductory background to the 
geography, demographics and current developmental status of the country. The two 
subsequent parts will then briefly delineate Sierra Leone‘s early precolonial and 
colonial history. Both pay particular attention to the country‘s societal structures of the 
civil sphere therein. Section 4.3 then proceeds with a succinct outline of how the 
country‘s civil sphere became gradually more formalised by the Krio society under the 
influence of British colonial rule. The Krio were dominant in Sierra Leone from the 
late 18
th
 to the mid-20
th
 centuries and the first who engaged in the creation of civic 
associations and organisations based on the British model. Subsequently, the last 
sections engage in a critical reflection about how colonialism sowed the seeds for a 
bifurcated civil sphere where a primordial and civic public continue to intersect in the 
same land.  
 
4.1. Sierra Leone: General Background Information 
Sierra Leone is located in West Africa and covers a total of 71,740 square 
kilometres, bordered by Guinea to the north and northeast, Liberia to the south and 
southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The climate is tropical, hot and humid 
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and only experiences two seasons: the rainy season (May – September) and the dry 
season (March to May). The heaviest rainfalls occur along the coastline and in the 
south of the country, nurturing dense tropical forests broken by mangrove swamps. 
The country‘s total population amounts to 5.6 million (July 2013 est.), which can be 
further divided into the following ethnic groups: Temne (35 percent), Mende (31 
percent), Limba (8 percent), Kono (5 percent), Krio (2 percent), Mandingo (2 percent), 
Loko (2 percent), and other (15 percent) encompassing refugees from Liberia‘s recent 
civil war and small numbers of Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Indians. English 
is the official language (although regular use is limited to a literate minority), Mende 
is the principal vernacular in the south, Temne is the principal vernacular in the north 
and Krio (English-based Creole) is spoken by the descendants of freed slaves who 
were settled in the Freetown area. Krio is the lingua franca and a first language for a 
considerable part of the population and understood by 97 percent. Sierra Leoneans 
share different religious views; the majority of the population are Muslim (60 percent) 
followed by Christians (30 percent) and indigenous beliefs (10 percent). 
Intermarriages among different religious groups are not unusual and religious violence 
in the country is very uncommon. Despite steady but slow developmental 
improvement since the end of the civil war (2002), Sierra Leone remains among the 
world‘s poorest countries, ranking 177th out of 187 in the Human Development Index 
in 2012.39 At the time of writing, life expectancy at birth is 48 years and only 41 % of 
all adults are literate. According to the latest index by Save the Children, the country 
has the third highest child mortality rate worldwide, ranking 174 out of 176 countries 
assessed.40 On average, 60 percent of the population are living on less than USD 1.25 a 
day.41  One of the major challenges of the country is to improve the conditions for 
children and young people, who represent the majority of the population (60.9 percent 
are between 0-24 years old, 31.4 percent between 25-54 years of age while only 4% 
are between 55-64 years old). In a briefing paper drafted by the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) for the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) Sierra Leone Configuration in February 2011, it was estimated 
that about 800,000 youths (60 percent), ranging from 15 to 35 years of age, are either 
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unemployed or underemployed.42 Three years later, in 2014, the UNDP‘s estimates are 
even higher, indicating that a total of 70 percent are presently unemployed or 
underemployed.43 The majority of CSOs interviewed in Sierra Leone between 2011 
and 2012 also refer to the 70 percent rate.44 Equally Sierra Leone‘s President, Ernest 
Bai Koroma, stated in a speech in London on 18 November 2011 that with regard to 
the country‘s socioeconomic development, ―For the youth, this was a job poorly 
done‖.45  
 
4.2. Early History: Society in precolonial Sierra Leone.  
Research and writings on the indigenous history of West Africa are frequently 
challenged by the immense difficulty with regard to source material.46 There is a 
shortage of evidence and coherent chronology of narratives especially in the West-
African forest zone, where indigenous written records were virtually unknown before 
the nineteenth century (Hopkins 1973, p.7). The few records and sources which exist 
about precolonial society estimate that the terrain, known today as Sierra Leone, has 
been inhabited for at least 2,500 years. Settlers of successive movements from various 
parts of Africa gradually migrated westwards. According to Pham (2006 p. 2), the 
Limba are believed to be the oldest inhabitants of the region, followed by the Soso, the 
Kono and Vai. The Yalunka arrived at the end of the sixteenth century amid conflicts 
with the Fula and Loko, while the Koranko were settled by the early seventeenth 
century, as were the Temne, who had originally come into the northwest as traders 
from the Futa Jallon. Pham further describes pre-colonial society as principally 
agricultural. Specialised craftsmen were relatively rare and land tenure communal. 
Membership of the Poro (or Wonde) secret societies for men and the analogous Bondo 
(or Sande) sodalities for women were important for the initiation and instruction of 
youth in the ways of tribal culture and belief (ibid. p.2). Many of these pre-colonial 
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secret societies such as the Bondo are still active and very influential in Sierra Leone. 
They wield enormous power but few people are prepared to admit that they belong to 
one, let alone reveal its workings (Lakhani, 2010). During pre-colonial, colonial and to 
an extent also post-colonial times membership also involved participating in 
traditional educational institutions. For instance girls belonging to the Bondo society 
used to undergo a week-long training in the bush as an initiation to the role and 
responsibilities of socially-respected young women and future wives. They are taught 
family tasks, such as parenting, cooking and other domestic work, how to make 
themselves good looking, serve their husbands, respect elders in their community and 
not to be intimate with a man before marriage. Boys, on the other hand, used to be 
taught farming skills, how to set traps and guard against danger or how to climb palm 
trees. Those clearly demarcated gender-based roles and responsibilities still shape 
Sierra Leone‘s societal structures.47 In a long, informal conversation48, a Temne elder 
expressed concern about modern (Western) educational systems. In his view they 
cannot adequately prepare the youth for adult life given that children are entering 
married life with no preparation and knowledge of their responsibilities as husbands 
and wives. In interviews with local CSOs, some interviewees actually stressed the 
importance of this traditional training, next to Western-style educational institutions 
(e.g. CSO Nr. 2, Nr. 4, Nr. 28).49 Notably, although traditional forms of education are 
reportedly waning, the pre-colonial practice of female circumcision (also known as 
FGM – female genital mutilation) continues to be widely practised and supported 
across all sectors in society. It is estimated that between 90-94% of all Sierra Leonean 
women are circumcised. Non-circumcised girls are thought of as being unclean and 
face tremendous challenges in finding a husband. A failure to be initiated could be a 
one-way street to social marginalisation, if not stigmatisation (Datzberger, 2012b). 
Another pre-colonial tradition still prevalent in rural Sierra Leone includes polygamy 
among men (women are not allowed to have more than one husband). Although illegal 
under civil law, it is recognised and widely practised under customary law. Especially 
in the provinces, polygamy continues to be perceived as a sign of virility but equally 
serves as a means to an end in facilitating manual labour and productivity of farms. 
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An additional legacy of precolonial era is the belief in magic, gurus, and curses 
which marks Sierra Leonean cultural identity.50 In a video of the country‘s Fiftieth 
Independence Anniversary Celebrations at the National Stadium held in late April 
2011, thousands of Sierra Leoneans marvelled at magicians who seemed to transform 
objects into animals and vice versa. In conversations with ordinary Sierra Leoneans 
(not affiliated with any CSO) many stories were told about leopard men, or soldiers 
who caught bullets with their teeth during the war. Despite widespread poverty, one 
can simply not escape narratives that the supernatural is all around. On a long poda 
poda bus ride for instance, two Sierra Leoneans passionately discussed the difference 
between natural and artificial time – the latter (so it was suggested) being constructed 
by humans (and their minds) and the former being the only and real timeless truth.  
 
4.2.1. Pre-colonial nature of chieftaincy systems.  
What further makes Sierra Leone‘s history in the African context quite special 
are its dense tropical rainforests, sealing it off from the influence of any pre-colonial 
African Empires. It was not until the middle of the sixteenth century, that the Mane, a 
Mandingo group exiled from the Mali Empire, established a base at Cape Mount in 
present-day Liberia. The Mane subjugated their new neighbours and forced them into 
tributary relationships and, even though short-lived, their domination and influence on 
subsequent Sierra Leonean history was significant. Mane descendants, today known as 
the Mende, entered Sierra Leone in the eighteenth century in search of fertile lands and 
established farming communities around military strongholds. They introduced the 
first political centralisation in the area alongside weaving, more advanced ironworking 
and the slave trade (Pham 2006, pp. 2-3). As in most of the sub-Saharan African 
region, pre-colonial controls of power mainly lay with people and not demarcated land 
or territory. Societies were not governed on the basis of written rules, laws and 
policies, but by reciprocal imperatives, decisions of hereditary hierarchy, and religious 
and cultural mores (Harris 2013, p 19). Moreover, the West African political nature of 
pre-colonial culture and life was deeply rooted in chieftaincy systems, guided by 
specific institutionalised traditions with respect to accession to office and performance 
of functions. As Adjaye and Misawa explain (2006, p.2): 
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The chief was the political, social, economic, legal and military head of the traditional 
state. As political head, he was responsible for the maintenance of good order in his state. 
He was the guardian of the fundamental values of his people and mediated between them 
and the spiritual forces. He administered tributes, court fines, market tolls, and other 
revenues. He was also the final arbiter in the administration of justice. It can thus be seen 
that in the precolonial era chiefs commanded a great deal of autonomy.  
 
Chiefs were mainly appointed based on their hereditary lineages. In instances 
where multiple candidates qualified for a chieftaincy position, other leadership 
qualifications would become an essential criterion as well. At times, a system of 
rotation was introduced which meant that competing houses took turns in choosing a 
successor. In terms of their legitimacy, precolonial chiefs could not take actions 
affecting the community without the advice of their elders. According to Abraham 
(2013, p. 159) there were checks and balances in the political system to prevent, or 
deal with, the misuse of power by a chief. Secret societies were the most effective 
socio-political mechanism to sanction any barbarous behaviour of chiefs. This was 
executed through procedures such as poisoning, murder or, more harmless, de-
legitimatisation through the refusal to perform ceremonies (ibid.). Adjaye and Misawa 
(2006, p. 2) further hold that the chief ruled with the advice of a council that has been 
variously termed an inner or privy council. Where the system functioned well, these 
institutional checks safeguarded against dictatorial tendencies. Hence, chiefs ruled by 
consensus and could be dethroned for violating the trust, sanctions or taboos of the 
state as well as for incompetence (ibid.). Overall, the traditional functions of chiefs 
were to protect the lives and property of their subjects, maintain law and order, and 
make laws for the social and economic well-being of their people (Abraham 2013, p. 
159). A chief was expected to be fair, just, kind and generous. Consequently, 
accumulation for personal purposes was discouraged by the traditional system, as the 
chief was obliged to redistribute much of his wealth or income (ibid. p. 160). Their 
pre-colonial status, powers and societal position were severely distorted during the 
British colonial administration, affecting the societal structures as well as political 
culture of present day Sierra Leonean society.  
 
4.3. Sierra Leonean Society under Colonial Government  
During the age of European expansion, the Portuguese were among the first to 
establish contacts within Sierra Leone. In 1462, the Portuguese explorer Pedro de 
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Sintra set foot on West African soil, which would later become Freetown. Inspired by 
a mountainous West African shore, looming in the shape of a big cat, de Sintra named 
the newly discovered territory Serra de Leão (Lion Mountains). Soon, the Portuguese 
built a fort to trade gold and ivory. The English, eager to prevent the Portuguese from 
establishing a trade monopoly, entered the country in the mid-sixteenth century. From 
1550 onwards, the most profitable commodity became humans. In conjunction with 
the Dutch, the French and the Danes, the slave trade expanded dramatically. It is 
estimated that between 1761-70, in total 108,100 slaves were exported from Sierra 
Leone alone, followed by an average number of 62,500 in the subsequent three 
decades (Fage 2002, p. 266). Whereas in the earliest days of the export slave trade 
from West Africa, Europeans had occasionally captured some of the slaves 
themselves, by the eighteenth century it was extremely unusual for slaves to be 
procured other than by purchase from the established African rulers or from merchants 
who were themselves often operating under some kind of royal licence or control 
(Fage 2002, pp. 265-266). Thus, slave trade and foreign exploitation would not have 
been possible without the help of African chiefs and elders. At the same time, a 
number of English commercial agents married into local ruling clans and founded 
Anglo-African families. As Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle (1999, p. 23) note:  
 
They defiantly manipulated local connections with the Poro society [secret society of 
Sierra Leone and Liberia] as they competed against each other, and greatly extended the 
scale of the slave trade. Their wealth and success, which enabled them to establish towns 
that were larger and better fortified than those of the older ruling families, made them 
many enemies. In time, they became an embryonic comprador element in the local 
population, agents of European capital, and prime costal beneficiaries of the Atlantic slave 
trade. 
 
Two essential developments led to the creation of a British settlement in 1808, 
what was to become the Province of Freetown and a British colony in 1896. In the first 
place, upon the loss of thirteen American colonies, the British were in need of a new 
economic strategy. The idea was to convert Africans into producers of raw materials 
for British industry and consumers, instead of exporting the workforce to the former 
colonies in America. In the second place, with the creation of the Society for Effecting 
the Abolition of the Slave Trade (1787) there was a growing moral discomfort with 
slavery in general. In part, British philanthropists founded the Province of Freetown 
with the thought of creating a new home for freed slaves. Although the British 
government officially banned the slave trade in 1807, it continued to grow in Sierra 
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Leone. More slaves were carried from Africa in the year 1821 than in any previous 
year, and the slave trade continued till the mid-19
th
 century. Acemoglu et al. (2013, p. 
12) further highlight that in 1923 roughly 15 percent of the rural population was in 
servitude and frequently local chiefs themselves were large slave owners too. It was 
not until 1927 when slavery was legally abolished in Sierra Leone, and the country 
would serve mainly as a homeland for freed slaves.51 In practice, the law was only 
gradually enforced and in some places even ignored (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p.12).  
 
Apart from freed African Americans, West Indians and other liberated Africans 
also immigrated to Freetown between 1787 and 1885, creating a new ethnicity - the 
Krio. They were given legal recognition as British subjects in the colony in 1853, 
which meant they had the same equal standing as earlier settlers. The Krio‘s early 
contact with Western culture and their access to Western education enabled them to 
attain a certain measure of wealth and social and economic influence (Kilson 1964, p. 
90, Wyse 1989). Many of them attended newly established schools in the colony as 
well as the renowned Fourah Bay College, which was founded in 1827. The latter was 
not only West Africa‘s first university but at times, (notably before the civil war in 
1991), also one of the most prestigious educational institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
By 1839, the Krio began to seek opportunities abroad and spread from the Gambia to 
South Africa and as far off as East Africa (Wyse 1989, pp. 19-32). While further 
research is needed into the impact the Krio diaspora made on their host societies, they 
gave rise to a class of educated Africans with relations all over West Africa (ibid.).  
 
In 1863, the British promulgated a new constitutional charter for the colony 
(which remained unchanged until 1924) leading to the creation of municipal councils 
and self-government in 1893. Voting rights, however, were limited to small local 
elites. Concurrently, civic associations to contest these elections emerged. A growing 
Krio bourgeoisie, looking up to British political culture and society, founded civil 
committees in the in the Province of Freetown from the mid-19
th
 century onwards. In a 
way, these first civil associations were predecessors of political parties and / or civil 
society organisations. Yet, considering that until 1951 the government‘s decision 
making procedures were not freely accessible to organised groups of persons, both 
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political parties as well as CSOs were institutionalised relatively late in Sierra Leone 
(Kilson 1964 p.93). In due course, these first forms of civic associations became 
popular vehicles for the Krio population to address particular areas of concern or 
express specific grievances. Some of the most influential organisations included the 
Sierra Leone Mercantile Association (founded in 1851), composed of Krio and white 
merchants. Its main goal was the attainment of favourable trade policies. Hence it 
sought representation in the colonial legislature and in 1863 one of its members, John 
Ezzidio, was appointed as the first African member of the Legislative Council under 
colonial rule (Kilson, 1964, p. 94). The association declined in the mid-1860s and its 
work was assumed by another pressure group known as the Sierra Leone Native 
Association (1872-1882). It was later replaced by the Sierra Leone Association (1884-
1888) and served as a civil forum for debating matters of general concern (ibid, p.94). 
Furthermore, the Dress Reform Society (founded in 1887) was created as an ethnic 
consciousness group whose members adopted loose-flowing African garments to 
emphasise their racial and cultural identity. Subsequent notable civil groups included 
the Sierra Leone Native Defence Force (1908), the Negro Progressive Society (1908), 
and the African Progress Union (1919). However, with only a few exceptions, the 
membership of all these associations hardly reached beyond ethnic communities and 
tribes other than the Krio. Being the most influential ―local‖ society throughout 
colonial rule, it was also the Krio population who gained an early predominance in 
politics, albeit vastly disproportionate to its small size (Kilson, 1964 p. 90). However, 
compared to other British colonies in West Africa the Sierra Leonean Krio never really 
had quite the same privileged status. Whereas in countries like Nigeria or the Gold 
Coast (Ghana) the Krio population enjoyed professional employment in agencies of 
the colonial regime (from being lawyers to doctors), in Sierra Leone, they were largely 
excluded from these circles. The only privilege given to the Sierra Leonean Krio was 
the opportunity to serve on the Legislative Council - albeit underrepresented. By 
means of a very active press the Krio found an outlet in articulating their political 
views, frustrations and anger about the subjugation to the British. I.A. Omu‘s article 
on ‗The Dilemma of Press Freedom in Colonial Africa: The West African Example‘ 
(1968) elucidates (p. 279):  
 
African-owned newspapers in the colonial period rivalled the colonial government. Those 
who conducted them reasoned that, in the absence of a democratically elected 
government, the press was the most effective constitutional weapon for ventilating 
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grievances and influencing the trend of events. Given the freedom of the press, which they 
assumed they were entitled to enjoy as British subjects, their newspapers would each be 
the guardian of the rights and liberties of the people as well as the interpreter of their 
ideals and aspirations.  
 
By and large, freedom of the press was never really seriously threatened in any 
of the British African colonies up to the end of the First World War. This is not to 
imply that colonial governors and European officials were not averse to the highly 
critical voices against colonial administration. Rather, the situation of the press at the 
time presents somehow a curious paradox in that the African nationalist press was 
practically free yet basically controlled. I.A. Omu explains this contradiction in terms 
by highlighting a number of factors (pp. 279-281). First, the press served as a channel 
for opposition in view of the fact that Africans lacked the opportunity to constitute an 
alternative government. Second, politics was the field to which public attention was 
almost exclusively directed. Third, a certain prestige value was popularly attached to 
making criticisms of government, reflecting the indigenous African phenomenon by 
which outspoken men were held in high esteem. Hence, Africans looked with a 
mixture of surprise and satisfaction upon their fellow countrymen who unhesitatingly 
assailed the seemingly all-powerful governor. Lastly, critical perspectives served the 
economics and sales figures of newspapers. By 1900, the Sierra Leonean population 
had no fewer than thirty-four newspapers at different times.  
 
After the Province of Freetown became the first Crown Colony in 1808, it would 
take nearly 100 years before the British also took over the Sierra Leonean hinterland. 
With the aid of several ―treaties of friendship‖ the land upcountry was proclaimed a 
British protectorate in 1896. As noted by Harris (2013, pp. 9 – 46), the expanded 
colonial state helped to delineate state-society relations. The political and societal 
status of the Krio was weakened and the chiefs in the annexed Protectorate were given 
more power.  
However, initially, almost every chieftaincy responded to the British 
administration with armed resistance. The most rampant instance was the Hut Tax 
War in 1898, - a countrywide revolt against an introduced flat rate on households 
immediately imposed after the loss of political sovereignty. The Hut Tax War would 
be the only large-scale military resistance to colonialism in Sierra Leone. Civilian 
resistance continued but took on various new forms, such as for example the afore-
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mentioned critical press. Likewise, the formation of political organisations and an 
active trade union movement spurred many strikes and rioting in the capital.  
 
In the rural areas, the main targets of hostility were the tribal chiefs who had 
gradually established close ties with the colonial administration. Upon annexation the 
British divided the country into five districts, each headed by a district commissioner. 
Incapable of administering the Sierra Leone hinterland, and reluctant to commit the 
resources necessary to be able to do so, the colonial administration assigned traditional 
rulers of natives the authority of a paramount chief, who in turn were put in charge of 
subordinated local chiefs. It was a cheap and pragmatic policy for the British to rule 
the natives through their own leaders and local chiefs. Put differently, the autonomy 
given to the chiefs was not in relation to their pre-colonial status or to maintain 
traditional structures and culture but rather enabled the colonial government to bring 
the territories beyond the Province of Freetown under their control. Chiefs would 
derive their legitimacy entirely from the colonial government and ironically, the 
institutionalisation of ―native custom‖ typically made chiefs less accountable than 
precolonial leaders had been (Acemoglu et al., 2013, pp. 8-9). This system of indirect 
rule led to a strict hierarchy of chiefs classified by grades and class. It allowed the 
colonial administration to control all sectors of society without deploying a large 
number of colonial officials (Adjaye and Misawa 2006, p. 3). Needless to say, the 
power given to indigenous rulers went far beyond the limits traditionally assigned to 
them. Paramount chiefs bore the responsibility for collecting taxes, and providing both 
policing and the local labour force. Soon chieftaincies became the source of 
arbitrariness and corruption which served the British as an excuse to dethrone, depose 
or punish some chiefs (ibid. pp. 23-4). Antagonists were immediately replaced with 
locals who were believed to be more cooperative and loyal to the colonial rule. All of 
this clearly distorted the pre-colonial rule of family-based hierarchies, clans and 
traditions. Acts of local resistance were inevitable and duly occurred throughout the 
20
th
 century. They took on the form of rioting or attacks directed against tribal chiefs 
in various communities and regions across the country.  
 
The legacy left by colonial administration and legislation still affects the civil 
sphere and civil society landscape in Sierra Leone. To date, a ruling family in Sierra 
Leone is recognised as one that was established before the time of independence in 
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1961 (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 10). The way in which Sierra Leone‘s interior was 
divided sowed the seeds for a persisting urban and rural divide in many respects. 
While the colonial administration brought prosperous areas outside Freetown under 
customs control, it was reluctant to invest in policing or any form of rural 
development. More than a hundred years later, this two-tier approach still challenges 
and marginalises local civil society organisations in rural areas of the country (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). The 2004 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) accurately states in Chapter One of its Report (Volume Two)52: 
 
Rather than constructing a unified Sierra Leonean state, the colonial government 
effectively created two nations in the same land. The colonial capital Freetown, known as 
the Colony, and the much larger area of provincial territory, known as the Protectorate, 
were developed separately and unequally. The colonial government formalised the 
common law practised in the Colony yet neglected the development of customary law in 
the Protectorate, thus producing two separate legal systems that persist to the present day. 
The impact of colonial policies and practices, including those relating to citizenship, 
ownership of land, land tenure rights and conflict of laws, was far-reaching. People in the 
Colony enjoyed vastly superior social, political and economic development and access to 
vital resources such as education. The divide between the two entities bred deep ethnic 
and regional resentment and destabilised the traditional system of Chieftaincy. 
 
Several important events stemming from the civil sphere preceded Sierra 
Leone‘s independence. On the one hand, the gulf between the Krio elite and the 
majority of the population further widened. This was also the case for the Colony 
(Freetown) and the Protectorate (surrounding hinterland). Krio influence slowly began 
to wane when Lebanese immigrants and traders from Europe gradually gained more 
economic dominance in Freetown and upcountry. On the other hand, frustrations 
among the natives in the provinces about joblessness or low wages as well as lack of 
access to education grew apparent. To vent their anger, educated rural elders created 
the Committee of Educated Aborigines (CEA) in 1922. The CEA‘s main mission was 
to advocate for a redistribution of the governmental resources to rectify the 
comparative backwardness of socioeconomic conditions in the Protectorate. Their 
efforts were soon successful, leading to a new constitution in 1924, which introduced 
an amended formation of the Legislative Council, consisting of twelve formal and ten 
informal members. Of the ten informal members, two represented European 
commercial, banking, and general interests; the other eight represented African 
interests. Sierra Leonean members included five Krio on behalf of the Colony and 
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three paramount chiefs (two Mende and one Temne) on behalf of the Protectorate 
(Pham 2006, p. 24). An important legal consequence of the new constitution was that 
the distinction between Colony and Protectorate lost its significance and therefore 
paved the way for a united Sierra Leone (Thompson, 1997 p. 4). Both representatives 
of the Colony‘s Krio elite as well as the newly appointed paramount chiefs used their 
new status during debates to advocate for the interests of their respective 
constituencies (Pham, 2006, pp. 24-25). On the whole, the vast majority of the Sierra 
Leonean population remained underrepresented, however. For Kilson (1964 p. 90), the 
sociological consequences of the colony-protectorate division have substantially 
influenced the postcolonial as well as post-war development of party politics in the 
country. The long-standing predominance of the Krio, combined with their 
condescending attitude towards protectorate Africans, stimulated a deep-seated 
antagonism among educated protectorate groups (ibid. p. 90). Between the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries, pressure groups, proto-political parties, and proto-nationalist 
parties were formed with the aim of influencing the colonial government in the interest 
of their often non-Krio members. These early organised political groups can be 
regarded as Sierra Leone‘s antecedents of later political parties. One of the first proto-
nationalist groups against colonial administration was the Sierra Leone Branch of the 
National Congress of British West Africa (SLNC), formed in 1920. The SLNC 
developed liaison with other groups, for instance teachers‘ associations, women‘s 
clubs, church groups, and trade unions. It also employed a variety of political 
techniques for pursuing its goals which included public meetings, protest marches, 
submission of memoranda to the colonial government, deputations to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, and participation in the election of three representatives to the 
Legislative Council (ibid. p. 95). In 1938, the Sierra Leone Youth League (SLYL) 
eclipsed the SLNC. In stark contrast to the SLNC, the SLYL served as a political 
arena for the vast majority of underrepresented segments of the population (e.g. lower 
level professionals, the unemployed or labourers). Its founder, I.T.A. Wallace-
Johnson, studied in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s and gave the SLYL a strong 
Marxist touch. Within a year of its founding the League claimed some seven thousand 
members and entered into politics. Two of their demands were concerned with African 
representation in the legislature and universal adult suffrage (Pham 2006, p. 25). It was 
precisely on the grounds of the SLYL‘s Marxist and militantly anticolonial orientation 
that the colonial administration imprisoned I.T.A. Wallace during World War II. 
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Unable to recapture its earlier dynamic quality during the post-War period, the SLYL 
was absorbed by one of Sierra Leone‘s first political parties, the Krio-dominated UPP 
(United Progressive Parity). Instantly, an opposition party, the SLPP (Sierra Leone 
People‘s Party) was formed in April 1951. Most of the SLPP‘s leadership was drawn 
from the descendants of traditional ruling families in the protectorate, especially the 
Mende. With the emergence of the SLPP another amendment of the constitution 
occurred in 1951, laying the groundwork for decolonisation. By the late 1950s, the 
UPP was in the backseat when the British chose only SLPP members to serve on the 
Executive Council. Despite this initial success, the SLPP soon experienced internal 
frictions resulting in the formation of Sierra Leone‘s second largest party the APC (All 
Peoples Congress) - a breakaway group who refused to uphold elections before Sierra 
Leones independence on 27 April 1961. Henceforth, Sierra Leone‘s political landscape 
and political culture would be continuously marked by the power struggle between the 
two factions. Today, Sierra Leone‘s multiparty system is divided along the lines of 
local ethnicism. While mainly Mende from the southern region in the country support 
the SLPP, the APC derives its electoral constituency from the majority of Limba and 
Temne based in the north. For the Sierra Leonean scholar and Professor of Political 
Science (University of Richmond), Jimmy D. Kandeh, one of the reasons why Sierra 
Leone‘s multiparty system fell back into some sort of tribalism can be located in the 
fact that there are no major ideological differences between the two parties.53 Chapter 
6 will further delve into the argument about how ethno-politicisation also impinges 
upon the country‘s present civil society landscape and the political culture thereof.  
 
4.4. Discussion & Analysis: The civil sphere before independence 
Undoubtedly, exploring Sierra Leone‘s cultural particularism (see Section 1.2.3. 
of Chapter 1), or differently put, cultural identity and its societal characteristics, is a 
tricky undertaking. In an informal conversation, a local human rights activist uttered 
that Sierra Leone lost its identity and therefore its traditional cultural norms and values 
as soon as the slave trade and later colonisation overshadowed the history of the 
country. Yet, certain traditions, beliefs, and cultural practices persisted and can be seen 
in variations of neo-patrimonial systems, chieftaincies (even if severely distorted 
during colonialism), and the retention and ongoing formation of secret societies. All of 
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them are reflected in Chapter 2‘s presented matrix of local factors that shape and 
socially construct the values, beliefs and orientations of Sierra Leone‘s present civil 
sphere.  
 
Thus, to revert to the question prompted in Section 1.2.6. (Chapter 1): What can 
peacebuilding and development research and practice potentially learn from the 
historical, cultural, social and consequently political matrix of a conflict-ravaged 
society? To begin with, the above review of Sierra Leone‘s pre- and colonial societal 
order hopefully laid the groundwork for a clearer understanding of why Ekeh‘s (1975) 
―two publics in Africa‖ are still very much alive in present Sierra Leone. With the 
British settlement and the emergence of a Krio elite, the civil sphere was slowly but 
steadily divided along the dualities of a primordial and civic public.54 In many ways 
the Sierra Leonean experience of colonialism is the history of the clash between the 
British and an emergent African bourgeois class – the Krio (c.f. Ekeh 1975). Feeling 
ashamed of Africa‘s alleged ―backwardness‖, and aspiring to Western culture, the Krio 
appeared as an urban-based, educated elite alongside a mainly illiterate, rural based, 
―native‖ population. First, civic associations in the mid-19th century were principally 
grounded on the Krio‘s eagerness to beat the British at their own game. In Ekeh‘s 
language (p. 103): ―The African bourgeois class has a precarious foundation. It fought 
alien rulers on the basis of criteria introduced by them‖. Despite the assimilation of 
British political culture and ideals, the Krio were still heavily opposed to colonial 
administration. Strikingly, while claiming to be competent to rule, they missed one 
essential key: ―traditional‖ legitimacy stemming from the broader native population. 
The tragic irony behind the ―African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation‖ (ibid. p. 96) 
is that in order to override the colonial rule, the Krio bourgeois class depended heavily 
on colonialism for its very own legitimacy. The same was the case for chiefs, whose 
legitimacy derived entirely from the British administration.  
 
In retrospect, however, the far bigger challenge for the Krio turned out to be the 
tribal dynamics behind the processes of the first political party formations as they 
occurred shortly before independence. In the main, the SLPP as well as the APC drew 
their leading membership and political power from ruling families, their respective 
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secret societies (and sodalities) and chiefs in the Protectorate. This clearly undermined 
the Krio‘s past political influence and dominance in the Legislative Council. In other 
words, with the outmanoeuvring of the Krio elite from politics, Sierra Leone‘s 
political landscape experienced a predominance of patronage and clientelism, based on 
ruling families as they were strengthened during and shortly before the end of colonial 
rule. Naturally, these dynamics also affected the ―two publics‖ of the civil sphere, in 
that there is a constant intersection of primordial and civic (or liberal) societal features. 
Above all, civil society continues to be captured, or at least influenced, by chiefs and 
efforts to strengthen it might just strengthen the control of the chiefs over it 
(Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 35). In the wider African context, Ekeh (1975) also asserts 
that civic associations do not belong to the private realm (meant civic public) but are 
an integral part of the primordial public. As such, they do not complement the civic 
public in a Western (liberal) understanding but instead subtract from it, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to the benefit of the primordial public. Chapter 7 will, in particular, 
elaborate on this point.  
 
Conclusion  
Earlier (Chapter 2), the thesis contended that the total extension of a Western 
notion of civil society – that is, independent from the state, political, private, and 
economic spheres but in close interaction with them; and a domain of social life in 
which public opinion can be formed – can only be made at conceptual and theoretical 
peril. Accordingly, the aim of Chapter 4 was to demarcate the societal and political 
features of Sierra Leonean civil society that evolved under completely different 
circumstances in time and space. As pointed out by Harris (2013, p.166), while the 
British colonial administrative method of ―indirect rule‖ reconfigured local political 
hierarchies through capitalist and governmental penetration, many local features such 
as political and social practices remained or were even strengthened, including: 
chieftaincy, spiritual beliefs, judicial and land practices or secret societies. The 
subsequent Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will unfold how the legacies of colonial rule still 
impinge on the civil sphere, respectively on its political leeway, landscape and voice. 
These distinct features also presuppose the need to re-think to what extent civil society 
actors and functions (see Chapter 3) differ from externally introduced and prescribed 
idea(l)s.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Lumpen Youth, Civil War, and Conflict Resolution. 
Civil Society Shortly Before and During the War in Sierra Leone55 
 
 
―We were barefoot soldiers trying to negotiate the peace‖. 
Mr. Ahmed Muckson Sesay, Director OPARD-SL 
 
 
The preceding Chapter 4 sought to reinforce the thesis‘ argument that as a 
concept civil society has to be first and foremost embedded in the history of a country 
to really hold the key to understanding and explaining the dynamics of non-Occidental 
civil societies. In the case of Sierra Leone, state-society relations are entrenched in the 
experiences of the slave trade and colonial rule and manifested in the bifurcated nature 
of politics and societal fabrics. Cultural and socio-political characteristics were 
reshaped and distorted by the colonial experience while certain ―traditional‖ features 
continued to thrive.  
 
Chapter 5 will now critically reflect upon how Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere 
evolved during the post-colonial era and the many transformative impacts the civil war 
had on society, its political culture, agency and voice. In doing so, the chapter rests 
upon the assumption that every society and individual therein is complex and 
ambivalent by nature. The many inconceivable dynamics of a conflict and war force us 
to accept that we - as individuals, in groups or as a society - form a conglomerate of 
good and evil, although to different degrees at different stages, spaces and times.56 
Seemingly contrary forces within societies, their respective civil spheres, and the very 
circumstances in which they are embedded can prompt divergent impulses such as 
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 An earlier version of this Chapter was published (non-peer reviewed) in 2012. See: Datzberger, 
Simone (2012): ―Lumpen Youth, Civil War, and Conflict Resolution. Civil Society Before and After the 
War in Sierra Leone.‖ in: Journal of Sierra Leonean Studies, Vol 2. Ed. 2, 2012, pp 22-43, non-peer 
reviewed.  
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 An interesting psychological account of conditions and/or social contexts under which people are 
kind and helpful to others or, conversely, under which they commit harmful, even murderous acts is for 
instance provided by Arthur G. Miller (ed.), The Psychology of Good and Evil, Guilford Press 2005. 
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aggression (triggering conflict) and benevolence (nourishing peace and prosperity). In 
Mac Ginty‘s words: ―War is human and so is peace‖ (2010, p. 361). 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, in time of crisis, such as a civil war, civil 
society‘s agency, role and logic of societal configuration as well as organisation take 
on multiple and often contradictory dimensions. It is in this context that the following 
pages intend to unfold how the Sierra Leonean civil sphere was formed, altered and 
affected by events before and during the civil war. The analytical framework set out in 
Chapter 3 will be applied to flesh out how civil society underwent several stages of 
formation and transformation, which in turn impinged on its functions (agency) and 
actors (characteristics). The aim is to examine how the political culture of the civil 
sphere was cultivated and altered over the past decades in order to assess in Chapters 6 
and 7 how these events affected depoliticisation processes later on. With the aim to 
apply a ―civil society in Africa‖ model as opposed to a ―civil society for Africa‖ model 
(see World Bank 2007), the chapter draws on data obtained from several interviews in 
2011 and 2012 in Sierra Leone. An actor-oriented perspective is expected to widen the 
space for voices from below, hereafter referred to mainly as the civil sphere, as well as 
to broaden the analytical angle and perspective to civil actors who are not necessarily 
part of a formally registered CSO or CBO. In placing their accounts in a historical 
context, their functions shall be assessed to characterise the role, activities and agency 
of informal and formal civil actors in Sierra Leone.  
 
Much has been written about the civil war in Sierra Leone which sheds light on 
the different aspects of, and reasons for, the conflict, its actors, and their motivations. 
The analysis below cannot provide an all-encompassing account of the origins of the 
conflict, which has been summarised in compelling books by many others (e.g.: 
Abdullah 2004; Beah 2007; Bergner 2005; Farah 2004; Gberie 2005; Keen 2005; 
Krijn 2011; Olonisakin 2008; Pham 2006; Reno 1998; Richards 1995, 1996). Rather, 
the intention is to tell the story from the perspective of the civil sphere with the aim of 
outlining what kind of events and developments shaped the civil society landscape as 
we encounter it in present-day Sierra Leone. With this intention, the structure of 
Chapter 5 will be the following. Section 5.1 critically discusses Sierra Leone‘s 
political landscape before the war and how the accumulation of grievances over 
centuries, in combination with a number of tragic events, transformed fragments of an 
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emerging youth culture (i.e. a segment of the civil sphere) into a bloodthirsty rebellion. 
How this war was fought between several different factions, what role civil society 
played in it, and how the war changed the Sierra Leonean civil sphere will be the 
subjects of discussion in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. The last part of the chapter, Section 5.4, 
will then apply the thesis‘ analytical framework to assess the different actors and 
functions of civil society in Sierra Leone shortly before and during the conflict. By 
and large, the 1990s were characterised by a resurgence of a vibrant and politically 
active CSO landscape with an interest in establishing peace and making the transition 
towards democracy and sustainable development. The war created a vacuum in which 
civil society actors and activists flourished, advocating for democracy and peace. 
However, in spite of Sierra Leone‘s politically engaged civil sphere during the war, 
only a few selected civil society actors were actually able to participate in the peace 
negotiations at a national level. The exclusion or cherry picking of specific, mainly 
Freetown-based, CSOs would continue during the country‘s later peacebuilding and 
developmental stage (see Chapter 6). This is one aspect, out of many, that contributed 
to the depoliticisation process of the civil sphere, even though during the war Sierra 
Leone‘s civil society thrived as never before.  
 
 
5.1. Lumpen Youth Culture and the Emergence of the RUF 
The legacy of centuries of slave trading, foreign exploitation, and colonial 
administration challenged the genuine attempt to cultivate social cohesion, redistribute 
wealth, and develop local forms of political integrity after independence. There is 
consensus among scholars and practitioners that the misrule of the All People‘s 
Congress (APC) regime from 1968 to 1992 ultimately fostered the rage among 
socially excluded youth, and eventually led to the Revolutionary United Front‘s (RUF) 
guerrilla rebellion and a brutal and protracted war (Richards 1996; Abdullah & Muana 
1998; Olonisakin 2008; Davis 2010). The civil war, with all its barbaric acts of 
violence, is frequently described as a dreadful result of rising corruption, exploitation 
of youth by a gerontocratic cultural system,57 the conflicting dualities of a primordial 
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 Krijn (2011, see especially Chapters 1 and 8) convincingly concludes that one reason why young 
people joined the RUF or other factions was that they felt betrayed both by local rural elites and the 
state. One ex-RUF commander who was interviewed by Krijn stated, ―The root cause [of the war] was 
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was a youth movement‖. (Krijn 2011, p. 226).  
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and civic public, mismanagement of mineral resources, and neo-patrimonial 
manipulation of educational and employment opportunities.  
 
After Sierra Leone had established a multiparty system, the country‘s first 
leader, Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP, presided as prime minister. He was known for 
his good-governance principles and was widely appreciated among the population. 
The situation dramatically changed in 1964 when his brother, Albert Margai, took 
power. Albert Margai‘s rule was marked by patronage and a partial ethnicisation of 
politics that favoured specific ethnic groups such as the Mende (dominating the 
Eastern and Southern part of the country) over others such as Temne and the Limba 
(from the Northern parts) (Keen 2005, pp. 14-15, Olonisakin 2008, pp. 10-11).  
 
During the 1930s and ‗40s, a rebellious youth culture began to evolve in 
Freetown often described as the lumpen or rarray boys. In their study ―A Revolt of the 
Lumpenproletariat‖ (1998), Abdullah and Muana depict how a lumpen social 
movement became fertile soil for a lumpen revolution (later the RUF) almost 50 years 
later. Abdullah portrays these rarray boys as predominantly unlettered second-
generation city residents, infamous for being in disgrace with local communities due 
to their anti-social behaviour such as marijuana smoking, petty theft, and violence. 
Their meeting points where usually in peri-urban spaces called potes. When the 
country‘s political climate deteriorated again in the late 1960s and throughout the 
1970s, it did not leave these youth groups and political discussions about the political 
system unaffected. As Abdullah and Muana explain (1998, p. 174): 
 
As a group they knew the outline of the history of the slave trade and the dehumanization 
of the African it entailed, and could make connections between the colonial past and neo-
colonial present, generally espousing some form of pan-Africanism... Some of the pote 
types had read a little Frantz Fanon and Walter Rodney, bits of Che Guevara and Fidel 
Castro, swallowing undigested passages of Marx and Lenin from cheap or free volumes 
from the Soviet Progress Publishers.  
 
In the years following APC leader Siaka Stevens‘ rise to power in 1968, Fourah 
Bay College (FBC) university students also became part of the potes. Their prestige 
among their ill-educated brothers increased when they initiated several demonstrations 
in 1977. These student protests entered Sierra Leone‘s history books by forcing Siaka 
Stevens to hold elections and lower the voting age to 18. However, they did not stop 
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him from declaring Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978. His seventeen-year rule 
was plagued by injustice, widespread corruption, cuts in social welfare despite lavish 
spending (especially on the conference for the Organization of African Unity in 1980), 
and over-centralised power in Freetown. He fundamentally deepened the political, 
social, and infrastructural marginalisation of rural areas which colonialism had 
introduced. Railways were simply dismantled without developing rural roads in their 
place, and local rural governments were abolished leaving traditional chiefs holding 
office at their pleasure (Davis, 2010, p. 60).  
 
Stevens‘ rule caused widespread resentment among youth and left deep scars in 
the political landscape and civil sphere. For Sierra Leonean scholar and historian Joe 
A.D. Alie, by the late 1970s ―civil society was practically dead‖.58 Societal initiatives 
and concerns were simply ignored and civil society under Stevens‘ rule suffocated. 
Pham (2006, pp. 144-145) also pointed out how civil society was repressed and 
harassed by Stevens, in that he co-opted most potential rivals thus weakening Sierra 
Leonean society‘s capacity for dialogue over political and economic differences. He 
refers to the example of the country‘s principal labour union, the Sierra Leone Labour 
Congress (SLLC), and describes how Stevens constantly manipulated and sabotaged 
its members to ensure relative calm in the labour market, thereby thwarting any critical 
distinction between the state and civil society. In this regard, civil society, among 
other cultural factors, differed from a Western interpretation and political experience 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.1) on one distinct account. Stevens‘ clientelistic methods of 
political rule hampered the formation of an independent political, private, or economic 
sphere. Above all, following Rashid‘s argument (2004, p. 69), the ongoing economic 
and social deterioration of the country throughout the 1980s gave further rise to the 
formation of new radical youth groups (markedly leftist with slogans that were 
populist, socialist, and pan-Africanist) at FBC.  
 
A significant youth movement at that time was called Mass Awareness and 
Participation (MAP). MAP, according to Abdullah and Muana‘s accounts (1998, 
2004) was a lose coalition of members from different university clubs who maintained 
tight links with the lumpen world of the pote. Soon anti-government posters and 
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graffiti covered the campus and large parts of the city. With strong support from 
campus radicals, a young man called Alie Kabba was elected as MAP‘s student union 
president while he was away attending an annual Green Book celebration in Libya. To 
the disapproval of the authorities, rumours quickly arose that the Libyans sponsored 
MAP‘s leadership. In addition, some of FBC‘s students were accused of planning to 
encamp Libyan mercenaries in their rooms. Consequently, forty-one students were 
suspended from university in 1985 although neither the university nor the government 
formally investigated the charge. This prompted violent student protests. Alie Kabba 
and four other students were arrested but subsequently released and the matter was 
dropped by the administration (Abdullah, 2004, p. 49; Abdullah & Muana, 1998, pp. 
175-176; Rashid, 2004, pp. 80-81).   
 
For Abdullah and Muana, the expulsion of MAP from the college marked a 
turning point in youth-oriented opposition in Sierra Leone in that (1998, p. 176): 
 
Henceforth, the baton passed to the lumpen youths and pote-affiliated organic intellectuals 
(some ex-students of FBC and the second campus of the national university at Njala) in 
numerous study groups and revolutionary cells scattered around the country.  
 
It was at this point in time when embryonic RUF formations started to gain an 
ideological impetus from rural areas. Krijn (2011) draws attention to the fact that the 
Bunumbu Teachers College (a rural training college near the Liberian border which 
received continuous support from UNESCO throughout the 1970s and 1980s) also 
shaped the mindsets of soon-to-be RUF members. Despite the fact that some of 
Bunumbu‘s graduates voluntarily joined the RUF, its contribution to student 
radicalisation in Sierra Leone has been neglected in several debates given that the RUF 
has been often described as a movement without any ideological content (Krijn 2011, 
p. 21).  
 
In 1985, six years before the RUF launched its first attack, Siaka Stevens handed 
over the presidency to his army commander, Major-General Joseph Momoh. Momoh 
promised to instil discipline in public life and improve the living conditions for Sierra 
Leoneans. In light of the preceding student and youth protests, he also tried to solicit 
support from lumpen youth but without any major success. All in all, his governance 
proved to be no better (and perhaps even worse) than Siaka Stevens‘ rule. The 
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economy and public services virtually collapsed, and external debt climbed to 86 
percent of GDP (compared to 17 percent of GDP in the 1970s). The 1989 structural 
adjustment programme did not receive international financial support because the 
government failed to demonstrate its commitment to reform. In the hope of attracting 
corporate foreign investment, Momoh initiated two military operations in 1989 to evict 
illicit miners from the diamond mines (Davis, 2010, pp. 60-61).  
 
For Reno (1998, p. 121), Momoh‘s militarily operations further marginalised the 
semi-destitute illicit diamond miners and motivated many youths to later join the RUF.  
The tensions leading to war continued to build.  While the country saw itself in the 
midst of an economic downturn, Allie Kabba and some other exiled radicals deepened 
their Libyan connections. Some of the expelled students were now in exile in Ghana, 
and they recruited youth from Sierra Leone for military and ideological training in 
Bengahzi. Among them was Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal who was detained 
in 1971 for plotting against Siaka Stevens. Everyone who undertook military training 
in Libya between 1987 and 1988 became part of the very early formation of the RUF. 
It was in 1988 that Sankoh first met guerilla fighter and future Liberian President, 
Charles Taylor, in Libya. Taylor encouraged Sankoh to join the NPFL (National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia), which was initially founded as a pan-African movement. 
They made a deal that Sankoh would help Taylor to overthrow Samuel Doe‘s regime 
in Liberia, and in exchange Taylor would help the RUF to launch an armed struggle. It 
was in Taylor‘s particular interest to support the destabilisation of the Sierra Leonean 
government because of its support for the international community‘s peacekeeping 
efforts in Liberia (Abudullah, 2004, pp. 56-57; Krijn, 2011, p. 217; Richards, 1996, p. 
2-4).  
 
When the movement started to plan its first counter-insurgency a couple of its 
members considered it to be too risky and ill designed. Consequently, some members, 
including Alie Kabba, dissociated themselves from the RUF. Alie Kabba later stated 
that this was the moment when the way opened for the ―wrong kind of individuals‖ to 
became part of the RUF (Abuallah & Muana, 1998, p. 177).  
 
Experts, however, disagree as to whether the RUF lost its ideological base at this 
point in time, and therefore also to what extent it was politically driven to pursue a 
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specific agenda or interests. The Sierra Leonean scholar Gberie (2005), argues that the 
RUF did not have the cadres, ideological orientation, or the political base to be 
transformed into a serious political organisation. In his view the movement was 
largely conceived as a mercenary enterprise that never evolved beyond ―banditism‖. 
This was, for him, the very reason why its transformation into a political party after 
the war was doomed to failure. Similarily, for Abullah and Muana (1998, 2004) as 
well as Bangura (2004) the RUF lost its ideological credibility as soon as the organic 
intellectuals withdrew from the project. The RUF, they argue, started as an urban 
radical left-wing movement of students, but their lumpen followers soon became a 
―lumpen guerilla force‖ consisting of an uneducated underclass from the potes. Krijn 
(2011) vehemently criticises Abdullah‘s account and emphasises the fact that the 
majority of RUF members were from rural areas and not urban or peri-urban spaces. 
Strikingly, Krijn‘s interviews disclose that the majority of the RUF were Mende 
speakers, and that most of the early RUF volunteers had their origins in the Kailahun 
and Pujehun Districts (2011, p. 241). Hence, for Krijn the RUF rebellion was both a 
symptom of, and an attempted answer to, the socioeconomic crisis of rural youth 
(2011, p. 11).   
Both Richards (1996) and Krijn (2011) believe that the RUF had a political 
ideology - albeit a simple-minded one.  Their principles were expressed in the 
movement‘s manifesto called ―Footpaths to Democracy – Towards a new Sierra 
Leone‖.59 That the RUF had, and made use of, a manifesto indicates that the movement 
had, or at least wanted to follow, some sort of ideology. For example, reference is 
made to ending forms of exploitation:60  
 
In our simple and humble ways we say, ―No more slave and no more master‖. It is these 
very exploitative measures instated by so-called central governments that create the 
conditions for resistance and civil uprising.  
 
Likewise, the RUF repeatedly called for free education and medical care, 
collective farming, a people‘s court, and a system of promotion based on merit. Such 
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an egalitarian (yet meritocratic) agenda inspired many young people from the civil 
sphere to become part of the movement during its initial stages. Also, contrary to 
many portrayals of the RUF, Krijn found that a large part of the RUF cadre underwent 
some sort of education.  
 
For Keen (2005, pp. 39-47), the RUF also shows some indication of expressing 
an ideological position, even though it was in stark contrast with their actions, which 
included horrendous atrocities against civilians, widespread abduction, forced 
recruitment, exploitation, sexual violence, and drug abuse. As Fithen and Richards put 
it: ―the RUF represents a paradox. It claimed to have ambitions for a more just society, 
and yet ended up a random and arbitrary killing machine‖ (2005, p. 123). In this 
context, Ahmed Muckson Sesay, director of the CBO OPARD-SL (Organization for 
Peace Reconciliation and Development - Sierra Leone), refers to a statement he 
repeatedly heard during his mediation efforts with rebels when they were asked why 
they committed such atrocities:61 ―War was even in the Bible, when there was a war 
innocent people had to die.‖ Krijn explain the connections between violence and 
ideology , noting (2011, p. 219, footnote 9): 
 
It is a heroic assumption to conclude that an ideology is a guarantee against atrocity or 
mass civilian deaths at the hands of insurgent or revolutionary movements. History shows 
us rather the opposite: the stronger the ideology, the more victims. The rural-autarkic 
ideology of the Khmer Rouge movement in Cambodia caused the deaths of more than one 
third of the population. Mao‘s Cultural Revolution cost millions of lives. The mother of 
all revolutions, the 1789 French Revolution (birth of French rationalism) was soaked in 
blood, and it soon started to ‗eat its own men‘. It is possible that the problem with the 
RUF, as with the movements mentioned here, might be not its lack of ideology (and 
intellectuals), but that the cadres were blinded by too much ideology.  
 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to engage in a more detailed discourse as to 
what extent the RUF was driven by too much ideological or political thinking, or 
whether one could seriously compare their guerrilla attacks with the French 
Revolution. Yet, it should be acknowledged here that although the RUF operated only 
on the basis of an ill-formulated and badly communicated manifesto, it nevertheless 
set out some aims and ideas for the future. Still, the magnitude of brutality committed 
by the RUF is difficult to comprehend. In this context, Keen (2005) contends that 
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 The interview was held on 04.07.2011 in Masiaka, near Mile 91. The rebels attacked Mile 91 a total 
of 19 times in the period from 1994 to 2000. The role of OPARD-SL in the peace process will be 
further discussed towards the end of Section 5.2. on the civil war.  
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feelings of shame and humiliation among marginalised youth were ultimately 
expressed in acts of horrific violence as a way of communicating grievances. He 
echoes the thinking of US psychiatrist James Gilligan. In his essay about the triage of 
―Shame, Guilt and Violence‖ published in 2003, Gilligan holds that feelings of 
disrespect, including the lack of self-love, can lead to irrational and non-justifiable 
behaviour. It is worth noting in this regard, that the issue of respect was raised many 
times in the scope of several interviews and informal conversations with youth groups 
and clubs conducted in Sierra Leone in 2011 and 2012. Feelings of mutual and self-
respect were not only perceived as important but also interlinked with the 
peacebuilding, if not reconciliation process, of the country as a whole. Hence, in 
alignment with Keen (2005), it is argued that, greed with regard to the country‘s 
resources (most notably diamonds) played only a secondary role in the RUF‘s nascent 
stage.62 In fact, the majority of authors agree that the rebellion‘s motives were rooted 
in decade-long socioeconomic grievances. Although the RUF gained control over 
diamond mines and their revenues in due course to fund their violence and rebellion, 
diamonds did not cause, but rather perpetuated and protracted the war.  
 
In sum, Stevens‘ and later Momoh‘s political repression left no room for an 
inclusive political dialogue between the state, civil society actors, and the civil sphere. 
Democratic openings in the form of student demonstrations did not lead to a political 
outlet for ordinary civilians (in particular youth groups) to blow off steam and form a 
potent and serious opposition to the state or at least make their voices and concerns 
heard. When the RUF emerged as a vicious rebellion to overthrow the APC regime, its 
poorly communicated ideology gave rise to the hypothesis that Sierra Leone‘s civil 
war was not fought on the basis of a specific political aim, interest or democratic 
cause. It was though, the political suffocation of the civil sphere, the lack of agency 
and voice alongside a century-long accumulation of grievances that provided the 
fertile ground for a violent resistance driven by a vague political agenda. Section 5.4.1 
                                                 
62
 The ‗greed versus grievance‘ debate was famously introduced by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in a 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper published in 2000 arguing that ―Conflicts are more likely 
to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance‖ (2000, p. 91). Many scholars including 
Keen 2005 and Zack-Williams 2010) criticise Collier vehemently for ―dismissing the grievances of the 
masses against imperialist and domestic exploitation, corruption, and totalitarianism‖ (Zack-Williams, 
2010, p. 22). Gberie, despite describing Sankoh as ―nothing more than a functionary within a vast 
network of warlord economies that was controlled by Charles Taylor‖ finds an explanation for the root 
causes of the war in the nature of the state itself and ―near-criminal‖ APC misrule (2005, pp. 152–155).  
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will further take up on this point in analysing Sierra Leone‘s civil society actors after 
independence and during the war as a whole.  
 
 
5.2. Sierra Leone’s civil sphere during the civil war 
‖You can go‖, the man repeated, waving his hand this time. ―Go, go, go!‖ I stood up 
slowly and turned my body toward the soccer field. ―Wait!‖ the rebel hollered. I stood 
motionless as a couple of the boys grabbed guns from their backs and pointed them at me. 
I waited for the older rebel‘s order to shoot. Instead, he walked in front of me. ―You must 
choose a punishment before you leave,‖ he said. ―Like what?‖ I mumbled. Tears I could 
no longer hold back streamed down my face. ―Which hand do you want to lose first?‖… 
―Please, please don‘t do this to me‖ I begged one of the boys... ―If you are going to chop 
off my hands, please just kill me,‖ I begged them. ―We‘re not going to kill you,‖ one boy 
replied. ―We want you to go to the president and show him what we did to you. You 
won‘t be able to vote for him now. Ask the president to give you new hands…‖ It took 
three attempts to cut off my left hand… I sank to the ground as the boy wiped the blood 
off the machete and walked away. As my eyelids closed, I saw the rebel boys giving each 
other high-fives. I could hear them laughing. As my mind went dark, I remember asking 
myself: ―What is a president?‖ (Kamara 2008, pp. 39-41).  
 
It is estimated that about 27,000 Sierra Leoneans have been disabled or have had 
one or more of their limbs amputated, about 50,000 people lost their lives (UNFPA 
estimates about 60,00063), and one million people were displaced during the 1991-
2002 civil war.64 In an interview with the Fifty/Fifty Group the director refers to a case 
when she had to take care of a four-month old baby whose legs were cut off by the 
rebels.65 In other words, atrocities committed by the RUF and other armed groups had 
no limits.  
 
The gruesome war in Sierra Leone was complex, involved different armed 
groups, and crossed the war-ravaged Liberian and Guinean borders. Kaplan famously 
described the Zeitgeist of the situation in the mid-1990s as (1994, p. 9):  
 
[A] microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, 
throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of 
central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of 
disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.  
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 See UNFPA (29.05.2006) http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/news/pid/174, last visit 
13.02.2014. 
64
 See IRIN News (24.10.2011): http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94037, last visit 
13.02.2014. 
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 The Fifty/Fifty Group is a local CSO - interview held on July 5th, 2011, in Freetown. 
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On 23 March 1991, about 100 guerrilla fighters invaded Sierra Leone from 
Liberia at Bomaru, Kailahun District, thereby kicking off a civil war that would (with 
interruptions) progressively engulf the entire country. It is assumed that the majority 
(if not all) were NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) fighters, who would be 
permanently lent out to Sankoh‘s forces by Charles Taylor (Keen, 2005; Krijn, 
2011).66 Soon they gained control over eastern Sierra Leone aiming to overthrow the 
president, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh of the APC. Ironically, earlier in the 
same year, amid mounting external and internal pressures (such as the earlier 
mentioned student protests) to end the 1978 one-party rule, Momoh finally gave in and 
adopted a new constitution, thereby opening a way out of the country‘s political 
stagnation through the restoration of a multiparty electoral democracy. Ultimately, his 
reforms came too late to preserve Sierra Leone from the mayhem that was to blight the 
country for more than a decade. 
 
From the very beginning of the war, the national forces of the SLA (Sierra 
Leone Army) lacked the capacity, resources, discipline, and attitude to successfully 
defeat the rebel movement. In order to assist the government, an Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force was deployed to defend against 
the RUF rebellion. However, it was slow to reach across the country (Olonisakin, 
2008). By 1992, the RUF posed a serious threat to the diamond-mining areas in Kono. 
The situation further deteriorated, when - frustrated by poor payment, bad conditions, 
and lack of logistical support - a group of SLA junior military officers launched a 
successful military coup. President Momoh fled the country leaving the 25-year-old 
Captain Valentine Strasser to become the world‘s youngest Head of State. He 
established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and remained in power 
for four years. Initially, the RUF were expected to form a coalition with the new 
government and many civilians hoped the rebellion would simply peter out (Keen, 
2005, pp. 94-95). Exactly the opposite occurred. Strasser‘s rule repudiated the rebel 
movement so the RUF vowed to continue the war despite being weakened and 
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 Despite the general belief that the first attack was a joint RUF-NPFL effort, Krijns‘s interviews reveal 
that it was not the RUF that actually initiated the first attack. One of Krijns‘s informants from the ex-
RUF cadre stated: ―Before the war some Liberian rebels were trading with the Sierra Leonean army, 
because by that time Liberia was already in a war. But some of the Sierra Leonean guys cheated the 
rebels, so these rebels entered Sierra Leone and the conflict started. Of course the RUF all the way 
planned to attack Sierra Leone, but according to my information they wanted to wait a few months 
longer. But this incident speeded up the whole thing‖ (2011, pp. 62-63). 
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dislodged from its strongholds, except for an enclave in the Gola Forest. Before they 
could take over diamond mining areas and plan their next big offensive, which was to 
take place in 1994-95, it was necessary to rebuild forest camps and raid army stores to 
train new teenage cadres and abductees (Richards, 1996; Fithen & Richards 2005, pp. 
120-121). The NPRC was not only the RUF‘s enemy during the civil war but it would 
soon also deprive the RUF of its main sources of recruits: the marginalised, 
unemployed youth, street children, and petty criminals. It is estimated that the NPRC 
was able to expand the army from a pre-war figure of 3,000 or 4,000 to between 
15,000 and 20,000 by 1993 (Krijn, 2011, pp. 64-65).  
 
In the case of the RUF, young volunteers from the more remote parts of 
Kailahun and Puhehun Districts were joining the rebels. But when stories of atrocities 
spread, the movement quickly ran out of willing supporters and was forced to recruit 
mostly by capture (Fithen & Richards, 2005, p. 126). Many of the captives were the 
age of primary school children and easy to brainwash with RUF ideologies (mainly 
through a mix of drugs composed of cocaine, gunpowder, and marijuana). According 
to the Global Child Soldier Report of 2008, after the war, about 6,774 children took 
part in a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme. 
Statistics also reveal that 3,710 children had been with the RUF, 2,026 with the pro-
government Civil Defence Forces (CDF), 471 with the Sierra Leone Army, 427 with 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and 144 were with other factions or 
non-affiliated.67 Not all of the former child-soldiers benefited from DDR programmes 
and it is estimated that roughly 10,000 children had to fight in the war. 
 
In the course of his rule, Strasser increasingly lost control over his own army. 
His recruits (as mentioned above) were not only ill-trained but their loyalty was 
questionable. It was later estimated that about 40 percent of Strasser‘s soldiers had 
either deserted or defected to the rebels. A number of presumed rebel attacks were 
actually committed by rogue military units. Soon, the local press began to report about 
so-called ―sobels‖ – soldiers by day, rebels by night (Keen 2002, p. 8; Pham, 2006, p. 
94).  
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 For more information about child soldiers see: 
http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone, (last visit 17 November 2011).  
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Due to the SLA‘s collusion and ongoing RUF attacks, traditional hunting 
militias started to defend their villages, families, and goods. In 1997, these militias 
formed the Civil Defence Force (CDF), mainly composed of the kamajoisia of the 
Mende group, gbethis and kapras of the Temne, and the donsos of the Kono (Hoffman 
2007).68 It is noteworthy, that the CDF constitutes a militia which was raised from the 
civil population in the rural areas and therefore presents an interesting intersection of 
both the primordial and civic public. The ensuing Section 5.4.1 (―Civil society actors 
after independence and during the war‖) will further analyse this phenomenon. At first 
the kamajoisia clashed with the NPRC on a number of occasions, but as the NPRC 
soldiers became more corrupt and less reliable, Strasser sought their support and 
deployed 500 Kamajoisia fighters on the war front in Kenema and Kailahun Districts 
in March 1994 (Gberie, 2005, p. 85). Later on, he recruited the South African 
mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes, to wage war against the rebels. 
 
In the midst of continued attempts to counter the RUF insurgency, various 
political groups and CSOs pressured the NPRC to relinquish power to an elected 
civilian government at the beginning of 1996 (Pham, 2006, p. 113). At a conference 
held in Freetown in August 1995, it was hotly debated whether a peace settlement 
should come before elections or vice versa. Participants included the INEC (Interim 
National Electoral Commission), political leaders, and civil society representatives. 
The RUF was invited to the conference, but did not send a representative as they were 
against elections taking place without a prior peace settlement. Five months after the 
conference, Brigadier-General Maada Bio replaced Strasser in a bloodless coup. Due 
to persistent demand for democratic elections Maada Bio had no choice but to hand 
over power to an elected government. These elections were to be held in March 1996 
(Oloniasakin, 2008, pp. 17-19, 136). The RUF‘s rage at the upcoming elections was 
expressed in intensified attacks on civilians, notoriously mutilating and amputating 
limbs without discrimination. The violence received scant media attention, especially 
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 The CDF‘s role and functions during the war caused a lot of controversial debates among officials 
and academics. For some, such as the Sierra Leonean scholar Lansana Gberie, the CDF was an 
―extraordinary phenomenon‖ as it emerged as an organisation stemming from the civil sphere to protect 
civilians who were oppressed by rebel attacks (Ainley et.al., 2013 pp. 21-22). However, others, like 
Human Rights Watch, stress that the CDF committed the same war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
violations of the laws of war and of the Sierra Leonean state as other warring parties during the civil 
war. For this reason, the Special Court for Sierra Leone investigated whether the CDF should be 
considered as a military organisation with a system of military command and control. Based on (again 
disputed) expert testimonies the court indicted three high rank CDF members.  
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the cutting off of people‘s hands in a gruesome response to SLPP‘s canvassing slogan: 
―The future is in your hands‖. Despite the RUF‘s atrocities, SLPP leader Ahmad Tjan 
Kabbah became the newly-elected president (Pham, 2006, p. 115).  
 
Eight months later, in November 1996, Kabbah engaged in peace talks with the 
RUF in Abidjan. Although he declared a ceasefire and the army stood down, the CDF 
(assisted by Executive Outcomes) continued to attack RUF bases during the 
negotiations. The RUF signed the Abidjan accords but because of the CDF‘s assaults, 
the leadership was unable to reach out to its field commanders who were still scattered 
all around the county (Fithen & Richards, 2005, p. 120). In short, the Abidjan Peace 
agreements were doomed to fail before the ink had dried. Even greater chaos and 
destruction was to come and no superior international assistance was in sight. Seven 
years later, the final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) stated:  
 
The United Nations (UN) and the international community abandoned Sierra Leone in its 
greatest hour of need during the early 1990s. Lack of foresight by the UN and the 
international community resulted in the hastily prepared and ill-conceived Abidjan Peace 
Accord in 1996.
69
 
 
Despite Kabbah‘s government turning around the economy from a negative 
growth rate of minus 6.4 percent to a positive rate of 6.0 percent in just one year 
(Gberie 2004, p. 144), these changes were not really to the benefit of the broader 
public. A locally conducted opinion poll six months after the election showed severe 
disappointment in his performance, citing indicators such as growing hardship and 
poverty (Reno 1999, p. 138). Furthermore, Kabbah refused to renew Executive 
Outcomes‘ contract beyond January 1997, mainly due to pressure by the IMF to better 
control government spending. In retrospect, this was a fatal decision as it led to 
another coup on 25 May 1997, known as ―Bloody Sunday‖. The coup was not only the 
dreadful result of Sierra Leone‘s further deteriorating military situation, but it was also 
based on resurfacing tensions between the SLA and the kamajoisia. A small group of 
heavily armed soldiers in civilian clothing stormed Freetown and freed about 600 
prisoners; some of them were the country‘s most notorious criminals. Among them 
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 Section ―Findings‖ paragraph 372, see http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html, last visit 
13.02.2014.  
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was Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who had previously served as head of Strasser‘s 
security operations unit before becoming a sobel. Kabbah was forced into exile in 
Conakry. The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS) announced the formation of 
an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with Major Johnny Paul Koroma as 
its chairman. The AFRC declared the rebel war to be over, presented itself as the new 
government and proclaimed the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, who was in detention in 
Nigeria at the time, as the Vice Chairman of the Council. Sankoh became the deputy 
leader of the country and a joint AFRC/RUF leadership was ready to rule Sierra Leone 
(Gberie, 2004, pp. 143-153; Pham, 2006, pp. 122-123).  
 
The junta was condemned in Sierra Leone and internationally. Locally, the vast 
majority of ordinary Sierra Leoneans expressed their opposition simply by staying at 
home, refusing to go to work even after repeated threats of dismissal by the 
AFRC/RUF. Likewise, members of the National Union of Sierra Leone Students 
(NUSS) started to plan a massive demonstration against the military junta, gaining 
widespread support from the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), the 
Sierra Leone Women‘s Forum (SLWF), and many other civic organisations (e.g. the 
Inter-Religious Council, the Labour Congress and the Teachers‘ Union). The anger 
among AFRC/RUF soldiers about civil protests was intense. In August 1997, just 
about everyone on the streets of Freetown was attacked with machetes, sticks, and live 
bullets (Gberie, 2004, pp. 153 - 157).  
A few civil society associations and initiatives proved to be successful in their 
efforts to establish peace. For instance, the IRCSL (Inter-Religious Council of Sierra 
Leone) formed in early 1997 by the country‘s religious leaders played a significant 
behind-the-scene role in facilitating communications between warring parties 
throughout the war and peace process (Pham 2006, pp. 147-148). 
According to Oloniasakin, the determination of ―Sierra Leonean civil society 
mustered a will of steel [which was] perhaps one of the principal factors that endeared 
some key international actors, not least Tony Blair‘s newly elected government in the 
UK, to Sierra Leone‖70 (2008, p. 22). The nationwide passive resistance resulted in the 
formation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), an assembly of 
almost all the pressure groups, CSOs, and the local militias (kamajoisia and kapra). 
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 In July 1997, the AFRC-led government was officially suspended from all Commonwealth meetings.  
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The latter formally constituted the MRD‘s armed wing – the CDF (Gberie, 2004, pp. 
153-154).  
In interviews with several CSOs (e.g. Nos. 4, 6, 12 and 29, Appendix 1) 
conducted in 2011 and 2012 it was mentioned that during the war, society in Sierra 
Leone was united like never before in that everyone shared a common objective: to 
establish peace. Correspondingly, in a conversation about the concept of civil society, 
a representative from the Sierra Leonean Association for NGOs (SLANGO) made an 
interesting point: 
 
Civil society is very fragmented. However, that is what makes civil society to be civil 
society and one has to accept that civil society is diverse and complex. You cannot have a 
united civil society unless you have a common enemy.
71
  
 
In another interview with the Campaign for Good Governance (CCG),72 it was 
pointed out that most of the formal civil society actors (i.e., official organisations, 
associations, and alliances) emerged during or immediately after the war. While the 
civil sphere was constantly subjected to suffocation from independence onwards, 
Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape exploded during and after the conflict. For the 
Women‘s Partnership for Justice and Peace (WPJP)73, if there was one positive result 
of the war, it was certainly the emergence of local CSOs and politically active human 
rights activists.  
 
At a global level the disapproval of the junta was articulated in three United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) statements in May, July, and August 1997. In 
addition, help was offered by the OAU in order to support ECOWAS‘s efforts to 
restore President Kabbah. In September of the same year, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 1132, which imposed a total oil and arms embargo and authorised 
ECOWAS to ensure its implementation by using Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 23, 136).  
Sustained international, national, military, and civic pressure forced the 
AFRC/RUF to sign a new Peace Plan on 23 October 1997 during a meeting in 
Conakry. Its implementation, once again, was undermined by the legendary 
unpredictably of the junta (Gberie, 2004, pp. 161-163). In February and March of 
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 Interview held with SLANGO in Freetown, 5 July 2011.  
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 Interview held with CCG in Freetown, 7 July 2011.  
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 Interview held with WPJO in Freetown, 4 July 2011.  
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1998, the Nigerian-led West African intervention force ECOMOG successfully 
managed to restore Kabbah‘s presidency and drove the AFRC/RUF from power. 
Forced to go back to the bush, the ex-junta regained strongholds in Kailahun District 
and further strengthened its supply lines to Liberia (Fithen & Richards, 2005, p. 121).  
Once the Kabbah government was reinstated it immediately declared a state of 
emergency. In addition, considerable media attention was given to the fact that 
Kabbah had contracted the British private armed force, Sandline International, to 
defeat the junta. Sandline‘s involvement was harshly criticised as a violation of the 
UNSC sanctions and arms embargo. As a consequence, the British had to withdraw 
their High Commissioner from Sierra Leone. The affair was not only embarrassing for 
all parties involved, but it also initiated ongoing debates about the role of private 
security companies in regional conflicts in the absence of credible international 
military intervention (Pham, 2006, p. 134). In July of the same year, the UN 
established an Observer Mission (UNOMSIL) and sent out seventy observers. The 
AFRC/RUF kept attacking regions in the north, east, and south and managed to win 
back the diamond-rich Koidu. Sankoh returned from detention in Nigeria to Sierra 
Leone but was sentenced to death for treason in October 1998. The ARFC/RUF‘s 
armed response to Sankoh‘s conviction was the infamous Operation No Living Thing. 
On 6 January 1999, the rebels launched a bloody assault in Freetown, killing an 
estimated 7,000 people and committing widespread atrocities. All UNOMISL 
personnel were evacuated and Kabbah‘s government was given no option but to 
cooperate with the ARFC/RUF.  
 
5.3. Conflict Resolution and the agency of civil society therein.  
After the 1999 attacks, Kabbah‘s government was under pressure to negotiate 
with the rebels. On 25 May 1999, Kabbah and Sankoh signed a ceasefire agreement in 
Lomé, Togo, leading to a power-sharing agreement in July of the same year. From the 
very beginning the Lomé negotiations were dominated by the rebel‘s strategic 
advantage. The Sierra Leonean government, as well as the international and regional 
actors, were demoralised and just wanted an end to the war. As Zack-Williams aptly 
notes (2010, p. 30):  
 
Clearly, the Lomé chickens had come home to roost: by hurling a democratically elected 
government into negotiations with a bunch of armed thugs, the latter felt empowered to go 
to the whole hog.  
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International mediators from the UN, OAU, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth, the 
United Kingdom, and the US assisted in the talks. Civil society involvement was 
limited with the exception of the IRCSL whose role was recognised in Article VIII of 
the agreement. All other CSOs were granted observer status (particularly the Sierra 
Leone‘s Women‘s Movement for Peace) but none of them were permitted to actively 
participate in, or even raise any concerns during, the negotiations. The final outcome 
was a triumph for the RUF and its fighters. In a nutshell: the GoSL acceded to the 
RUF‘s demand for a blanket amnesty; Foday Sankoh was made chairman of the 
Strategic Mineral Resources Commission and the RUF obtained a further eight cabinet 
posts; the ex-junta, in return, promised to release abducted civilians, disarm, and to be 
reintegrated into the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces as well as to reconstitute itself into 
a political organisation (Olonisakin 2008, p. 138). 
 
Not surprisingly, the RUF‘s immunity from prosecution resulted in a great deal 
of criticism (within and outside Sierra Leone). The preamble of the agreement refers to 
the commitment and promotion of ―full respect for human rights and humanitarian 
law‖, which, quite obviously stands in stark contrast with Article IX, paragraph 3 of 
the accord, that stipulates: 74  
 
To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the 
Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against 
any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by 
them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991, 
up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. 
 
This controversial element of the agreement refelected the lack of a strong 
international demand for accountability for human rights abuses in the course of the 
civil war (Zack-Williams, 2010, p. 29). It equally reflects the immense pressure 
exerted over Kabbah during the negotiations by all parties involved. He expressed his 
silent protest, nonetheless, during the signing ceremony of the Lomé accords by 
bringing a child with him whose arm had been amputated by the RUF (Robertson 
2002, p. 467).  
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 The full version of the Lomé Peace Accord can be downloaded from: http://www.sierra-
leone.org/lomeaccord.html, last visit 14.02.2014. 
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At about the time that the Lomé negotiations took place, the newly elected 
government of Nigeria pushed for a negotiated settlement of Nigeria‘s participation in 
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone due to rising costs and increasing unpopularity of Nigerian 
soldiers. Since the beginning of ECOMOG‘s deployment, Nigeria contributed 90 
percent of the troops and had to bear most of the estimated US$ 1 million per day 
costs (it is worth mentioning that at that time ECOMOG was deployed, 65.6 percent of 
all Nigerians were living on less than US$ 1.25 a day).75 Nigeria‘s persistent calls to 
receive any kind of support from the US or UN remained unfulfilled. In Oloniasakin‘s 
words (2008, p. 87): 
 
Nigeria and ECOMOG were left to dominate the Sierra Leone scene for a long period 
with little or no attention from the international community. When the UN was eventually 
ready to engage more actively, these regional actors felt they were being dispossessed of 
their rightful role in a situation where they had for so long borne the costs. 
 
Also, considering the corrupt nature of the Nigerian regime, it was speculated 
that most of Nigeria‘s funds never reached the military forces in Sierra Leone (Pham 
2006, p. 135). Among others, Keen notes that some ECOMOG forces were involved 
in diamond smuggling (2005, p. 224). Thus, Nigeria‘s wish to bring its military 
support to an end was not unexpected, but it also weakened Kabbah‘s position further. 
All the poorly planned solutions and assistance from the regional and international 
arena, combined with the January 1999 attacks, signified an important wake-up call 
for the international community to finally take the situation in Sierra Leone more 
seriously (Zack-Williams, 2010, pp. 28-30).  
The UN‘s response was officially outlined in the Lomé accords. In October 
1999, the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed with 
6,000 troops; this was later raised to 17,500 making it one of the UN‘s largest and 
most expensive peacekeeping missions with a total expenditure of US$ 2.8 billion.76 It 
replaced UNOMSIL and led to ECOMOG‘s withdrawal in May 2000. From its very 
beginnings UNAMSIL faced several difficulties, as the RUF simply did not respect, 
and actually ignored, the Lomé agreements. On a couple of occasions UNAMSIL 
faced the embarrassment of its blue helmets being disarmed by the RUF as opposed to 
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http://www.ng.undp.org/documents/NHDR2009/NHDR_MAIN-REPORT_2008-2009.pdf, last visit 
13.02.2014. 
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 See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html, last visit 13.02.2014. 
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them disarming the rebels. Soon, the mission was dubbed ―UNAMSILLY‖. In May 
2000, the history of UNAMSIL reached its darkest hour when, shortly after 
ECOMOG‘s withdrawal, 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF.  
 
Yet ordinary Sierra Leoneans would not surrender. On 6 May 2000, women‘s 
groups gathered outside of the RUF rebel leader‘s house demanding the release of the 
UN peacekeepers. Freetown was geared up for a large demonstration against Sankoh. 
Two days later, on 8 May 2000, about 30,000 people, including members of the 
parliament, joined the protests. Although UNAMSIL troops were stationed at 
Sankoh‘s domicile they completely lost control over the situation when his 
bodyguards started to fire into the crowd. Twenty people were killed and dozens 
injured. Sankoh escaped but was seized and arrested on 17 May in Freetown 
(Olonisakin, 2008, p. 60).  
Immediately after the bloody demonstrations, the British deployed troops in 
Sierra Leone, ostensibly to evacuate British citizens. Supported by naval ships and air 
force planes, they eventually successfully reinforced the UNAMSIL contingent. In 
early July, some of UNAMSIL‘s soldiers who were still being held hostage by the 
RUF were freed. Illegal checkpoints in the Occra hills were cleared by August 2000, 
and the strategic junction town of Masiaka was recaptured.  
 
Events as they happened in rural towns like Masiaka are often overlooked. BBC 
correspondent, Mark Doyle said, ―over the past decade of war [Masiaka] has changed 
hands between various armed factions countless times‖.77 Masiaka serves to illustrate 
that without civil society involvement the conflict might have been protracted and 
lasted much longer. In the summer of 2011, a long interview was held near Masiaka 
with Mr Ahmed Muckson Sesay, director of OPARD-SL. The organisation was started 
in 1999 as a voluntary organisation (later becoming a CBO and then CSO) by local 
farmers to help promote peace. Between 1994 and 2000 the rebels attacked their town 
in total 19 times. Given that a few community members knew some of the rebels, 
OPARD-SL was able to initiate talks with the RUF. Later, the organisation would also 
serve as a mediator among all warring parties. ―We were barefoot soldiers trying to 
negotiate peace‖, said Mr Muckson Sesay in the interview. His efforts were duly 
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 See BBC article from 7 August 2001: ―Sierra Leone road trip: Freetown to Masiaka‖, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1478041.stm, last visit 13.02.2014. 
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acknowledged in an official letter written by UNAMSIL‘s then Commanding Officer, 
Colonel Khusahl Thakur:78 
 
My dear Bro Muckson [handwritten] … Your active mediation and indulgence 
reinvigorated and revitalized the sagging relationship between the RUF and UNAMSIL. 
This subsequently facilitated in strengthening the ties and retrieval of UN equipment 
captured by RUF in May 2000. As we bid adieu, I would pray to God Almighty to shower 
all the happiness, wellbeing and prosperity on you, your entire staff and the besieged 
residents of Sierra Leone. I am sure that you will exult in your endeavours and usher in 
the much needed peace to Sierra Leone.  
 
According to Mr Muckson Sesay, OPARD-SL‘s efforts during and after the 
conflict were never really acknowledged in official peace ceremonies. The reminders 
of OPARD-SL‘s brave and year-long endeavours are UNAMSIL‘s letter in Muckson 
Sesay‘s office and a peace monument an hour and a half‘s motorbike ride from 
Masiaka. In other words, although the conflict was eventually resolved through a 
massive international (British) intervention, one major aspect remains largely 
unnoticed; that is, negotiating the peace in Sierra Leone was initiated and constantly 
influenced by a series of initiatives stemming from the civil sphere. Masiaka is just 
one out of many examples where ordinary Sierra Leonean‘s proved their courage and 
their commitment to peace. For instance, another famous example can be made in 
reference to the activities and work of Fambul Tok
79
 founder John Caulker, who first 
became a human rights activist as a student leader during the war in Sierra Leone. He 
infiltrated rebel camps disguised as a rebel in order to pass along information to 
international organisations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.
80
  
 
Besides, as stressed in interviews with other CSOs such as the EFSL (Evangelic 
Fellowship of Sierra Leone) or the Fifty/Fifty group, civil society also provided all 
kinds of relief, humanitarian aid, and assisted refugees in internally displaced person 
(IDP) camps. Some of these locally established organisations received external 
funding to ensure continued support. Interestingly, the EFSL (which was founded 
before independence in 1959 in contrast to the majority of CSOs who emerged during 
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 A copy of the letter was given to me during the interview. 
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 Fambul Tok (Krio for ―Family Talk‖) emerged in Sierra Leone as a face-to-face community-owned 
program bringing together perpetrators and victims of the violence in Sierra Leone‘s eleven-year civil 
war through ceremonies rooted in the local traditions of war-torn villages. It provides Sierra Leonean 
citizens with an opportunity to come to terms with what happened during the war, to talk, to heal, and to 
chart a new path forward, together. See: http://www.fambultok.org/what-is-fambul-tok,  
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 Retrieved from: http://www.fambultok.org/about-us/staff-profiles, last visit 04.09.2014.  
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or shortly after the war) feels that local ownership of the process was much greater 
during the war than it is now during the country‘s peacebuilding phase. This point was 
also made by other CSOs. Chapter 6 will return to this point.  
 
In August 2000, the RUF announced that Issay Sesay would replace the 
imprisoned Foday Sankoh as its leader. Two months later, on 10 November 2000, the 
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed, reaffirming the commitments made at the 
Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. It welcomed the ―emergence of a new leadership 
within the RUF‖.81 The RUF, once again, had to agree to return all captured weapons 
and participate in a comprehensive DDR program. An arms destruction ceremony was 
held in Freetown on 17 January 2002. UNAMSIL concluded the disarmament process 
and the following day the war was officially declared over.  
 
5.4. Discussion & Analysis: Civil society actors and functions during the war.  
When examining how Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere developed and changed after 
independence and during the war, one finds many shades of grey as well as colours 
that change over time. It was a fragment of the civil sphere (the disillusioned youth led 
by a middle-aged Sankoh with Taylor‘s assistance) that triggered – not to be mistaken 
with caused - the war. Simultaneously, a large part of Sierra Leonean society 
courageously stood up to resolve it and/or provided relief.  
 
Any democratic opening stemming from the Freetown-based civil sphere 
between 1961 and 1991 saw itself immediately repressed by an autocratic regime. 
Once Stevens declared Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978, he successfully 
infiltrated civil society circles by co-opting or sabotaging those who could be a 
potential (and influential) opposition to state policies. Needless to say, Stevens‘ 
political power relied heavily on neo-patrimonial and clientelistic networks which 
depoliticised parts of the country‘s emerging civil society landscape. It would take 
almost a decade for Sierra Leone‘s civil society to recover from Stevens‘ autocratic 
rule, and to push for a multiparty system and a new constitution, which was finally 
adopted by president Momoh in 1991. Sadly, by the time the constitution was legally 
effective, the civil war had already commenced. In order to understand how the war 
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 The full Abuja agreement can be accessed at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html, last 
visit 13.02.2014. 
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affected and altered the civil sphere, it is important to stress at this point, that CSOs‘ 
activities and agency would reach far beyond the political realm. According to 
SLANGO, long before the war started CSOs gave warning signs, such as alerting the 
government about grievances with regards to health care, education, corruption, or 
malfunctioning justice systems. Stevens‘, as well as Momoh‘s, suppression and 
suffocation of the civil sphere was basically a one-way street to a war waiting to 
happen. From a different perspective, one could argue that the formation of the RUF in 
its very nascent stages was also a warning signal in itself. The actions and behaviour 
of disgruntled and disillusioned youth from the potes and rural areas and/or seditious 
students on university campuses reflected their frustrations regarding the 
mismanagement of the country, if not the entire region. Shortly before independence, 
ordinary citizens from rural and urban areas, students, and lumpen youth fed into a 
guerrilla rebellion without even taking part in it later on. The oppression, grievance, 
exploitation, corruption, and forlornness of a century, fuelled resistance against anyone 
who seemed to maintain the system, including the government, chiefs or corrupt 
elders. Yet the majority of early RUF members, such as Ali Kabba, were not 
determined to maim about 27,000 civilians, forcefully recruit 10,000 child soldiers, 
and kill thousands of innocent people. Can we explain the RUF‘s pattern of behaviour 
simply with the argument that the wrong kind of individuals gained greater influence 
over the time? Partly, but not entirely. Initially, not all RUF commanders encouraged 
their fighters to commit horrendous atrocities. Likewise, it became more and more 
difficult to differentiate rebels from sobels and other warring parties. In a way, the 
emergence of civil rebellions like those of the RUF and the collusion with armed 
forces later on was also an accumulation of anger, resentment, and shame (Keen 2005) 
from centuries of oppression (see Chapter 4). The RUF appeared from the country‘s 
civil sphere as a horrific expression of historically-accumulated privileges, grievances 
and a century long rural/urban division. Correspondingly, Krijn (2011) finds that most 
of the voluntary RUF recruits came from a rural underclass descending from client or 
previous slave families who despised ―free-borns‖. Interestingly, although the rule of 
every single pre-war president reflected the organisational logic of patronage and a 
partial ethnicisation of politics that favoured ethnic groups, Sierra Leone‘s civil war 
was never about ethnicity or tribalism as such.  
 
158 
 
In this regard, all of the above observations give rise to an essential question 
when it comes to the study of the civil sphere, namely: considering that civil society 
never really had a fair chance to establish itself as a clear opposition to the state, how 
can we conceptualise, or at least get a better grasp of, the politics and political culture 
and voice of civilians? Put differently, how did the civil war alter the agency and 
political leeway of civil society actors? Did it lay the groundwork for the 
depoliticisation of the civil sphere later on (see Chapter 6)? How did centuries of 
suppression and conflict affect the political culture of the civil sphere as a whole? In 
the quest for answers, the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 will be applied 
to shed light on the characteristics but also agency of the Sierra Leonean civil sphere 
shortly before and during the war.  
 
5.4.1. Civil society actors after independence and during the war 
From independence onwards, Ekeh‘s (1975) two publics ran like a golden thread 
through Sierra Leone‘s societal structures. On the one hand, primordial cultural traits 
continued to exist, such as: secret societies, sodality and polygamy, hierarchical forms 
of societal organisation through chieftaincy systems or gender relations. On the other 
hand, the pro-Western political culture cultivated by the Krio during colonial rule laid 
the foundation for a civic public aspiring to assimilate ‗modern‘ societal structures, 
culture and life. Next to political activism at FBC, slowly but steadily, a few more 
civic associations and/or CBOs or CSOs emerged by the late 1980 (e.g. ARD – 
Association for Rural Development, founded in 1986 or the NMJD – the Network 
Movement for Justice and Development, established in 1988). However, the majority 
of long-standing and well-funded organisations were created during the 1990s such as: 
CADO (Community Animation Development Organisations) established in 1990, the 
CCG (Campaign for Good Governance) founded in 1996 or the Fifty/Fifty Group, 
created in 1997.  
 
Strikingly, it was during the conflict when in the absence of large-scale 
humanitarian assistance, local civil initiatives simply mushroomed out of necessity. 
Over time they became more formalised, organised, structured, and recognised in 
Sierra Leone. To repeat the WPJP‘s earlier-referenced statement: ―If there was one 
positive result of the war, than certainly the emergence of local CSOs and human 
rights activists‖. In many instances these organisations would start off as small 
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voluntary initiatives or CBOs and later (after 2002, in the peacebuilding and 
development phase) convert to the status of a CSO. The fast growing numbers of 
CSOs gives rise to the underlying assumption that all these actors would eventually 
lay the basis for a more participatory political landscape and engagement with the state 
during the peacebuilding and developmental phase. Surprisingly, a few years into 
Sierra Leone‘s post-war period, one does not encounter a purely independent CSO 
landscape that acts as an effective watchdog of the state. Chapter 6 will further 
elaborate on this development.  
 
Another striking yet disputed phenomenon that occurred during the war is the 
CDF, which constitutes an interesting intersection of both the primordial and the civic 
public. To begin with, it is important to stress, that the CDF is understood as a militia 
that was ―raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an 
emergency‖82 and not as a military organisation or conventional army.83 Following 
Hoffman‘s (2007) detailed, and to an extent also anthropological, study of the CDF‘s 
social fabrics, the CDF exemplifies much more the militarisation of a social network. 
Hence, the difficulty in the case of the CDF is to make sense of the complex 
intersections of the civil and political realm and workings in Sierra Leone‘s primordial 
public. As Hoffman describes it, ―(…) politics at the district, chiefdom, and town 
levels has much greater impact on the average person‘s daily existence than do events 
at the national level‖ (p. 648). Accordingly, the CDF was organised by chiefs at the 
community level to resist the cruelties committed by the RUF and other players.84 The 
CDF thus surfaced as a paramilitary response of civilians who felt that the state 
military was either unable or unwilling to defeat the rebels. In this regard, one of the 
CDF‘s primordial features included the Mende kamajoisia (next to other traditional 
fighters) commonly referred to as kamajors, who constituted the largest force of the 
CDF. Mende kamajoisia are specialised hunters who firmly believe in magic, occult 
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 This definition was taken from the Oxford Dictionary, see: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/militia, last visit 22.02.2014. 
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 The Prosecution of the SCSL made great use of the expert testimony of Colonel Richard Iron, who 
was in charge of an experts report on the CDF command structure. His findings continue to be highly 
contested in public debates and the literature. More information can be obtained from: 
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 According to Hoffman‘s (2007, pp 641 -642) research, the CDF originated in the Liberian capital 
Monrovia among a group of expatriate Sierra Leoneans producing propaganda for the exiled SLPP 
during the 1997-8 interregnum. Also Gberie points out that it is actually not that well known that the 
CDF was largely composed of refugees who were displaced in camps because of rebel attacks (Ainley 
et al., 2013 pp. 21-22). 
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and secret ‗medicines‘ alongside the use of firearms. Moreover, in Mende mythology, 
the kamajors‘ very identity is predicated on the protection of villages (Ibid. p.642). 
Hoffman further explains that (p. 647): 
 
In contexts where the exercise of violence becomes synonymous with the demands of 
citizenship, adult manhood, or economic survival (all of which were true of the kamajors), 
these kinds of non-military, but temporarily militarized social institutions are a more 
logical entry point for both understanding and engaging the sodalities which constitute the 
conflict zone.  
 
In common with the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans, the Mende kamajoisia, 
the Temne gbethis as well as the kapras, and the Kono donsos belonged to secret 
societies (predominantly the Poro). The CDF‘s first intersection with the civic public 
occurred after the election in 1996, which brought the Mende-dominated SLPP back 
into the government‘s office. This was an essential turning point for the CDF in two 
ways. Firstly, when the co-founder and leader, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, was 
appointed the SLPP‘s Deputy Minister of Defence, the CDF could no longer be 
accredited the status of a strictly ‗civilian‘ or paramilitary defence force. Secondly, 
and building on the first point, Norman‘s political status led to a general (public) 
perception of the CDF as the SLPP government‘s actual security force. Consequently 
the CDF perfectly illustrates how the boundaries between the primordial and the civic 
public are blurred within the political sphere and how they were altered in the course 
of complex events, such as the civil war in Sierra Leone.  
 
Apart from civic formations such as CBOs, CSOs or the CDF, the war also led 
to the creation of many informal civic self-help groups, taking on the shape of street or 
youth clubs or any other form of civil informal association. One example can be made 
with regards to a Freetown-based club called Street Life Family (SLF), initially 
founded under the name Peacemakers shortly after the war in 2002.85 The club is the 
brain child of Mr Ahmed Tejan Kabba, who, struggling with the consequences of the 
conflict and poverty himself, reached out to the youth of his community with the 
simple message: ―Together as one‖ (the slogan of the club).86 Throughout its existence 
the club became a social support system for its members and persists to this day. Such 
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 The club and several of its members (individually and in group format) was interviewed several times 
during my stays in 2011 and 2012.  
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 Interview with Mr Ahmed Tejan Kabba, held on 27.06.2011 in Freetown.  
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actors, meaning civic support systems, or self-help groups are no exception in Sierra 
Leone.87 The functions as well as agency of these clubs will be discussed in more 
depth in the ensuing Chapter 6.  
 
Lastly, one major actor since independence and throughout the war is Sierra 
Leone‘s urban (ie Freetown) civil sphere itself. This manifest itself in the many public 
uprisings, demonstrations (e.g. FBC student demonstrations in 1977 or the public 
protests in front of Sankoh‘s house in 2000), the youth and student movements as well 
as acts of public resistance (in particular people‘s refusal to go to work after the 
AFRC/RUF leadership was announced in 1997). Until the end of the war, civil group 
action on a very large scale (in some instances up to an estimated 30,000 participants) 
constituted forms of major public resistance against political and societal power 
structures (be they primordial or civic) imposed on the broader public (also primordial 
and civic) of Sierra Leone.  
 
5.4.2. Civil society functions after independence and during the war 
As Section 5.4.1 pointed out, between independence and during the war, Sierra 
Leone‘s civil sphere emerged as a political and humanitarian actor at the same time. Its 
political functions were manifested through group activism and mobilisation in 
resisting political and societal authority and control. Besides, many individuals and 
local organisations surfaced as mediators between warring factions to negotiate the 
peace at the very local level (e.g CSO Nos. 4, 13, 45, 49). To use SLANGO‘s words, 
―During the war CSO‘s were involved with communities, undertook counselling 
services, and had been hand-in-hand with the broader peace process by providing first-
hand information from the very local level‖.  
 
From the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards, alongside political activism 
(understood hereafter as a function in the sense of agency), more and more civil actors 
started to provide humanitarian and developmental aid as well as service delivery. A 
phenomenon which would later (during the country‘s peacebuilding and development 
phase) also fortify the depoliticisation of Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape, and in 
a broader sense, the civil sphere as such (see Chapters 6 and 7). In the absence of large 
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 Today the SLF has about 50 members (mainly young men) who support each other in several areas. A 
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scale humanitarian and developmental assistance, civil society actors simply fulfilled 
functions the state or international community did not sufficiently provide. To give a 
few illustrative examples, one rural organisation, APEM (Association for Peoples 
Empowerment), was founded as a local CSO during the war in Bo. This CSO‘s initial 
objectives were to help displaced women, reach out to refugee camps and provide 
these women with small micro credits.88 Similarly, the Fifty-Fifty group assisted rape 
victims, amputees, and children and soon started to collaborate with many other 
women‘s organisations that emerged shortly before or during the war. Another 
example includes GEKO (German Kooperation). Despite its confusing name, GEKO 
is in fact a local organisation that came into existence in 1999 towards the end of the 
war with the aim to rehabilitate the North of the country. In an interview, the associate 
director stressed that one of the main reasons why it became a CSO was based on the 
fact that there were no other ways to officially obtain funds for their activities and 
initiatives.89 This probably further explains why several CBOs gradually converted 
into the status of a CSO during or shortly after the war (for instance the CDHR, Centre 
for Democracy and Human Rights, is one out of many).  
In short, not only did (and still do) these CSOs/CBOs provide all kinds of relief, 
humanitarian, and developmental aid, but some of them (individual activists and CSOs 
alike) also used their social capital and primordial networks (connections to rebels or 
armed forces) in a continuous mediation effort to resolve the conflict at the very local 
level.90  
In addition, Ms. Francis Fortune described the wartime period as a key moment 
for CSOs and civil movements to arise. In her view, it was not the international 
community who initiated the creation of these CSOs but ordinary Sierra Leoneans 
themselves.91 Even though funding allocations played an essential part, most projects 
and activities were initiated locally. At the same time, Fortune also noted that local 
CSOs saw themselves repeatedly excluded from essential peacebuilding decision-
making processes at the macro level. Their participation and political (activist) 
function at peace negotiations at a nationwide scale was extremely restricted, 
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especially with the ICRSL as the only actor present during the Lomé talks. This 
clearly hampered the political agency (or function) of CSOs in the course of the 
several attempts to establish peace. To what degree exclusion impinged upon the 
political culture and voice of Sierra Leone‘s CSO landscape in the later stages of the 
peacebuilding and development process of the country will be the subject of debate in 
Chapters 6 and 7. For now, it is worth mentioning that the majority of rural CSOs 
expressed salient concern about a ‗pseudo‘ inclusion of only a few selected, mainly 
Freetown based organisations in important decision-making processes and events after 
the war.  
The mushrooming of Sierra Leone‘s CSO/CBO landscape in a time of crisis led 
to an interesting ancillary effect (or function): both the primordial and the civic public 
gradually intersected within the civil sphere. This is an interesting phenomenon that 
frequently continues to be overlooked, in particular when it comes to the study of civil 
society in sub-Saharan African fragile states. Whereas the above-mentioned functions, 
such as protecting civilians, conflict mediation, humanitarian and developmental 
assistance, service delivery or social cohesion are widely acknowledged as 
peacebuilding and development functions of civil society (see Section 3.6.6 of Chapter 
3), the transformation of the conflict-affected (primordial) civil sphere through the 
emergence of a more formalised civic public merits further examination. Sections 
3.3.4 – 3.6.6 (Chapter 3) highlighted that functional models usually focus on needs-
based assessments for short- and long-term needs in the peacebuilding and 
development process of a country. In so doing, they usually fall short in elucidating 
how and why moral values or norms, which supposedly hold society together (or not), 
are socially engineered over time. This is an aspect which should not be dismissed in 
the case of Sierra Leone, as its primordial and hence also political culture was (and to 
an extent still is) based on the organisational logic of patronage (see Chapter 4). In 
other words, the intersection of social, political and economic relations and spheres 
shape the political culture of the society and the way it functions to this day. Chapter 
6, and in much greater detail Chapter 7, delve into questions of how the emergence of 
a civic public intersected with the primordial public (and vice versa); but also how 
these new forms of state-society relations have affected Sierra Leone‘s political culture 
and voice since the end of the war in 2002. 
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Conclusion 
From independence and throughout the period of the civil war, liaisons between 
civic groups and the government were either suppressed or co-opted by a corrupt 
regime. In many instances, the societal logic of neo-patrimonial power hierarchies also 
infiltrated the civic public (e.g. Sierra Leone‘s Labour Union during Stevens‘ rule). 
Nonetheless, Sierra Leone experienced notable moments of democratic openings (such 
as the student protests in 1977 and 1991 or the public demonstrations in 2000), 
stemming from a politically active and mainly Freetown-based civil sphere. Roughly 
ten years after Stevens declared Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978, student 
activists again challenged local politics, state behaviour and societal structures marked 
by a self-enriching gerontocracy. They called for a full return to multiparty rule, and in 
some cases, even for a revolution. As Mitton (2013, p. 327) accurately observes: ―It 
was within this environment that the RUF launched its 1991 invasion, with leader 
Foday Sankoh vowing to overthrow the APC regime of Joseph Momoh‖. Put another 
way, better health care, access to education, good governance, containment of 
corruption – all of these issues were raised by ordinary citizens, student groups, civil 
society groups, and to an extent also by the rebels. The civil sphere as a whole 
(encompassing both its evil and good components) strove for social justice, albeit 
expressed through extremely divergent, and in the case of the RUF, also 
incomprehensibly horrific, actions. In the course of an emerging war-economy not all 
of the rebels and sobels favoured an end to the war, contrary to the broader public. The 
latter stepped up in various formations and efforts to call out for peace. At a collective 
level, thousands of civilians gathered to demonstrate for peace and conflict resolution. 
Locally, many single individuals played crucial roles in providing relief and promoting 
peace and mediating between warring parties in their respective communities. In a 
2006 CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone, the 
authors hold (p. 21)92: 
 
The 1990s was therefore, characterised by a resurgence of a vibrant civil society in Sierra 
Leone whose interest was ensuring a transition towards democracy. This renaissance 
pointed to the fact that despite attempts on the part of certain regimes in Sierra Leone to 
oppress its progressive development, they did not succeed. It needs to be mentioned that 
the civil society was not completely voiceless on the anti-democratic policies pursued by 
previous administrations in Sierra Leone. However, it lacked coordination, independence, 
credibility and neutrality and its activities did not affect significantly, the socio-economic 
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and political spheres of the country, until comparatively recently. Philosophically 
however, one could argue also that the various activities of civil society since the mid-
sixties laid the basis for the nineties.  
 
Regardless of Sierra Leone‘s vibrant and politically active civil sphere before 
and during the war, only a few selected CSOs were actually able to observe the peace 
negotiations at a national level. In other words, despite civil activism, those groups 
saw themselves repeatedly excluded from important decision-making processes and 
peace negotiations at the national level.  
 
To conclude, Sierra Leone‘s rapidly growing civil society landscape emerged 
under the pressures of a civil war. In time of crisis, there was the sheer need for 
civilians to respond to the many humanitarian and developmental needs themselves. 
Likewise, the country‘s political culture was constantly confronted by the gradual 
intersection of both the primordial public and civic public which colonialism had 
distorted. These events still affect Sierra Leone‘s present-day civil sphere. Several 
interviewees emphasised that ethnicisation of politics, as well as tribalism in Sierra 
Leone‘s present political landscape, was never as prevalent as it is today.93 Similarly, 
Francis Fortune, argues that since the end of the war, ―Sierra Leoneans are now finally 
working from being subjects to becoming citizens‖, - especially among the younger 
generation. On a more optimistic note, Mitton‘s research finds that (2013, p. 328) 
―Although the political system remains troubled by problems of corruption and 
exclusionary patronage, it is nevertheless far better suited to steering youths away 
from violence that the pre-war one-party state that stifled dissent.‖ Yet, in 
acknowledging that Sierra Leone‘s society is deeply entrenched in the intersections of 
a primordial and a civic public, one of the essential crunch questions seems to be 
whether Sierra Leone will be able to move beyond, or at least in conjunction with, the 
legacies of colonial rule. According to SLANGO94:  
 
Sierra Leone needs to find now its own way of democracy. Each democratic country 
found a balance of equation – and so needs Sierra Leone. 
 
 Such a democratic equation may come at compromise, however. Chapter 6 will 
explore in detail why the formalised, politically active and organised civil sphere and 
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civil society landscape that developed during the war, ultimately lost its active, 
independent and ―liberal‖ flavour later on.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Sierra Leone’s Civil Society Actors and Functions during the 
Peacebuilding and Development Process 
 
 
―Now that Sierra Leone has resolved the conflict we all have to ask ourselves: What 
comes after the peace?‖ 
Ms. Gladys Gbappy Brima 
Founder and co-ordinator of the Women‘s Partnership for Justice and Peace (WPJP) 
 
Chapter 5 provided an overview of how Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere became 
more formalised and organised throughout the conflict. Both the mushrooming of 
more visible and recognised civil society actors but also various public protests and 
marches suggest that the collective wish to establish peace intersected with  primordial 
societal features such as tribalism, regionalism as well as ethnical, political or neo-
patrimonial loyalism. Ordinary civilians formed associations with the aim of helping 
the most vulnerable but also to fight for an end of the civil war. Especially in the later 
stages of the conflict, local civil initiatives surfaced as noticeable actors next to 
crumbling state structures. Within a few years, informal and often loose grassroots 
movements turned into registered and formal organisations. Some of them are still 
internationally recognised and well-funded (e.g. CSO Nos. 1, 3, 7, 12, 19 or 32) while 
others are continuously struggling to exist (CSO and CBO Nos. 15, 16, 25, 29, 43, 45). 
In addition, many informal civic support systems, associations, or clubs emerged 
simply out of necessity. Sierra Leonean civil society is characterised by a very young 
population and lively youth club culture. On the whole, Sierra Leoneans have a 
longstanding tradition of associating as a form of social interaction in everyday life. 
This is, in particular, manifested in the century-long existence of secret societies, as 
well as the vast number of clubs, sodalities and, later, self-help groups as well as 
formally registered CSOs, CBOs, and various types of associations.  
 
When tracing the evolvement of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere over the past ten 
years, it is important to acknowledge that primarily, it was not the international 
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community that fuelled civic activism during and shortly after the war. If anything, 
ordinary people proactively initiated several activities on the ground to assist their 
fellow citizens in adversity, to warn about human rights abuses and to negotiate or 
campaign for peace. Over time, increased funding commitments spurred many civic 
actors to formally register as CSOs thereby stimulating the creation of a specific civil 
society landscape as we encounter it today in Sierra Leone. In addition, many INGOs 
took local civil society actors under their wing and international aid agencies engaged 
in efforts to build and strengthen CSOs‘ capacities. But despite good intentions the 
growing attention towards Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere created a salient paradox: 
although current efforts support and strive for the (re-)creation of an active, vibrant – 
‗liberal‘ – citizenry, that ―understands their roles and responsibilities, and exercise 
their rights‖ (PBF/SLE/A-6), international donor support has not empowered civil 
society actors in such a liberal way. That is, recalling what was set out Chapter 2, to 
understand civil society as independent from the state, political, private, and economic 
spheres but in close interaction with them; a domain of social life in which public 
opinion can be formed. Instead, Chapter 6 will explore how Sierra Leone‘s vibrant and 
active civil society landscape during and shortly after the war appears to be currently 
largely characterised by tribalism, regionalism, ethnicism and political party loyalism, 
if not co-optation. In the course of two field research stays in 2011 and 2012, many 
interviewees described Sierra Leone‘s civil society as being no longer able to engage 
independently with and influence state politics. In addition, to a large extent civil 
society appears to be neutralised to serve and complement a national developmental 
agenda supported and co-steered by the international community. This is a surprising 
development in many ways, considering the vibrancy of the civil sphere during and 
shortly after the war. It is thus worth asking: what has happened to Sierra Leone‘s civil 
society since the end of the conflict and should international peacebuilding and 
development assistance really bear all the blame? 
 
In the quest to find some answers, Chapter 6 identifies and elaborates on three 
main phenomena that affect civil society‘s political agency and voice. The first one is 
the instrumentalisation of civil society outlined in Chapter 3. Gradually, civil society 
emerged as an actor that fulfils functions the state‘s institutions are too weak to, or 
incapable of, providing. In other words, past and ongoing peacebuilding, 
democratisation and development efforts encourage civil society actors to complement 
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the country‘s broader developmental agenda instead of actively influencing and 
thematically shaping it (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.5; Chapter 3, Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
Second, Sierra Leone‘s post-conflict phase experienced a noticeable return towards a 
political culture in which both the civic and the primordial publics intersect. Chapter 4 
elaborated on the historical context of how and why colonial administration effectively 
created two nations in one land. The civil sphere in Sierra Leone is definitely different 
today than it was during or shortly after the war. More precisely, as discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), the societal dynamics of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere cannot be 
understood and analysed without giving firm consideration to a number of factors and 
dynamics: the slave trade and colonial legacy; urban versus rural areas; local versus 
elite ownership; influence and support of IOs and INGOs; neo-patrimonial networks 
and chiefdom systems; ethnic and religious organisations and religious leaders; gender 
relations and equality; cultural identities; and lastly life circumstances (e.g. living 
conditions, health, nutrition, education). Third, in the wake of these entanglements 
civil society in Sierra Leone currently appears to be ―toothless‖, ―dormant‖ or 
―inactive‖ – phrases repeatedly used by interviewees. In short, civil society in Sierra 
Leone struggles with fragmentation, a top-down mentality among CSOs themselves 
and regionalism expressed in a salient urban – rural divide.  
 
The first section of Chapter 6 provides a short background on the most crucial 
developments during the country‘s peacebuilding and development phase and the role 
as well as involvement of civil society therein. Section 6.2 will then continue to flesh 
out the characteristics of civil society as we encounter them in Sierra Leone today. 
Particular attention will be paid to voices from the civil sphere, how Sierra Leoneans 
perceive their civil sphere themselves. This section further elaborates on the interplay 
between local ownership and the influence of IOs and INGOs as well as why civil 
society is at a potential and serious risk of being depoliticised. Lastly, the analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 3 will be applied once more to critically assess the 
empirical data presented in the following pages.  
 
6.1. Background: Civil society during Sierra Leone’s peacebuilding and 
development phase (2002 – 2013) 
When the war in Sierra Leone came to an end, the general life expectancy was 
only thirty-nine years. About 70 percent of all schools had been destroyed in the 
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fighting, and only eighty out of five hundred health centres were functioning to some 
extent. The country was (and still is) ranked near the bottom of the HDI, the adult 
literacy rate was less than 25 percent, and child mortality rates were shockingly high 
(Smillie 2009, p. 18). ―Roads are slowly rebuilt but many people don‘t have the 
money to use them‖, said a Sierra Leonean UN professional in an informal 
conversation in 2012. He supports more than 10 people with his average managerial 
salary (based on local not international payment standards). Informal support systems 
based on the earnings of only one member of a big family or clan are fairly standard.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Sierra Leone was often labelled as a ―forgotten 
emergency‖ by international aid agencies and donor communities - with good reason. 
The country has a historical record of comparatively low donor interest (especially 
during the conflict) and has been an ‗aid orphan‘ for decades (Smillie 2009, p. 15–28). 
For example, Smillie‘s assessment of the 2005 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) report on Fragile States reveals that Japan, Spain, 
Germany, and Canada collectively spent USD 195 million in Senegal and only USD 
15 million in Sierra Leone (2009, p. 24). In the years following the peace process, 
funding commitments did not increase dramatically. Looking at the latest ―OECD 
Sierra Leone Report on International Engagement in Fragile States (2011)‖, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Sierra Leone in 2009 totalled USD 437 million. It 
averaged 33.5 percent of the Gross National Income (GNI) in 2007, falling to 19.1 
percent in 2008 (due to the financial crisis), and rising slightly to 23.0 per cent in 
2009. The OECD further states that a consultative group meeting in late 2009, led by 
the World Bank (WB) and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), resulted in 
pledges that amounted to a stable continuum of the current levels of funding of USD 
300 million per annum (OECD p. 21–22). Also, the latest report of the final evaluation 
of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in 2011 (p. 23), found that there is a 
―substantial funding shortfall in Sierra Leone‖, if agreed peacebuilding efforts are to 
be sustained over the next few years.  
 
With respect to civil society, finding information on funds allocated directly to 
local CSOs during Sierra Leone‘s peacebuilding and development phase is like putting 
together a jigsaw puzzle. While no official figures are available from donors‘ reports 
such as the OECD, UNDP or World Bank, according to M‘Cormack-Hale (2013, p 
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141-142), in 2006 CSOs together with INGOs received, in total, 26 percent of non-
ODA and ODA assistance to carry out activities in Sierra Leone. In the case of DfID 
there is more transparency. In 2005 the UK set up a flagship project called ENCISS 
(Enhancing the Interface between Civil Society and the State to improve Poor People‘s 
Life). During its first five years of its existence (2005 - 2010), it cost the British 
government almost £8.5 million with a commitment for a further £4.5 million between 
2011 and 2013 (Cubitt 2013, p.101). In June 2013, the head of DfID announced an 
extension of the project for a fourth year.95 Cubitt‘s research also reveals (ibid.): 
 
Locals argued that the initiative was ‗never evaluated by civil society as a need‘ nor the 
conceptual framework shared with them. People felt the agenda was ‗imposed‘ and this 
created strong resistance. The animosity may have been influenced by the government‘s 
successful manipulation of the project which was originally designed to strengthen just the 
demand side of governance not the supply side. In the outcome, ENCISS failed to produce 
an effective strategy for state/society engagement.  
 
She continues to describe ENCISS procedures as a ―long, costly and poorly 
accountable chain‖ and locals felt that the funding was channelled through 
overwhelming bureaucratic structures, wiping out a large proportion of the budget 
promised for civil society building activities (p. 103). At the time this chapter was 
written, no other recent data was available in order to provide a clearer picture on the 
amounts of funding earmarked for, or directly allocated to, local CSOs in the past ten 
years - either by the international community, bilaterally, through INGOs or 
altogether. That said, the above-mentioned 26 percent allocated in 2006 seems to be a 
considerable share of the cake. At the same time, some interviewees (e.g. CSO Nos. 6, 
8, 24, and 46) stated that access to funding was much easier in the years shortly after 
the war than now. CSOs felt that funding for civil society activities and actors had 
been declining for the past five years or so. In addition, once international donor 
support dwindles, many local CSOs struggle to find alternative ways of generating 
funds and financial independence. In some instances CSOs were also asked a sub-
question:96 whether they had already an alternative strategy (―plan B‖) to generate 
funds after donors withdraw? Only one organisation (No. 32) presented a concrete, 
                                                 
95
 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/head-of-dfid-sierra-leone-speaks-at-
national-civil-society-forum, last accessed 05.05.2014. 
96
 Not listed in Appendix 2.  
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and by now successfully implemented scheme.97 In the main, the majority of all 
interviewed CSOs stressed the lack of both capacity and of opportunities to find new 
or additional sources of incomes. CSO No. 29 further noted ―the majority of people 
who run or work for CSOs have side jobs so that they can survive‖.98  
 
The above-listed figures on shortages of funds and burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures are not intended to cast Sierra Leone‘s peacebuilding and development 
process in a negative light. On the contrary, since the end of the civil war the country 
has actually experienced quite positive achievements which also affected the civil 
sphere. According to the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Sierra 
Leone‘s post-conflict economic performance has been strong.  ―Real Gross Domestic 
Product is projected to expand by a staggering 50 percent in 2012, driven by a jump in 
iron ore production, but even without that the economy is projected to grow by 6 
percent per annum on average during 2012-2014.‖99 In addition, Sierra Leone has 
made important gains in the strengthening of its post-conflict democracy and progress 
towards self-sufficient administration of its electoral system and conducted three 
general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2012 in addition to Local Council elections in 
2008 and a number of by-elections (UNDP, 2014)100. However, despite peaceful 
elections and economic growth, looking at the country‘s poverty profile as a whole, 
the results for the broader population are rather mixed. The GoSL‘s third Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-III) states (2013, p. 12)101: 
 
The decline in poverty was most pronounced in the urban areas outside Freetown, with a 
reduction from 70.9% in 2003 to 39.5% in 2011. Poverty in Freetown increased from 
13.6% to 20.7% in 2011. Despite the increase in poverty in Freetown, urban poverty as a 
whole decreased from 46.9% in 2003 to 31.2% in 2011. Rural poverty also declined from 
78.7% to 66.1% but remained high relative to urban poverty over the same period. Hence, 
poverty remains pervasive in rural areas. 
 
Section 4.1 in Chapter 4 provided additional details on the country‘s current 
developmental situation, in particular with regards to Sierra Leone‘s human 
development indicators. It is worth repeating though, that currently 70 percent of 
                                                 
97
 CSO No. 32 generates an income through a locally run and owned restaurant as well as selling 
different types of goods manufactured by trained youth and other beneficiaries of their projects.  
98
 Interview held 31.07.2012 in Freetown. 
99
 See: http://www.sl.undp.org/content/sierraleone/en/home/countryinfo/, last visit 04.03.2014. 
100
 Ibid.  
101
 See: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Agenda%204%20Prosperity.pdf#page=3&zoom=auto,0,819, last 
visit 04.03.2014. 
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youth are unemployed or underemployed. ―People continue to live by the day‖, it was 
recurrently stated by several CSOs, CBOs and individuals during interviews and 
informal conversations.  
 
Although the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone was formally declared over on 18 
January 2002, post-conflict reconstruction plans were already developed long before 
that time. Despite the failures of the Lomé Peace talks (in 1999), the international 
community, in conjunction with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), orchestrated 
the creation of several instruments to bolster the peacebuilding process of the country. 
Chapter 5 provided more detailed information on the rather limited involvement of 
civil society. The Lomé Peace Agreement, even if disregarded by the RUF, set the 
groundwork for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
in 2002. Furthermore, and upon request of the GoSL, the UNSC‘s Resolution 1315 
commenced negotiations to create a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in August 
2000. The SCSL differed in two respects from other ad hoc tribunals and courts. 
Firstly, it was not a mechanism imposed upon the Sierra Leonean government by the 
international community. Secondly, its jurisdiction embraced both international 
criminal law and crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Pham 2006, p. 158). The TRC, as 
well as the SCSL, started their work in July 2002, just shortly after the first post-war 
presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 14 May 2002. The SLPP 
overwhelmingly won the elections, and its leader Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re-elected 
president. Two years later, in 2004, the national DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, 
and rehabilitation) process was concluded.102 According to CSO No. 12, civil society 
was not really involved in setting up essential developments that guided and shaped 
the peacebuilding process. ―Many institutions which were created in conjunction with 
the international community are detached from the locals, such as the SCSL or the 
TRC. The majority of people, also the educated ones are not even aware of their [the 
SCSL and TRC‘s] concrete work areas‖ (CSO No. 12). 
 
In 2005, the UNAMSIL officially ended its work, and the focus of the UN 
changed rapidly from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and development. UNAMSIL 
                                                 
102
 It encompassed a total of 72,490 combatants, demobilised 71,043 people, offered 63,545 the 
opportunity to take part in reintegration programmes, and took care of 6,845 child soldiers (Solomon 
and Ginifer 2008, p. 2). 
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was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) - 
established by the UNSC to assist the government in further consolidating peace and 
build on the previous work accomplished by the peacekeeping mission. UNIOSIL 
terminated its mission in December 2006, and in 2007, Sierra Leone became (next to 
Burundi) one of the first two pilot countries of the then newly created United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).103 The first ―Sierra Leone Peacebuilding 
Cooperation Framework‖ was presented in December 2007 at one of the PBC‘s 
―country-specific meetings‖. The framework serves as a basis document for the PBC‘s 
work and efforts in the country. With respect to civil society involvement, the PBC‘s 
website states104: 
 
Civil society may engage with the PBC and its related activities in a variety of ways. At 
UN headquarters, civil society organizations are encouraged to attend meetings of the 
Commission and may informally contribute to the PBC‘s work by providing written 
submissions to the PBC members and the Peacebuilding Support Office. Civil society 
organizations may also participate in certain meetings of the PBC country-specific 
configurations, often called NGO informal briefings. In countries receiving advice from 
the Commission, national and local civil society organizations are encouraged to engage 
in national consultations on the peacebuilding frameworks. Civil society representatives 
may also periodically participate in meetings of the PBC and serve as members of the 
Joint Steering Committees, which oversees the Peacebuilding Fund. 
 
In practice, throughout the PBC‘s engagement with Sierra Leone, local civil 
society representation and involvement was extremely weak at UN HQ level.105 First, 
the PBC‘s Sierra Leone organisational committee, as well as its country-specific 
configuration, do not officially include local civil society representatives.106 Instead, if 
                                                 
103
 The PBC was established (upon the request of UN member states) to assist post-conflict countries in 
transitioning from war to peace and to move towards sustainable development. Its role within the UN 
family became: ―(1) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the 
international financial intuitions, national governments, troop contributing countries; (2) marshalling 
resources and (3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace‖. See PBC website 
at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/, last visit 02.03.2014. 
104
 See: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/structuremember.shtml, last visit 06.03.2014. 
105
 This is based on the author‘s professional work experience for the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Support Office (UNPBSO) from 2007-2010 as a consultant and later Associate Peacebuilding 
Programme Officer.  
106
 The PBC‘s country-specific configurations consist of the members of the organisational committee 
(that is: seven members elected by the General Assembly; seven members selected by the Security 
Council, seven members elected by the Economic and Social Council, five top providers of military 
personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions, five of the top providers of assessed 
contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to the United Nations funds, 
programmes and agencies, including a standing peacebuilding fund), as well as the country under 
consideration, countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are 
involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and sub-regional 
organisations; the major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort; 
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CSOs would like to actively partake in the process, they have to follow ―Provisional 
Guidelines for the participation of civil society in meetings of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, submitted by the Chairperson on the basis of informal consultations‖ 
(see: PBC/1/OC/12). Putting aside that most local civil society actors in Sierra Leone 
do not have regular access to the internet, the highly technical language of the 
document may pose an additional challenge as well. This leads to the second point, 
namely, the majority of local CSOs in Sierra Leone not only lack the capacity and time 
but also diplomatic skills, influence and knowledge to proactively initiate dialogue and 
advocate for their concerns at UN HQ level. As a result, local civil society actors are 
implicitly and explicitly, depoliticised at the international level in that their political 
influence, agency and voice is severely challenged by the above-outlined structural 
barriers.  
 
Sierra Leone became not only one of the first two countries on the agenda of the 
PBC, but also of its funding arm, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), 
which was created to fill critical funding gaps in the early stages of recovery from 
conflict. The PBF‘s Joint Steering Committee (JSC) comprises, among others, two 
local CSOs (alongside representatives of the government and international 
community). However, in several interviews, the majority of CSOs neither believed 
that their voice was represented through the PBF‘s JSC nor that the money was 
efficiently spent. Reasons can be found in the top-down mentality of UN agencies in 
Sierra Leone but also in the lack of co-ordination and communication among civil 
society actors themselves (CSOs and CBOs, but also any other form of association or 
club) at the local level. Several CSOs described the Sierra Leonean landscape as 
―fragmented‖ and badly coordinated, despite the existence of the umbrella 
organisation SLANGO (Sierra Leone‘s Association for Non-Governmental 
Organisations). The exact same observation was also made in 2006 in the scope of a 
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone (2006). 
Conducted by the Sierra Leone CSO Campaign for Good Governance (CCG) in 
collaboration with Christian Aid, the study identifies ―poor communication network 
between CSOs‖ as one of the main weaknesses in Sierra Leone‘s civil society 
                                                                                                                                             
the senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives, 
such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant. More information can be 
obtained from: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/structuremember.shtml, last visit 06.03.2014. 
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landscape. They further specify ―CSOs have poor communication between 
themselves. Some are even reluctant to share information on their respective 
programmes and activities. This lack of communication has a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of CSOs‖ (p. 82-83).107 Partially, one finds an explanation in the fact that 
many CSOs have to compete for funds from external donors. Additionally, the PBF‘s 
JSC also mirrors a certain top-down mentality among local CSOs themselves. The 
participating CSOs who joined the bargaining table are longstanding, capacitated, 
well-funded and run by educated elites. As of March 2014, the PBF allocated USD 
50.12 million (approved budget, real-time) in total through its two facilities (the PRF 
Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility and the IRF Immediate Response Facility), with 
one project (in the total amount of USD 140,000)108 specifically targeting the capacity 
building of CSOs to evaluate and monitor PBF projects implemented by civil society 
actors on the ground.  
 
Only a few months after the PBC and the PBF started to engage in the 
peacebuilding process of the country, the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) 
established the United Nations Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone, known as 
UNIPSIL.109 In the course of several interviews, some Freetown-based CSOs 
highlighted the difficulty of collaborating with UNIPSIL, in particular during the early 
stages of the peacebuilding process. As characterised by CSO No. 13:  
 
UNIPSIL excluded CSOs from the process. When CSOs approached them and asked for 
more transparency, the mission told them that their strategy was secret. The entire process 
was male-dominated anyway. UNIPSIL collaborated a lot with political parties — in the 
end, this is their way of double standard setting. Likewise, DfID cut off many local CSOs 
                                                 
107
 The report can be downloaded at: 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_SierraLeone_Country_Report.pdf, last visit 11.03.2014. 
108
 More information can be obtained at: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00071612, last visit 
04.03.2014. 
109
 The missions mandate involved both political and development activities, such as  
Providing political support to national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tension and threats 
of potential conflict, whatever the source; 
Monitoring and promoting human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law; including efforts to 
counter transnational organised crime and drug trafficking; 
Consolidating good governance reforms, with a special focus on anti-corruption instruments such as the 
Anti-Corruption Commission; 
Supporting decentralisation, reviewing the 1991 Constitution and the enactment of relevant legislation. 
Closely coordinating with and supporting the work of the Peacebuilding Commission as well as the 
implementation of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and projects supported through the 
Peacebuilding Fund; 
See: http://unipsil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9613&language=en-US, last visit 02.03.2014. 
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from direct funding. It was certainly a missed opportunity for using the core capacity of 
local CSOs. Hence, there are many structural but also individual barriers for local CSOs. 
 
In its very early stages, the World Bank‘s (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund‘s (IMF) engagement in assisting the government in drafting three consecutive 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) seemed to be more inclusive. The first 
PRSP, known as ―Sierra Leone Vision 2025‖, covering the period of 2005 - 2007 was 
designed to address the restoration of national security, good governance, economic 
revitalisation, and provision of basic goods to the most vulnerable groups.110 The 
process for the preparation also included participatory poverty assessments (PPA) and 
civic engagement, the latter was led by two CSOs. PPAs were carried out in 42 
communities reaching out to all districts and a total number of 8,591 community 
members. According to the PRSP-I the objectives were to (p. 15):  
 
a) Create awareness of the PRSP process and contribute to understanding of the 
underlying principles.  
b) Compliment ongoing initiatives through the creation of a communication environment 
c) Provide information on poverty related issues and appropriate strategies for addressing 
them from the perspective of the poor and CSOs, and 
d) Monitor the process of formulation, implementation and recommend corrective actions.  
 
One of the participating CSOs, the Network Movement for Justice and 
Development (NMJD) organised sensitisation workshops on the PRSP in all 14 
administrative districts. The sensitisation covered over 1,500 participants from a broad 
spectrum of civil society and the citizenry, including youths, women, disabled persons, 
government officials, traditional and religious leaders, ex-combatants, war victims, 
students, etc. (IMF 2005, p. 15). The main objective of these sensitisation programmes 
was to spur the emergence of voluntary regional and district civil society groups 
known as PRSP Task Teams (ibid.). All the same, the process included planning 
workshops at national and local levels to sensitise stakeholders.  
 
                                                 
110
 Prior to the PRSP-I, a first interim PRSP was already put in place in 2001. In 2003, the WB assisted 
the government with financial assistance in the total amount of USD 105 million, including USD 40 
million in the form of grants. The required budget for the PRSP-I was USD 1.62 billion. Yet, total 
donor disbursements for the period of the PRSP-I amounted only to USD 975 million, hence creating a 
funding gap of USD 645 million. Furthermore, in 2006, Sierra Leone reached the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) completion point and became eligible for substantial debt relief (Davis 2010, p. 118). 
More information can be found at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05191.pdf, last visit 
04.03.2014,  as well as in the ‗Agenda for Change‘ document, p 1-38.  
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Although none of the CSOs interviewed made a particular mention of the WB 
and IMF‘s inclusive strategy, the PPAs nonetheless illustrate how the PRSP-I sought 
to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the process aimed to give a voice to 
the people most affected while encouraging civil society actors to complement but also 
promote a national agenda towards peace and development at the very communal 
level. On the other hand, it also sought to strengthen those civil society actors, based 
on a liberal model, through the creation of an environment of communication between 
an independent society and the state.  
 
Shortly after the 2007 elections, the new APC-ruled government under President 
Ernest Bai Koroma presented the second PRSP-II, called ―An Agenda for Change‖.111 
Remarkably, information about civil society involvement in the preparatory process or 
about their perspectives and voice is less transparent. The final document simply reads 
―The institutional mechanism for developing the Second PRSP included central and 
local government, civil society groups, development partners, parliamentarians and 
national consultants‖ (p. 25). Thus, it leaves it unclear as to whether PPAs and 
sensitisation programmes also continued in the second stage.  
 
Sierra Leone‘s present and third PRSP, covering the period of 2013-2018, 
clearly sets the tone for a pure developmental agenda and moves beyond the country‘s 
peacebuilding phase. Its vision is to become a middle-income country with 80 percent 
above the poverty line by 2035 (GoSL PRSP-III, 2013, p. xiii). Prior to the launch of 
the PRSP-III, President Ernest Bai Koroma initiated the ―Sierra Leone Conference on 
Development and Transformation‖ (SLCDT), which took place in Freetown from 
January 30 through
 February 1, 2012. During the country‘s fiftieth independence 
anniversary, the President had announced that Sierra Leoneans should come together 
―to chart a path to transform the country to middle-income status in the next twenty-
five years and a donor country status in fifty years‖ (Conference Report Volume 1 
2012, p. 9). About 450 officials and experts gathered to discuss the future and 
developmental issues of the country. The conference was steered by a committee 
composed of the president himself, the chief of staff, and representatives of all 
                                                 
111
 It was estimated that Sierra Leone would require almost USD 2 billion for implementation of PRSP-
II. At the time this chapter was written, no official figures with regards to current funding gaps were 
available. 
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recognised political parties, statutory institutions, CSOs, and professional associations. 
In order to ensure that the views of ordinary Sierra Leoneans were also reflected in the 
conference programme and outcome, the event was preceded by nationwide activities, 
such as focus group discussions, essay competitions, and TV/radio phone-in and 
discussion programs, as well as online platforms. Despite this broad outreach, critics 
interjected that the event was yet another political tool to help promote Ernest Bai 
Koroma‘s and the APC‘s campaign before the upcoming elections in November 2012. 
Above all, the required funds for the conference (in the total amount of roughly USD 
192,000112) were covered by the government.  
 
After the SLCDT‘s outcome documents were presented to the parliament, the 
president set up a committee to coordinate the drafting and development of the Agenda 
for Prosperity. As for civil society involvement, the final document states (GoSL 
PRSP-III, p. 10): 
 
Although CSOs were represented in the Pillar Working Groups and they usually 
participate in regional and national consultations, CSOs were consulted as a special focus 
group and given the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the process of finalizing the 
document. To this effect, a half-day consultative workshop was conducted with a 
representative group of CSOs and their consolidated comments and recommendations 
have been reflected in the document.  
 
Reading through the PRSP-III it is not apparent what kind of civil society 
recommendations or contributions fed precisely into the final version. More generally, 
during interviews CSOs had different views on the SLCDT and the way in which civil 
society was enabled to contribute and influence the agenda. Whereas some Freetown-
based CSOs were highly satisfied with the overall outreach and involvement, the 
majority of CSOs interviewed in the rural areas expressed discontent about the 
process. In some instances interviewees in the rural areas were not even aware of the 
SLCDT and what purpose it served. Two interview partners, CSO No. 19 and No. 29, 
mentioned that it was up to the government to decide which CSOs were invited to 
participate. A few Freetown-based organisations pointed to the fact that some CSOs 
also used the SLCDT as an occasion to enter political ―corridors of power‖. For 
instance, the director of a very active women‘s organisation (CSO No. 5), interviewed 
in 2011, switched sides and became a political actor in 2012. CSO No. 19, who 
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participated as one of the key civil society actors in PRSP-I, further noted that 
representation was extremely low as only one CSO was invited per thematic sector, 
which was found not to be an adequately suited bottom-up approach to really have an 
impact. Even though the first PRSP clearly made an effort via PPAs to reach out to the 
rural areas and give a voice to the poor and most disadvantaged, PRSP-III seemed to 
be less inclusive. There is a clear marginalisation of rural based CSOs and the broader 
citizenry, which somehow indicates that little by little the legacies of colonial rule are 
once again shimmering through.  
 
 
 
Although civil society involvement was overwhelmingly described as weak, the 
SLCDT‘s main focus on developmental related areas seemed to be adequately timed. 
During both field research stays, CSOs, CBOs, youth groups and several other 
interviewees (see full list in 
Appendix 1) were asked if they 
believe that peace is established 
and the country has already 
reached a pure developmental 
stage. Their answers are depicted 
in Chart 1, encompassing in total 
132 responses across the country, 
gender and classes. Whereas 
views may have changed in the course of the past two years, between 2011 and 2012, 
for the majority (58 percent), the country was still in an in-between stage. Some raised 
concerns about the November 2012 elections and the elections in 2017, describing 
them as a litmus test for the peace process of Sierra Leone. A few expressed concern 
about past gang fights in Freetown or occasional, yet brutal, Forah Bay College 
demonstrations as a potential threat. Others again counter-argued that violent youth is 
a global problem, not limited to Sierra Leone. Of the 18 percent who perceived the 
situation in the country as still fragile, the main reasons were overwhelmingly located 
in concerns related to youth unemployment.  
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Even though Chart 1 represents only a very small segment of the Sierra Leone 
population, it captures the current spirit of optimism in the country manifested in the 
desire to leave the conflict-shattered past behind and hope for a better future. In a 
public opinion poll conducted by the Freetown-based Centre for Development and 
Security Analysis (CEDSA) in 2009113, the majority felt that their living conditions 
will improve in the course of the next five years. While several interviewees 
noticeably emphasised improvements in areas concerned with infrastructure 
development (electricity or road construction) most of them expressed concern about 
slow advances with regards to human development, in particular education.  
 
In the main, Sierra Leone‘s transition from conflict to peace and development is 
frequently portrayed as a shining and much praised example of post-conflict recovery 
supported, and largely led, by the international community.114 Following three 
consecutive peaceful elections (2002, 2007, 2012), Sierra Leone was recently also 
classified as a ―Low Income State‖ and is no longer considered a ―Fragile State‖ by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In March 2013, the UNSC extended 
UNIPSIL‘s mandate for the last time until 31 March 2014 when the mission transfered 
all its responsibilities to the Sierra Leone UN Country Team (UNCT).115 The latter has 
taken over UNIPSIL‘s remaining peacebuilding efforts (e.g.: strengthening of 
democratic and human rights institutions or security sector reform). Shortly before 
UNIPSIL‘s departure, the SCSL also officially finished its work on 31 December 
2013. In early March 2014, the UN officially launched a ―new phase of support in 
Sierra Leone with the transitioning of its political mission to a more development-
focused UN presence‖.116 For UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, ―Sierra Leone 
represents one of the world‘s most successful cases of post-conflict recovery, 
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 Featured in the work of Simpson (2010 p. 161-171). CEDSA‘s public opinion poll interviewed 
college students in 2008 and adults in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and Makeni in 2009. 
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 See for instance: UN News Centre (2014a): ―Sierra Leone is a success story built on steady progress, 
Security Council told‖, 26.03.2014, see: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47437#.U0Pz-VfpeQE, last visit 08.04.2014. 
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 See: 
http://unipsil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jh9sCOJResY%3d&tabid=9611&language=en-
US, last visit 02.03.2014. 
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 UN News Centre (2014a), ‗Closing political office in Sierra Leone, UN shifts focus to long-term 
development‘, See: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47278&Cr=sierra+leone&Cr1&keepThis=true&TB_i
frame=true&height=650&width=850&caption=UN+News+Centre+-+Top+Stories#.Ux7m4pyluQE, 
last visit 11.03.2014. 
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peacekeeping and peacebuilding‖.117 The UN‘s engagement in the country will be now 
predominantly based on its Development Assistant Framework (UNDAF). 
Correspondingly, the GoSL priorities outlined in the PRSP-III (2013-2018) include: 
diversified economic growth, managing natural resources, accelerating human 
development, international competitiveness, labour and employment, social protection, 
governance and public sector reform, gender and women‘s empowerment.  
 
All of these positive achievements notwithstanding, experts from academic and 
practitioners‘ circles still find that the country‘s smooth transition from peacebuilding 
towards development should be taken with a grain of salt. In a roundtable discussion 
on the future of Sierra Leone, held at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science in December 2013, invited speakers characterised the country‘s peacebuilding 
and development track record as largely positive yet cautioned against a too 
enthusiastic and monolithic assessment.118 Among others, panellists arrived at the 
conclusion that the degree of capacity varies tremendously across government 
departments thereby impeding the ability to function effectively. It was widely 
acknowledged, however, that significant strides have been made in terms of achieving 
civil and political liberties. For instance, Sierra Leone expert Lisa Denney, from the 
ODI (Overseas Development Institute), pointed to some important improvements in 
the security sector and citizens‘ willingness to use institutions such as the Sierra Leone 
Police (SLP). Then again, while conducting field research in Sierra Leone, in an 
interview with CSO No. 16, it was mentioned that this newly established trust is not 
yet build on firm ground and that the SLP needs to be still far more professional and 
disciplined. Based on the director‘s own experience with projects involving the SLP, 
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 The event was organised by Simone Datzberger, Viviane Dittrich and Luisa Enria and took place on 
6 December 2013 at the LSE. The roundtable brought together academics, researchers and practitioners 
to address and critically assess the challenges as well as emerging opportunities in the ongoing peace-
building and development process of the country. The former Chairman of Sierra Leone Diaspora 
Network (SLDN) UK, Ade Daramy, chaired the roundtable discussion, which consisted of experts 
ranging from various disciplines and professional backgrounds: Sneha Baljekar (Postgraduate Adult 
Nursing Student, Sierra Leone Student Partnership representative, King‘s College London), Nana Busia 
Jr. (Former Senior Advisor on International Human Rights Law & Head of Access Justice Programmes, 
U.N. Sierra Leone), Lisa Denney (Research Officer, Overseas Development Institute), David Harris 
(Lecturer in African Studies, University of Bradford), Francis Ben Kaifala Esq (Barrister and Solicitor, 
Partner at Wright & Co) and Alexandra Malet (Postgraduate Adult Nursing Student, Sierra Leone 
Student Partnership representative, King‘s College London). A short article about the event can be 
accessed at:  
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/02/14/from-peace-building-towards-development-opportunities-
and-challenges-for-sierra-leones-future/, last visit 06.03.2014. 
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CSO No. 16 made reference to ongoing cases of impunity from prosecution (as did 
also panellists at the LSE roundtable event), mainly as a result of tribalism or bribery - 
the latter predominantly occurring because of low salaries. Similarly, the former 
Senior Advisor on International Human Rights Law & Head of Access Justice 
Programmes, UN Sierra Leone, Nana Busia, described the interface between state and 
civil society as weak; a societal situation that he felt arose as a long-standing outcome 
of state formation in the country. His remarks subtly hint at the legacies of colonial 
and post-colonial rule. They not only match well with the historical and analytical 
background discussion of Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis at hand but also reconfirm one 
general closing observation among participants, that is: presently, ―Sierra Leone lacks 
an activist civil society‖. By and large, civil society seems to be still at the periphery 
of policy-making, with only a few exceptions to the rule. Although deliberately 
interposed as an overstatement, Sierra Leone-born lawyer, Francis Ben Kaifala Esq 
even called for a civil revolution taking on the form of impartial civil engagement at 
the political level, though not, of course, by means of violence.  
 
6.2. Sierra Leone’s present civil society landscape: characteristics, challenges and 
agency.  
One of the most striking findings during both periods of field research was that a 
large majority of interviewees depicted Sierra Leone‘s civil society as very lively and 
vibrant during and shortly after the conflict yet expressed that it became dormant and 
politically inactive later on. For a Sierra Leone academic at FBC (interviewee No. 61), 
Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere is characterised by tribalism, political party loyalism and 
no independent press.119 Civil society, in the lecturer‘s view, is ―toothless‖ and lacks 
―a pro-active focus‖ and initiatives. The turning point when CSOs appear to have 
changed in character was often located by respondents in the time after the 2007 
elections. As interviewee No. 63, a Sierra Leone scholar and historian, observes:
 120 
 
With the change of government in 2007 civil society has taken a back row. For instance 
[refers to CSO No. 12] took a back seat. They focus now more on the reform of the 
chiefdom system and don‘t give prominence to issues such as corruption or issues of 
service delivery. They should challenge the government more. Also, a lot of local CSOs 
have started to align themselves with the government, even women‘s groups that used to 
be very active [refers to CSO No. 7] are now taking a back seat.  
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 Interview held 15.08.2012 at Fourah Bay College, Freetown. 
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 Interview held 18.08.2012 at Fourah Bay College, Freetown. 
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This observation also extends to Sierra Leone‘s pre-war student movements and 
lively political activism that took place and shaped the university culture as well as 
political climate and environment over decades (see Chapter 5). FBC, once the 
country‘s intellectual and political vanguard and de-facto opposition to Siaka Stevens‘ 
one-party state has become silent during the country‘s peacebuilding and development 
phase. As Gardner (2014) notes, the university itself has slid into apparently 
irreversible decline.121 ―Material conditions have atrophied almost continuously since 
the civil war ended in 2002, and campus accommodation is now uninhabitable to the 
extent that even students from the farthest provinces are denied lodgings.‖122 In an 
informal conversation, a young (foreign) lecturer at FBC expressed a sense of 
frustration as repeatedly computers donated to the university usually disappear only 
within two weeks‘ time. In Gardner‘s words123: 
 
In such circumstances, one might expect to find the students in fighting spirit. Yet despite 
being equipped with a collective history that boasts the remarkable events of 1977 – when 
‗No College No School‘ demonstrations spread from FBC and forced Stevens to hold 
elections and lower the voting age to 18 – students at FBC today rarely challenge the 
university administration and almost never confront the government on national issues. 
 
Instead, political party loyalism, tribalism and ethnicism have eaten deeply into 
student life. Sierra Leone scholar interviewee No. 63, was also asked what in his view 
caused this recent development of an inactive, if not dormant and depoliticised civil 
society, be it among CSOs, students or more generally the public sphere. In reply he 
commented that:  
 
If you have a liberal regime that is open to criticism civil society can flourish. Otherwise, 
it tends to be passive. In Sierra Leone the newspapers are champions for the government. 
For example, Awareness Times or Standard Times used to be very critical, in the last 18 
months or so it became the mouthpiece of the government.  
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 Tom Gardner is a postgraduate student at Oxford University. He is currently making a documentary 
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 Blog post by Gardner, Tom (18.02.2014), entitled: ―Fourah Bay College: The decline of Sierra 
Leone‘s ‗Oxford in the Bush‘‖, published by Sierra Leone expert Mats Utas see: 
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The current vanishing freedom and impartiality of the press was not only re-
confirmed in interviews but also during several informal conversations.124 
Furthermore, on 21 October 2013 Reuters reported that the Sierra Leone editor of the 
Independent Observer and a local journalist were arrested by the SLP for publishing 
an article which compared President Ernest Bai Koroma to a rat. The event stirred 
many concerns over press freedom in the country.125 Almost simultaneously, the latest 
Freedom‘s House study (2014) held that Sierra Leone‘s status declined from ―Free‖ 
(in 2012) to ―Partly Free‖ (in 2014) due to persistent problems with corruption and 
lack of transparency.126  
 
Despite several allegations about the freedom of the press, the vast majority of 
CSOs did not feel hindered from operating freely in Sierra Leone. Only one 
organisation (CSO No. 40) made mention of incidences in which the CSO‘s website 
was repeatedly attacked after publishing discoveries of corruption by the state. At the 
time the interview was conducted the website was not accessible either. In the same 
breath, CSO No. 40 noted that the organisation cautioned youth about two elements in 
the pre-election period of 2012. These included the media and civil society. ―Both 
institutions are supposed to be independent in Sierra Leone but in reality both of them 
are politicised‖ [CSO No. 40]127 – meaning that they are more loyal to the political 
parties than actually being an independent watchdog of state politics, or advocate for 
particular causes and rights.  
 
Correspondingly, several CSOs pointed to the fact that some individuals use the 
status of their organisation as a stepping stone to enter state politics or benefit from 
governmental support in one way or another. When posed the question, ―How would 
you describe civil society in Sierra Leone?” (see Question 1, Appendix 2), some of the 
most salient answers in this regard included:  
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Notably, a few interviewees gave critical yet far more moderate answers. For 
CSO No. 6, ―civil society is very fragmented but this is also what makes civil society 
to be civil society. One has to accept that civil society is diverse and complex‖. 
Similarly, interviewee No. 60 argued: ―To some extent civil society is active. The 
difficulty is they act in their own interest and not in common. (…) Some are purely 
Table 1. Question 2 (Appendix 2): How would you describe civil society in Sierra Leone? 
―Civil society in Sierra Leone is influenced by the government. In general civil society is not too 
powerful. Civil society is supposed to be an opposition to the government, but actually, it is not.‖  
[CSO No. 18] 
―Some CSOs are simply a mouthpiece of the government. They take on sides and are highly political 
[meant as allied with one of the two main political parties].‖ (…) ―In some meetings the government 
jokingly refers to civil society as ‗evil‘ society, when CSOs make people aware of their rights and 
challenge authorities.‖  
[CSO No. 20] 
―Only a few organisations are vibrant and strong. The majority needs to have a clearer focus, direction, 
credibility and accountability.‖ 
[CSO No. 12] 
―People only make noise for their own agenda but not for other issues, given the bad economic 
situation of the country. Project proposals often differ from the truth and represent a different picture to 
justify proposals.‖  
[CSO No. 14] 
―There is a tendency of CSOs in taking sides. CSOs only exercise politics if it fits their interest. Sixty 
per cent of CSOs only talk. Forty percent of all CSOs act on their own interest. A lot of CSOs are 
dormant by now. Sierra Leone has many briefcase CSOs. There is a lot of corruption going on.‖  
[CSO No. 16]  
―Not all of civil society in Sierra Leone is political [meant as allied with the government in one way or 
another]. Some are sponsored, others are not. Some are playing the music of the government, those 
can‘t be seen as civil society. When they go on radio they call themselves a niche, but they are not. 
Some of them praise officially the government on the radio.‖  
[CSO No. 19]  
―That is a difficult question. It is difficult to distinguish between civil society and state actors in Sierra 
Leone. A good number of CSOs are too close to the state actors, there are a few vibrant ones but there 
are the ones that are absorbed in politics.‖  
[CSO No. 25]  
―Civil society in Sierra Leone is faulty and fragmented. You have lots of divided societies. They don‘t 
speak in one voice.‖  
[CSO No. 1] 
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independent, others are partisan‖. Another director (CSO No. 10) described the 
characteristics of Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape as mixed and not 
homogeneous. ―Some are capacitated - but there are not many of those - and some are 
well organised and others are not. That is why more capacity building is needed‖ 
(CSO No. 10). For a rural CBO (No. 44), ―Sierra Leonean civil society is the voice of 
the grassroots level, which should be the intermediator between the grassroots and the 
government.‖  
 
A recent study conducted by OXFAM on ―Civil society engagement with 
political parties during elections‖ (2013) reached out to political parties in Sierra 
Leone in order to gather their views on the activities and work of local CSOs. In sum, 
political parties indicated that ―credible‖ [emphasis added] CSOs have presented and 
preserved an image of honesty, independence, neutrality and non-partisanship in their 
engagements. Political parties also referred to the existence of numerous so-called 
‗briefcase CSOs‘ (2013, p.18). These were defined by local focus group discussion 
members of the OXFAM study as (p. 18):  
 
(…) a CSO that has registered with the appropriate government agencies or departments, 
but whose office and operations are actually limited to the briefcase of its founder. 
Moreover, these CSOs have either fictitious or inactive board members, and their founders 
sometimes falsify documents to secure funding. When they succeed in doing so, they 
usually have to rely on family members and/or friends to carry out the CSOs activities. In 
many cases the founder also functions as director, administrator, accountant and human 
resources manager. The sole purpose of these CSOs is to serve the interests of individuals. 
 
The occurrence of briefcase CSOs was also mentioned by several interviewees 
the author has spoken to. The scope of the issue became even more evident while 
trying to reach out to local organisations during both research visits. Frequently 
officially registered CSO were either not visible or their offices seemed to have 
vanished despite office signs outside the house. Residents were occasionally able to 
provide some background information about the idle organisation in their building. 
Their stories usually ranged from the short-lived existence of the CSO due to shortage 
of funds to not noticing if the office was officially operating. According to CSO No. 
29, many CSOs also change their address or disappear as there is no structured 
funding. In addition, interviewees reasoned that increased donor support implicitly 
encouraged locals to found a CBO or CSO for no other purpose but income 
generation. 
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6.2.1 Issues of corruption and challenges with the civil sphere at community level  
When interviewees were asked about a potential solution to the corruption 
problem they identified the need for a better organisational platform. Among others, 
CSO No. 5 made reference to an already existing civil society monitoring group, 
which was set up by the Anti-Corruption Commission to train local CSO staff 
members in how to monitor anti-corruption practices and reports. The commission 
also presented a three-year strategic plan. But according to CSO No. 2, even though 
the Anti-Corruption Commission and the GoSL are well aware of the issue both 
remain silent. It is speculated that some of the investigators enriched themselves in the 
same manner as CSOs did but ―they were all covered because of their connections 
with the Ministry of Justice‖ (CSO No. 2).  
 
Certainly, studying and analysing the civil sphere in peacebuilding and 
development processes is a constant balancing act of one‘s own objective thinking. 
The recent hype regarding the realm of civil society and the ―local turn‖ (see Chapter 
1) in research and practice created an understandable inclination to idealise if not 
romanticise local initiatives in several respects. Yet, ―corruption is in human nature‖ 
(CSO No. 12) and occurs at all levels, from the top to the very bottom, from the global 
North to the South. In the case of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere there is yet another 
component that further completes the general image: abject poverty. When visiting 
and talking to communities in Sierra Leone, inevitably the question comes to mind 
whether there are instances when corruption within the civil sphere can be justified, or 
at least, its occurrence better understood. Apart from the emergence of briefcase CSOs 
as a source of income, corruption occurs also at the very local and community level. 
CSO No. 1 believed that among others, community development funds are the core of 
the problem. For the period of project implementation, chiefs are frequently given 
access to the resources, and consequently funds are not always properly disbursed or 
allocated. To put it in another way, Labonte‘s (2008) earlier referenced findings (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2) were reconfirmed in the course of many conversations – 
formal and informal. Apart from the corrupt behaviour of elders and chiefs, neo-
patrimonial power structures and clientelism, explanations were also given in 
reference to persisting unequal gender relations as well as low levels of education and 
illiteracy among the weaker segments of a community. In further expanding on the 
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issue, CSO No. 24 alluded to some essential aspects about the societal configurations, 
fabrics and workings of community everyday life:  
 
Most of the leaders in communities are very old from 70-90 years old. By the time they 
were young many things were not in practice, for example gender sensitivity. They still 
believe that men have to be decision makers and that they have to be in charge of 
everything. Likewise, young people‘s opinions or views are not respected. Youth have no 
rights. One has to tackle these issues when working with communities. You need to 
sensitize elders and undertake a lot of trainings to counter this kind of attitude. The power 
of elders can hinder the development of a community.  
 
Putting intergenerational power imbalances aside, CSOs and CBOs additionally 
pointed to many other challenges they regularly encounter in their work with local 
communities. These include:  
 Expectations of beneficiaries are too high 
 Low participation  
 Inaccessible or hard to reach   
 Syndromes of aid dependency 
 High illiteracy rates (in particular among women)  
 Lack of synchronicity among CSOs when they engage with the same 
community.  
 
Lastly, efforts to strengthen and empower the civil sphere are also amplified by 
the extreme poverty of the population. ―Before you even start talking, people ask you 
already: What do you have for me?‖ (CSO No. 29).128 Especially in Freetown, 
according to CSO No. 29, civil society actors encounter the difficulty that people 
neither have the time nor the leisure to ―listen to your talk‖. Their first priority is to 
make an income in whatever way they can. Needless to say, CSOs often provide 
incentives (e.g. food and beverages) before they even start with their work. In short, 
widespread poverty affects political activism, if not mobilisation strategies, for a 
particular cause in several respects. CSO No. 19 further sheds light on the fact that, it 
is ―difficult to get them concerned about certain issues. People live by the day. 
Understandably, they are only concerned about their own daily bread‖. Apart from 
what CSO No. 19 termed as ―hardwork‖, that is facilities and services of any kind, 
people in the communities don‘t seem to be interested in the ―softwork‖ of CSOs, 
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meaning advocacy for a particular cause but also workshops and training sessions. 
Overall, it often remains overlooked in studies about the relationship of civil society, 
peacebuilding and development, how poverty as well as illiteracy can affect political 
activism stemming from the civil sphere. Chapter 7 will further elaborate on the 
argument of how abject poverty can hamper political agency and voice and as a result 
fortify the depoliticisation of a country‘s civil sphere.  
 
6.2.2 Local ownership, agency and external influence through IOs and INGOs 
Numerous signs in the streets of Freetown, but also in rural areas, indicate that 
several Western INGOs and IOs make these places home to their offices. The author‘s 
mapping analysis, presented in the 
Methods section (Introduction of 
the thesis but also in Appendix 3), 
finds that local CSOs still 
outnumber INGOs with a total of 
213 being recognised as officially 
registered. The number of INGOs 
active in Sierra Leone is still 
remarkably high, with a total of 145 organisations.
129
 This is not unusual if one 
compares the INGOs‘ presence to that in other sub-Saharan African Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).130  
 
Interviews further revealed that a significant number of local CSOs are not only 
funded by the international community but also by INGOs. In addition, a large 
majority of CSOs either serve as implementing partners or were set up by INGOs. 
Given the timeframe and scope of the thesis, it seemed unmanageable to quantitatively 
assess how many of these 213 registered local CSOs are implementing partners, and 
respectively, how much external funding they receive. Consequently, the thesis had to 
revert to qualitative means of measurement in the form of expert interviews. Against 
this background, all interview partners were approached with the question (see 
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Appendix 2): Would you say that external actors (such as INGOS, IOs or even global 
media) have enabled or challenged the work of your organisation? If so why? As the 
analysis below will show, their experiences varied across sector, by donor and 
appeared to be very mixed.  
 
All in all, the following aspects were commonly listed as positive results from 
the collaboration with external/international donors and INGOs:  
 Provision of funding and/or equipment 
 Capacity building, workshops and various types of training 
 Assistance in creating tighter networks with other organisations 
 Support to build up a good reputation 
 Discipline CSOs and their staff to be more accountable  
 
In several cases, interviewees gave detailed accounts of successful donor input. 
For example, CSO No. 26 emphasised that UNICEF (United Nations Children‘s Fund) 
introduced the idea of sending homeless children from children‘s centres back to their 
communities. This is of particular importance in the context of Sierra Leonean culture 
as these children would otherwise face tremendous challenges in the future to become 
part of a community again.131 Most CSOs seemed very receptive to collaboration with, 
but also training by, Western staff of INGOs or IOs. One well-funded CSO (No. 36) 
even stated that they do not encounter any challenges with their donors, as ―we correct 
our mistakes as we go along‖. According to CSO No. 16 ―the way INGOs or 
internationals work serves as a role model for local CSOs‖. Also a rural based CBO 
(No. 44) noted that, ―Donors even educate you about your own culture. They feel for 
the people here‖. A surprisingly high number of interviewees noted that they trust the 
international community more than the GoSL.132 More generally, several CSOs 
indicated that they can learn something from the West but they ―should contextualise 
it to local realities‖ (CSO No. 3). The ensuing section 6.2.4, and in greater detail also 
Chapter 7, will delve into this particular statement and address issues of political 
culture, and cultural particularism and whether they are truly Sierra Leonean solutions 
                                                 
131
 UNICEF‘s approach further included supporting the families taking care of the child and regular 
follow-ups on the child‘s situation.  
132
 Many expressed great sympathy for President Ernest Bai Koroma but felt that most of the ministers 
and chiefs were the prime cause of continuous dishonesty, embezzlement and fraud.  
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to present developmental problems in the country. At times, staff of the same 
organisation had different views on donor support. For instance, whereas one project 
officer (CSO No. 20) described the collaboration with UN donors as ―very positive‖, 
one of his colleagues seemed to be more critical. 
 
The positive achievements of donor support notwithstanding, respondents 
equally referred to several challenges concerning their collaboration with IOs, aid 
agencies, governments and INGOs. These included:  
 Lack of access to funding (in particular in rural areas) 
 Discontinuous funding, cuts in running projects / programmes or abrupt donor 
withdrawal 
 Funding criteria are too rigid  
 Expectations of donors are too high 
 Timeframes are not always realistic 
 Difficulties in adapting to external management systems (e.g. format of project 
proposal and other documents) 
 Donors do not always consider all aspects of expenditure (in particular 
administration costs) 
 Lack of ownership 
 
The above-listed challenges can be related to the issue of depoliticisation of 
Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape in both the narrower and broader senses. 
Generally, issues such as funding criteria, expectations of donors, timeframes or the 
difficulty to adapt to external management systems are an indication of the difficulties 
to act in accordance with the international frameworks to support civil society in 
peacebuilding and development practice presented in Chapter 3. Local CSOs are under 
a certain pressure to meet specific objectives (outcomes) so that their activities 
(outputs) will have an anticipated impact in the short-, medium- or long-term. This 
clearly affects their political agenda (if any) and general work pace. Building on that 
point, lack of ownership was a recurring theme in many interviews. The majority of 
CSOs felt that local ownership in terms of agenda-setting, project design and 
implementation appeared to be far more flexible during the conflict than at the later 
stages of the peacebuilding and development process. This may, even if only partially, 
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also explain why Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape was frequently described as 
very active and lively during and shortly after the war, and ―dormant‖ later on. It is 
also noteworthy that local ownership was predominantly more of an issue raised by 
Freetown-based organisations. Table 2 depicts some of the most salient answers in this 
regard.  
 
Contrasting earlier accounts about the benefits of donor support with the above 
listed statements, one detects a few contradictions. A significant number of 
Table 2. Question 6 (Appendix 2): Statements referring to lack of ownership 
―We would like to see our core values more reflected in our work. [Gave community initiatives as an 
example]. Also, we are not as independent in our own decision-making processes as we wished. 
Generally, donors should treat local CSOs with more respect, as local initiatives are culturally more 
sensitive.‖ 
[CSO No. 1] 
―CSOs need more local ownership. To give an example, in the case of the UN, most of the money was 
spent on UN staff, equipment, or administrative costs.‖ 
[CSO No. 2] 
―There should be definitely more local ownership. Local leaders should have more ownership in the 
rural communities, and more projects are needed to enable them to build capacities. There is also a 
strong need to ensure better coordination amongst international and local actors and initiatives.‖ 
[CSO No. 3] 
―There is a pressing need to improve the communication and linkages between top-down and bottom-
up actors. This also differs enormously from community to community. There are many problems with 
regards to the collaboration with INGOs. One of the biggest one is certainly the drafting of project 
proposals, as they have to be often amended and changed to meet the donors‘ criteria but not the local 
one. Local CSOs still face many power constraints.‖ 
[CSO No. 5] 
―External actors have definitely a big influence when it comes to agenda setting.‖ 
[CSO No. 6] 
―Sometimes donors don‘t allow you to use your own ideas. Usually, IOs as well as INGOs don‘t get 
involved into the community approach.‖ 
[CSO No. 26] 
―You have to cut your proposals and design them in a certain way to obtain the funds. At the end of the 
day your project has to meet the donor‘s expectations to achieve specific results.‖ 
[CSO No. 28] 
―Our donors don‘t promote the job we have done. They present it more as their own work and not what 
we actually did.‖ 
[CBO No. 44] 
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interviewees expressed a clear dissatisfaction about the lack of ownership and power 
in decision-making processes. Then again, many positive mentions were made with 
regards to Western support and what there is to be potentially ―learned‖, be it through 
workshops or any other form of training. To complicate the issue further, CSOs 
pointed to several implementation dilemmas when they reach out to work with local 
communities themselves. At first these entanglements may come across as part of the 
complexities inherent in peacebuilding and development processes. When digging a 
bit deeper, they provide extremely useful insights for ongoing research on the civil 
sphere, nonetheless. In the first place, these ambiguous answers and perceptions about 
local ownership reconfirm some of the earlier arguments made in the chapter trilogy of 
Part I. In alignment with Paris (2010), none of the interviewees argued against the 
liberal conception of local ownership as such. Just the opposite; there was a noticeable 
pro-Western and pro-liberal attitude among interviewees towards external intervention 
and donor support. In particular, interviews and many informal conversations with 
youth groups revealed a remarkable (but also unreflective) glorification of the Western 
world. Points of criticism made by local CSOs mainly revolved around the behaviour 
of donors, other CSOs, the GoSL or structural and cultural barriers. To put it another 
way, local ownership was never criticised on a philosophical or intellectual basis, but 
with reference to its execution on the ground. Issues of trust, corruption, lack of 
capacities, lack of time and strikingly, cultural particularisms, such as inter-
generational power imbalances, appeared to challenge its implementation the most. 
 
The repeatedly perceived lack of ownership also supports earlier claims about 
the creation of a specific kind of civil society landscape and agenda-setting in the 
scope of externally-led peacebuilding and development interventions (Chapter 3). As 
will be more evident in Section 6.2.3 of this chapter, in the case of Sierra Leone, 
funding allocations led to an instrumentalisation and, as a result thereof, the 
depoliticisation of the civil sphere. To make use of CSO No. 1‘s words, ―who pays the 
piper calls the tune‖. For a large majority of CSOs, external financial aid is 
concomitant with setting the agenda for their organisation and work. Only in very few 
instances, CSOs found that they could fully follow their own thematic focus and lead 
(e.g. CSO No.9, CSO No. 15). In the main, ―CSOs lack independence from external 
donors and cannot sustain themselves. Better capacities amongst locals need to be 
built‖ (CSO No. 4). Dependence on funds, and hence the very survival of the 
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organisation as such, pushes many CSOs into areas of intervention favoured by their 
respective donors and not themselves. To give an example, CSO No. 29 wrote a 
project proposal explaining the need for an anti-smoking campaign to be presented to 
the parliament. In the director‘s view, it is an issue that leads many youth to the 
consumption of other drugs, as well as to other health risks. No donor was willing to 
support this cause and consequently the CSO had to revert to projects targeting 
reproductive health and malaria.  
 
Moreover, one of the biggest pressures for CSOs is discontinuous funding from 
their counterparts. Financial support is often project/programme based and not 
organisation based, again affecting the long-term impact but also survival of CSOs. 
For instance, CSO No. 17 had to cut projects which were supposed to last five years 
down to two years. Donors explained that the financial crisis was the main cause. 
Similarly, CSOs pointed to the fact that big donors such as DfID started to allocate 
their funds to British INGOs and not local organisations. Poor performance was often 
named as one of the main reasons for this sudden turn. In CSO No. 24‘s words, ―The 
irony behind external funding is that if local CSOs become too strong, they put INGOs 
out of existence‖. Instead of submitting project proposals on a yearly basis, a more 
suitable approach, according to CSO No. 24, would be to finance those local civil 
society actors in such a way that they can become independent from their donors. 
Though, as mentioned already earlier, when CSOs where asked about alternative ways 
of sustaining their organisations, the majority could not think of a solution. Only a few 
interviewees (e.g. Nos. 32 and 34), suggested income generating projects for local 
CSOs.  
 
6.2.3. Civil society’s activities, depoliticisation and the retreat of the state 
Both periods of field research underscored that during the conflict and the 
peacebuilding and developmental phase of the country, CSOs emerged as actors who 
complemented services the government was either too weak or unwilling to provide 
(see Section 1.2.5, Chapter 1). ―While the CSO landscape exploded during that time, 
most organisations did not realise that this was to be a constant commitment‖ (CSO 
No. 12). In this regard, all CSOs were posed the question: “Do you think that your 
organisation covers areas that should be tackled by the government or even the 
international community? If so – what areas; if not – why?” (See Appendix 2).  
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Almost all CSOs answered the question in the affirmative. In addition, their 
responses also pointed to areas which they believe should be tackled by the GoSL. 
Activities which were mentioned the most included mainly service delivery, such as:  
 Healthcare services, distribution of medicine (in particular in remote areas 
where the government is not active) 
 Water and sanitation  
 Support for disadvantaged women, gender equality 
 Education (children and adult) 
 Trainings, workshops and sensitisation programmes for chiefs and 
communities 
 Community development 
 Agriculture 
 
In order to get a much clearer picture of the magnitude and variety of the areas 
and activities local and international CSOs engage in, every organisation mapped in 
Appendix 3 was also matched against a set of functions (activities). The results are 
presented in Chart 3.  
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INGOs were deliberately included (coloured in dark grey) in the analysis as they 
complement state services in the same way as their local counterparts. Besides, many 
local CSOs are not only funded by INGOs but also serve as their implementing 
partners – in the long- and short-term. Notably, the overlapping of activities 
undertaken by some organisations posed the biggest challenge for the mapping 
exercise. For example, a CSO may target several aspects of community development 
while also seeking to enhance gender equality or child education. It also works the 
other way round, in which a CSO‘s work on gender equality and better access to 
education may potentially improve community development. In such instances, 
preference was given to the CSOs main core focus and agenda-setting, while still 
acknowledging that this compromise may stretch the general image and results 
depicted in Chart 3. 
 
Taking into account Sierra Leone‘s low HDI and overall poverty profile, it does 
not come as a surprise that communal, human and social development appears to be 
the largest engagement area. The wide spectrum of activities generally includes water 
supply, nutrition programmes, healthcare, education, rehabilitation plans or 
stimulating local forms of businesses and employment generation. The high number of 
local CSOs in this field further suggests two main causalities. The first one relates to 
the influence of external donors outlined in Section 6.2.2, be it through frameworks, 
funding allocations or implementation strategies. Secondly, communal and social 
development initiatives presuppose social and cultural ties which international actors 
do not have. Local expertise is not only a prerequisite to overcome cultural barriers but 
also to initiate programmes on the spot and tackle the everyday concerns of 
individuals in their own language and socio-cultural manner.  
 
The focus on children and youth (ranked 2
nd
) as well as women (ranked 3
rd
) 
echoes the recent shift of priorities over the past decade in the international 
community‘s peacebuilding and development work. Since the turn of the millennium, 
there has been an increased attention towards weaker segments of post-conflict 
societies and this trend can be also observed in Sierra Leone. This is, in particular, the 
case with regards to women. Following UNSC resolution 1325 on Women Peace and 
Security in 2000, there has been an avalanche of subsequent UNSC resolutions, 
agencies, programmes and initiatives for more gender-friendly peace and development 
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processes around the globe. Gender-markers, as a tool for gauging whether 
programmes respond to the different needs of women, children and men, have become 
a standard procedure in project evaluation and implementation. Interviewees 
frequently noted that they had added a gender component to their projects at the 
request of their external counterparts.  
 
However, the external push to be more gender sensitive should not distract from 
the fact that Sierra Leone has longstanding local CSOs advocating for women‘s rights 
that were established before and during the war. The country‘s peacebuilding process 
has been shaped by various civilian initiatives brought to life and led by women; here 
the Fifty/Fifty Group or the Women‘s Partnership for Justice and Peace are just a 
couple of examples. Shortly after the war, their initial target was for women to take up 
30 percent of the seats in Parliament after the 2012 elections in November - without 
success however.133 To this day, Sierra Leonean women face tremendous challenges to 
access government positions and overcome patriarchal power structures.134 In 
conversations with women‘s grassroots associations and CBOs (Nos. 42, 43, and 44) 
the situation in the North of the country was described as being much harder, 
impinging on the rights of women the most. Notably, while many of the local 
women‘s organisations depicted in Chart 3 engage in activities to provide all kinds of 
services to women (training, education, micro-finance projects, etc.), the few women‘s 
CSOs who are politically active, are in the main well-educated women or from elite 
backgrounds. On the whole, despite some political activism to improve the rights of 
women in the country, service delivery dominates the agenda.  
 
Looking at healthcare (ranked 5
th
), it is important to add that all 29 organisations 
are solely dedicated to healthcare services and no other activities. If one were to 
include organisations that provide healthcare next to several other services (in Chart 3 
categorised under communal, human and social development) the number would 
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 Information retrieved from: Datzberger (2012f): ―Far from being victims, women‘s networks have 
led the way in campaigning for peace and justice, Africa LSE, see: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2012/06/12/far-from-being-victims-womens-networks-have-led-the-
way-in-campaigning-for-peace-and-justice/, last vist 10.04.2014. 
134
 Jackson‘s (2014) short discussion on how the award-winning documentary 30% (Women and 
Politics in Sierra Leone) emphasises the challenges women face in the battle for gender equity, provides 
more information on the topic. See Africa LSE, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/02/07/whistling-
women-gender-space-and-power-paradigms-in-africa/, last visit 10.04.2014. 
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easily increase up to a hundred. Immediately after the war, Sierra Leone received a lot 
of support for healthcare from international donors. Over the long haul, however, Lisa 
Denney and Alexandra Malet find that while the initial response provided urgently 
needed capacity it didn‘t provide long term capacity building.135 Sierra Leone‘s 
healthcare is currently provided by the state, private and non-governmental actors. 
Even though President Ernest Bai Koroma announced a free health-care initiative in 
2010 there are still severe shortcomings.136 New frameworks are badly managed by the 
Ministry of Health and healthcare is not only underdeveloped in Sierra Leone (lack of 
medication, infrastructure and retention of trained medical staff) but also corrupt. 
Frequently patients have to bribe nurses and doctors, thereby bumping up their low 
salaries, for better treatment. Moreover, health initiatives hailed in the press as 
groundbreaking, such as free healthcare for under-fives struggle in their 
implementation. For example, drugs are often not available as they are siphoned off 
and sold privately. In 2012, it was estimated that 26 percent of all drugs donated to 
Sierra Leone never reached the health facilities they were destined for.137 INGOs as 
well as local CSOs surfaced as an additional service provider to complement and 
substitute a healthcare system the state is hitherto too weak and incapacitated to 
provide.  
 
Interviews with local CSOs working on human rights related issues brought to 
light that, by and large, their activities resemble more service provision (human rights 
trainings or legal assistance) than advocacy or confronting authorities with human 
rights violations. One of the main reasons can be located in the fact that Sierra Leone‘s 
official law continues to operate side by side customary law - once more an indication 
of how Ekeh‘s (1975) two publics continue to intersect. For example, it is no 
exception that local magistrates turn a blind eye to incidences when young women are 
forced to marry their rapist as practiced in customary law (CSO No.36). Local human 
rights activists further mentioned that they rely heavily on the support of international 
actors. Chapter 7 will assess and discuss more thoroughly how the intersections of the 
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 LSE Roundtable Event, 06.03.2013. 
136
 The estimated cost to implement Sierra Leone‘s Free Health Care Initiative in 2010 was USD 35.8 
million out of which 86.5 percent was provided mainly by the ADB, DfID, UNICEF, UNPFA and the 
WB. Information retrieved from: World Report, thelancet.com, Vol 381 January 19, 2013. See: 
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673613600744.pdf, last visit 10.04.2014. 
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civic and primordial public not only shape the political culture of society as such but 
also hamper political activism and CSOs‘ advocacy work on the ground.  
 
Taken as a whole, Chart 3 strengthens and substantiates the thesis‘ earlier claim 
(Section 1.2.5, Chapter 1), namely, that the majority of CSOs appear to be 
depoliticised actors who complement or even provide state services. Funding 
allocations, or externally introduced agendas and work schemes, can influence the 
degree of political activism if not also the disposition to advocate for a need or cause. 
In the long haul, depoliticisation processes can additionally reflect, or even lead to, 
political neutralisation expressed in the sheer lack of willingness to challenge or 
oppose state policies and their implementation.  Similarly, interviews also brought to 
light that not only CSOs but also Sierra Leone‘s Unions are very weak and lack the 
capacity to advocate for their concerns. The thesis‘ findings correspond well with the 
aforementioned OXFAM study (2013) which identified several striking challenges for 
CSOs in trying to influence political parties in Sierra Leone; these are (OXFAM 2013, 
p. 29):  
 
 Fragmentation among CSOs such that they have an inconsistent voice on issues 
 Poor engagement skills, which limit their persuasiveness 
 Lack of innovation 
 Insufficient human and financial resources to maintain engagement after elections.  
 
Recognising that civil society is a constantly changing societal process and not 
an end result or outcome, Section 6.2 aimed to depict the status quo. While civil 
society has become an object of re-construction but also an instrument for project 
implementation in the country‘s peacebuilding and development process, the 
unintended consequences of these efforts remain a scarcely researched terrain. Section 
6.3, and in much greater depth Chapter 7, are therefore dedicated to addressing this 
gap. With the help of the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3, both will 
critically reflect upon the above-identified depoliticisation of Sierra Leone‘s civil 
sphere.  
 
6.3. Discussion & Analysis: Present Civil society actors and functions  
Apart from a few longstanding organisations and associations, the vast majority 
of Sierra Leone‘s CSOs emerged out of necessity and a collective will to establish 
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peace, and not because of externally imposed liberal ideals and agendas. Crucially, this 
trend has changed during Sierra Leone‘s peacebuilding and development process. As 
outlined in Section 6.2.1, the increase of funding commitments not only bureaucratised 
the collaboration between external donors and local actors but also influenced the 
agenda-setting of the majority of local CSOs. Interviews also brought to light that 
project proposals frequently have to be redesigned to comply with external 
frameworks and different management systems. This clearly confirms general 
observations made in Chapter 3 addressing the amplified use of M&E mechanisms; 
the pressure to meet funding criteria established in frameworks; and consequently the 
unintended creation of a specific civil society landscape which targets specific 
functions and actors. Furthermore, civil society, be it in the form of a formally 
registered CSO, or, be it as an individual of the civil sphere (as a beneficiary of 
projects and programmes) has become heavily dependent on aid and external funding 
assistance. In a recent publication, M‘Cormack-Hale (2013) critiques past and ongoing 
efforts to re-build Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape as ―problematic‖ since 
democratisation and development objectives actually ―undermine the overarching 
policy objective of rebuilding and strengthening the failed state‖ (p. 150). In her view, 
this has led to a counterproductive phenomenon in Sierra Leone: strengthening CSOs 
did not lead to corresponding increases in state capacity. In agreement with 
M‘Cormack-Hale‘s analysis, the thesis goes even one step further. It is suggested that 
Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere is not only instrumentalised to serve a liberal peacebuilding 
and development agenda but also experiences a gradual depoliticisation, understood 
here as removed from the arena and influence of state politics, at both the collective 
and individual levels. To begin with, weak involvement in important decision-making 
processes about the country‘s path from peacebuilding towards development already 
enfeebled the agency of local civil society actors during the war. Section 6.1 
delineated how civil society actors saw themselves repeatedly excluded by 
international actors who collaborated closely with the GoSL (e.g. UNIPSIL‘s Joint 
Vision, but also at UN HQ level). Although the process of Sierra Leone‘s first PRSP 
seemed to be more inclusive, this trend took a sudden turn with the new elected 
government in 2007 which was re-elected in 2012. The few CSOs invited to the 
bargaining table (e.g. SLCTD, PBF JSC) are usually longstanding, well-funded, well-
capacitated and networked, with offices in Freetown. Less capacitated and more 
remotely located initiatives or grassroots associations are generally not well 
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represented. In this regard, there is also a certain top-down and bottom-up mentality, if 
not fragmentation and regionalisation, among local civil society actors themselves, 
detectable in an urban-rural divide and the lack of agency and influence from less 
capacitated CSOs. However, it would be far too simplistic to locate the root causes of 
what was often described as a ―dormant‖ or ―inactive‖ civil society in the international 
community‘s peacebuilding and development assistance alone – even if funding 
allocations and agenda-setting (did) play an essential part. As argued in Chapters 4 and 
5, the nature of Sierra Leone‘s present-day state-society relations is also deeply 
embedded in the country‘s history of state formation, most visible in a political culture 
that embraces and entangles both a primordial and a civic societal sphere. Chapter 7 
will take up and elaborate on this point.  
 
6.3.1. Civil society actors  
Roughly two-thirds of this Chapter captured the voices of local CSOs as 
opposed to other civil society actors such as informal social movements, sodalities, 
secret societies, youth and self-help groups or any other informal grassroots 
association. What might come across as a preferential treatment by the author, in fact 
mirrors Sierra Leone‘s civic public as it emerged and was pre-dominantly shaped after 
the war. In referring to Osusu, labour gangs and sodalities as an embodiment of 
autonomous (civil) constructions, Cubitt (2013, p. 106) holds that ―effective civil 
society appears to be horizontal and not part of the hierarchical bureaucracy 
constructed with the help of outsiders‖. Funding schemes targeting the civil sphere are 
geared towards formally registered civic formations, be that CSOs, CBOs, FBOs, or 
any other type of official association. By contrast, the broader civil sphere emerged as 
a beneficiary of local or international CSOs, and other external donors. Interviews 
with youth clubs and organisations (Nos. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56) further 
disclosed that informal groups either lack the expertise, skills and/or capacities to raise 
their own funds for their often vague agendas. In addition, youth clubs entail elements 
of political loyalism as opposed to keeping a critical eye on the actions of the 
government. The same observation was also made by Gardner (2014) with regards to 
FBC student culture and life.  
 
What is more, actors who do not belong to a traditional Western model of civil 
society are less visible and often difficult to discern. By pure chance the author walked 
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past an informal local grassroots association of farmers in Makeni (interview No. 43) 
founded by a female rural community member in 2005. The director obtained free 
access to land from the government and engaged other women of her community to do 
farming with her. At the time the interview was held, the association had received a 
small amount of support from the government but no funding from INGOs or IOs. 
With the founder being one of the few who can read and write, and with poverty 
among all members and no permanent staff, the association continuously struggles to 
capacitate and sustain itself. Thus, a member of society‘s life circumstances, such as 
living conditions, health, nutrition and education, also affect their agency and capacity 
to advocate for their core concerns. For now, the local association‘s agency is limited 
to taking care of female farmers while lacking the capacity, influence and skills to 
raise awareness about their daily struggles and concerns. Low levels of education, high 
illiteracy rates as well as gender imbalances infringe on society‘s political agency 
which in turn spurs depoliticisation from below. As SLF founder Ahamedi Tijan 
Kabbah accurately put it: ―An empty bag cannot stand‖. People‘s priority is to take 
care of their families and provide their daily bread. Their pursuit of self-actualisation 
and self-empowerment appears to be constantly challenged by the struggles of the 
everyday.  
 
More generally, the prevailing focus on local CSOs encouraged a civil society 
landscape resembling Tocqueville‘s vision of an independent civil society in the form 
of civic associations (see Chapter 2). For Tocqueville, civil society epitomised non-
political actors who maintain a functioning democracy, prevent the fragmentation of 
society and teach their members to make use of their rights and liberties in a 
responsible manner. Put simply, a society which is in charge of its own destiny 
without governmental support and aid. In practice, Sierra Leone‘s civil society actors 
are far from this Tocquevillean ideal. First, their main raison d‟être is service 
provision to a socioeconomically deprived civil sphere. Second, not only is there 
political loyalism among some local CSOs but there are also several characteristics 
where primordial and civic societal features continue to intersect. This is expressed in 
cultural particularisms such as secret societies, customary law or intergenerational 
power imbalances, gender inequality and patronage. Hence the primordial public 
benefits and subtracts from the civic sphere in various ways. This is most evident in 
widespread corruption and the emergence of briefcase CSOs. Of course, both 
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corruption and clientelism can be also found in the political and societal cultures of the 
Western world (see for instance the work of Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, 1994). Yet, in 
the case of Sierra Lone, corruption is inter alia also a result of neo-patrimonial power 
structures entrenched in all strata of society, though to varying degrees.  
 
Lastly, Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape, in the form of registered CSOs, is 
a constantly moving and shifting societal construct. The thesis‘ mapping exercise was 
only able to provide a snapshot of registered organisations. A sudden shift in funding 
allocations could change the general image rapidly. To give a few examples, CBO No. 
45 and No. 46 used to be registered as CSOs until recently, but lack of urgently-
needed funding forced them to downgrade to the status of a CBO. Similarly, at the 
time of writing this chapter the author learned that since the 2012 interviews CSO No. 
16 had ceased to exist and CSO No. 29 had to close its Freetown offices and now 
operates only outside the capital. All of these actors were serious organisations 
engaging in urgently-needed developmental and communal work. In other words, 
dependency on aid not only influences CSOs‘ agendas but also their sheer existence as 
individual and collective actors.  
 
6.3.2. Civil society functions 
Sierra Leone‘s civil society functions, and accordingly activities, changed 
rapidly during the country‘s peacebuilding and development phase. Actors known for 
being peace and human rights activists (e.g. CSO No. 4, CSO No. 35) shifted or 
widened their focus from reporting about human rights abuses, peace negotiation and 
mediation towards reconciliation, food security, environmental protection, organic 
farming, economic empowerment of women and youth, education for the 
underprivileged, water sanitation or health care. Many local CSOs who came into 
existence shortly after the war simply responded to society‘s most pressing needs. 
Then again, donor requests and standard settings altered initial project proposals and 
activities as well. While several positive mentions were made with regards to donors‘ 
assistance and how they capacitated local CSOs, this collaboration invigorated an 
interesting dynamic with regards to local ownership. Increasingly, internationally- or 
locally-led projects started to promote community-driven development programmes. 
This was addressed in Section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1, as well as in Section 6.2.2 above but 
is also echoed in the high occurrence of CSOs engaging in communal, social and 
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human development shown in Graph 2. For M‘Cormack-Hale (2013), the irony behind 
this trend is that ―the promotion of community-driven development, where people are 
still very much responsible for their own development does little to promote a vision 
of a state that is in touch with people‘s needs and is meeting them adequately‖ (p. 
150). The thesis adds to this point that current forms of communal development do 
little to strengthen locals in a Habermasian tradition of empowering the civil sphere to 
publicly debate and eventually advocate for their own concerns. Instead, while being 
put in charge of services that could potentially be provided by the state, Sierra Leone‘s 
civil sphere is driven into a corner of being a beneficiary who implements projects 
introduced and monitored by local CSOs, INGOs or other international donors. In 
doing so, the civil sphere complements, as opposed to actively shaping, the country‘s 
developmental agenda. Weak state institution and service provision also fortified the 
formation of self-help groups as well as street clubs which serve as informal, and often 
the only social, support systems for their impoverished members.138 
 
In this light, the thesis suggests that functions of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere 
resemble state-society relations as promoted in conservative liberalism. That is, a 
limited welfare state and a society in Tocqueville‘s wishful thinking of taking control 
over their own lives and therefore not dependent on the state. Despite the high number 
of local CSOs, the average individual is too impoverished and faces many structural 
barriers to have that control (see ensuing Section 7.3 of Chapter 7). To give a brief 
example: in the search for better opportunities, there has been rapid rural-urban 
migration flow, in particular among the youth. In the latest UNHABITAT report ‗The 
State of African Cities 2010‘ it is indicated that 38-40 percent of all Sierra Leoneans 
live in urban areas. UNHABITAT further estimates that by 2050 this figure will 
change to 62.44 percent.139 CSO No. 4 is not alone when stressing that this trend 
undermines not only food security in rural areas but also leaves the old and aged 
behind without any care.
 
The Sierra Leonean journalist Madieu Jalloh notes that: ―(…) 
                                                 
138
 The author wrote a short online article on the issue. Datzberger, (2011a): ―Voices to the Youth – ‗We 
can see the light but we are not working.‘‖, LSE IDEAS, see: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/08/sierra-leone-voices-to-the-youth-%E2%80%98we-can-see-the-
light-but-we-are-not-working%E2%80%99/, last visit 12.04.2014. 
139
 Information retrieved from an online article by the author, Datzberger (2011b): ―Sierra Leone - 
Barefoot soldiers for social justice and peace‖, LSE IDEAS, see: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/12/sierra-leone-barefoot-soldiers-for-social-justice-food-security-and-
peace/, last visit 12.04.2014. 
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to say that agriculture is vital to Sierra Leone‘s economic growth is an 
understatement‖.140 In this regard, CSO No. 18, who belongs to the category of 
communal, social and human development, made a striking comment referring to the 
country‘s mismanaged agricultural resources:  
 
The government should take care of promoting local farmers and local rice production. It 
is ironic. Sierra Leone has a vast land of fertile soil but still needs to import rice, the 
government should encourage citizens to produce rice and become active in agriculture. In 
fact it is a business opportunity for many as local rice is cheaper than imported one. Also, 
the government does not encourage internal industry. Sierra Leone has lots of cash crops 
like coffee or cocoa, but all of these are exported for processing. We should process these 
crops in Sierra Leone and export them. 
 
By and large, local CSOs support and train Sierra Leoneans to farm rice on their 
lands as opposed to advocating or pushing the government to change its neoliberal 
economic course. In interviews, the National Associations of Farmers Sierra Leone 
(NAFSL) was repeatedly described as weak; so were other unions. Even if there were 
some sort of activism to challenge the GoSL‘s course, those initiatives are heavily 
supported if not monitored and guided by Western INGOs. For instance, in April 2014 
Christian Aid published a highly critical report on Sierra Leone‘s massive revenue 
losses from tax incentives.
141
 What was presented at a first glance as a purely locally 
driven civil society initiative to challenge the GoSL‘s tax policies, turned out to be 
been written and researched by Curtis Research, an independent consultancy based in 
Oxford, UK. Apart from local CSO network coalitions, the INGOs Christian Aid, IBIS 
and ActionAid were heavily involved in compiling the report.
142
 The good intentions 
of these Western INGOs notwithstanding, it is a form of political activism not 
stemming or organically emerging from the civil sphere but a product of externally 
driven CSOs. This further distracts from an essential and frequently overlooked 
function of the country‘s civil sphere. Namely, in a society where the primordial and 
civic public constantly intersect, it became implicitly civil society‘s function to re-
negotiate the power-relations between those two worlds. Chapter 7 will delve into this 
point.  
                                                 
140
 Sierra Leone Express Media, ―Massive rural-urban migration and its impact on agriculture in Sierra 
Leone.‖, See: http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/11278, last visit 12.04.2014. 
141
 Information retrieved from the Guardian Global Development Blog, see: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/15/sierra-leone-tax-incentives-foreign-
investment-before-poor-ngos, accessed 06.05.2014. 
142
 A full version can be downloaded at Christian Aid‘s website: 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Sierra-Leone-Report-tax-incentives-080414.pdf, accessed 
06.05.2014. 
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Conclusion 
With few exceptions, donors do not risk supporting local activism and therefore 
giving the most affected a voice. As highlighted in Chapter 1, when it comes to the 
practical implementation of what appears to be in theory ―empowering‖ for the civil 
sphere, in practice concepts such as local ownership, cultural particularism or being 
more sensitive to forms of everyday resistance are challenged by several ambiguities 
as well as structural barriers on the ground. The argument is not that peacebuilding 
and development scholarship and practice should refrain from a local-turn in their 
approach - on the contrary. Rather, it is suggested that a local-turn in scholarship and 
practice needs to be firmly embedded in empirical research on the ground. As 
Katherine Boo stated (2012, p. 407): ―I believe that better arguments, maybe even 
better policies, get formulated when we know more about ordinary lives‖. Analysing 
those voices from below opens up an entire new perspective on to how peacebuilding 
and development efforts are not only socially reproduced but also socially engineered. 
Ongoing forms of clientelism, unequal gender relations or the continuous acceptance 
of customary law are indications of how the civic and primordial public intersect – 
despite the civil war and internationally steered peacebuilding and development 
assistance later on.  
 
As Chapter 7 will further elaborate, these intersections offer a completely new 
analytical, theoretical but also practical entry point. Empowering the civil sphere is 
recurrently challenged by the legacies of colonial rule, cultural particularism and the 
political culture of communal life. At the same time, a large body of literature 
belonging to the alternative discourse school (see Chapter 1), is challenged by the 
positive perceptions and descriptions made by CSOs about external (liberal) donor 
support. More importantly, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, severe poverty continues 
to be an underestimated factor as an impediment towards societal empowerment from 
below; rendering any quest for alternatives to a liberal agenda almost irrelevant. 
Simply put, empowering, strengthening and consequently transforming the civil 
sphere can be far more complex and frustrating, in practice as in theory, than 
researchers and scholars generally tend to admit.  
 
To conclude, the lack of political representation and advocacy of CSOs in Sierra 
Leone are striking turning points in the country‘s present developmental phase. The 
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last chapter will assess this phenomenon, but also explore alternatives for 
strengthening a non-Western civil sphere. It will reflect upon the consequences of 
applying a liberal notion of the concept of civil society in present peacebuilding and 
development efforts. In doing so, Chapter 7 critically assesses and examines how the 
civil sphere is currently the subject of re-construction in post conflict countries, and 
how this affects local civil society landscapes, their respective political culture and 
voice.  
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PART III 
 
Peacebuilding and the Depoliticisation of Civil Society 
in Sierra Leone 
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Chapter Seven 
 
(Re-) conceptualising civil society in Sierra Leone 
 
 
―Once you have freedom of speech and freedom of association we have to ask ourselves: 
What comes next? We need freedom after we have spoken.‖ 
[CSO No. 3] 
 
Sierra Leone‘s history of state formation, the decade-long civil war and the 
ensuing peacebuilding and development efforts shaped the country‘s civil sphere and 
social fabrics in seemingly ambiguous ways. If compared to societies in the West, it is 
a country full of socially entangled dualisms grounded in the intersections of 
primordial and civic everyday actions, realities and spheres. Despite efforts to 
liberalise societal structures and local politics, primordial and civic juxtapositions 
linger within the civil sphere to this day. There are numerous examples to better 
illustrate this point: official law is still challenged by the uncertain and illiberal nature 
of widely practised and accepted customary law. Chiefs are struggling with the power 
given to local councillors while local councillors may feel a certain loyalty towards 
their chiefs. Gender equality campaigns are frequently run by women who belong to 
secret societies favouring the practice of FGM. Hospitals and medical INGOs operate 
next to traditional medicine men. Youth complain about intergenerational power 
imbalances and patriarchal societal structures while showering community elders with 
deference and respect. Thousands of civilians successfully demonstrated for the 
reinstitution of a multiparty system whereas today Sierra Leone‘s political parties 
hardly differ in their ideological viewpoints and beliefs. Liberal values such as 
democracy and good governance are praised even though clientelism, 
neopatrimonialism and patronage are tolerated and continue to exist. CSOs 
complaining about the lack of an active and vibrant civil society are themselves 
frequently close to political parties and/or local chiefs as well as being heavily 
dependent on the generosity and agenda-setting of their donors. Above all, externally-
led efforts to strengthen and empower local civil society actors by means of a liberal 
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agenda inadvertently bolstered societal arrangements reflecting primordial features of 
tribalism, ethnicity and regionalism.  
 
These admittedly quite bluntly delineated dichotomies may at first come across 
as several contradictions in direct terms. Altogether they actually open up an entire 
new perspective on to how the legacies of past events and external intervention are 
eventually socially reproduced over history and time. The war provided a unique yet 
tragic momentum for local CSOs to emerge. As a result, the succeeding peacebuilding 
and development phase presented a significant window of opportunities for the 
international community to reshape and reconstruct state society relations based on the 
instincts of a liberal paradigm. On the surface, Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape 
prospered in the form of numerous associations and organisations. Behind the scene, 
those actors appear to gradually forfeit their liberal functions of an independent, 
empowered and participatory civil sphere. This is a striking phenomenon and its 
multifaceted causal mechanisms, as well as how they are intertwined, remain by and 
large unexplored. In interlinking the theoretical, analytical, historical and empirical 
accounts of Parts I and II, this last chapter will return to the thesis‘ overall research 
question at hand:  
 
Why are civil society landscapes in non-Western fragile states at risk of being 
gradually depoliticised? 
 
In developing a response, the chapter will advance three main arguments. First, 
in further advancing the work of Howell and Pearce (2002), Verkoren and van 
Leeuwen (2012), Cubitt (2013) and M‘Cormack-Hale (2013), Section 7.1 supports the 
commonly agreed consensus that civil society has become instrumentalised to serve a 
broader liberal peacebuilding and development agenda in numerous ways. Causalities 
explaining this phenomenon can be located in donor‘s ―cherry picking‖ (Cubitt 2013) 
of only well-established actors; but they can also be found in weak state capacities 
(M‘Cormack-Hale 2013) or a top-down mentality and bad coordination among local 
CSOs, to name a few. Second, Section 7.2 argues that a deeper inquiry into the 
cultural particularisms and political culture of Sierra Leone reveals that Ekeh‘s 
bifurcated state is very much alive. In other words, Western idea(l)s of participatory 
approaches and democracy are challenged by a persisting urban-rural divide as well as 
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socially entrenched forms of neopatrimonialism, elite-loyalism and tribalism. This 
observation should not be misinterpreted as giving a sense that Sierra Leone‘s civil 
sphere is not open to, or capable of, establishing democratic and participatory societal 
structures. On the contrary, as it will be argued later, Sierra Leonean society finds 
itself currently in the midst of renegotiating those various intersections of a primordial 
and civic sphere. Yet efforts to strengthen the civil sphere concomitant with rigid 
monitoring mechanisms and evaluation frameworks frequently lack the aptitude to 
grant such processes enough leeway and time. Third, the effects colonialism has had 
on African societies are still reflected in the current monopolisation of wealth and 
power among a few (elites) next to a vast majority living in abject poverty. More 
concretely, Section 7.3 sheds light on how abject poverty, human development and 
above all the lack of education affect civic activism and agency. This remains a 
scarcely addressed aspect in peacebuilding and development literature. Comparing a 
sub-Saharan African post-conflict country‘s society to Maslow‘s famous ―Hierarchy 
of Needs‖ (1943), one may question where a physiologically starved society – not to 
mention the lack of safety and sometimes also love/belonging and esteem its members 
endure – finds the strength for self-actualisation, self-transformation and self-
articulation as it occurs in the Western world? Liberal depictions of civil society 
consequently risk overlooking societies‘ key constraints that thwart any form of self-
actualisation from taking place.  
 
Critically reflecting upon these entanglements, the last section (7.4) will then 
address the necessity of re-conceptualising settled modes of thinking in further 
advancing our knowledge about war-torn civil spheres in non-Western fragile states. It 
will explore how a society‘s political culture, as well as the matrix of local factors 
discussed in Chapter 2, may enhance our understanding as to how agency and voice is 
socially engineered. This is imperative in the quest for alternatives as to how 
peacebuilding and development efforts may empower and give a voice to weaker 
segments of a population to legitimise actions and agendas that affect the country as a 
whole.  
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7.1. Instrumentalisation of the civil sphere in peacebuilding and development 
practice.  
Earlier, in Chapter 3, the thesis expanded on how international frameworks 
targeting civil societies in fragile states are generally occupied with three main 
aspects: inclusiveness, capacity building and effectiveness. In short, external 
peacebuilding and development assistance inadvertently converted local civil society 
actors into objects of measurement based on pre-determined indicators, outputs, 
outcomes and long-term impacts. Over time, strengthening civil society became an 
outwardly legitimising strategy for a liberal peacebuilding and development agenda 
and course. However, most donors and their respective frameworks (e.g. 8 Principles 
for CSO Development Effectiveness) are not anticipating that funding allocations, as 
well as implementation and M&E mechanisms, promote a rather restrictive landscape 
of and for a war-torn and non-Occidental civil sphere to flourish in its own manner 
and pace. As the empirical data presented in Part II suggests, in the case of Sierra 
Leone the majority of local civil society actors are repeatedly challenged by externally 
imposed bureaucratic structures, log-frames and administrative procedures. Then 
again, donors are struggling with the lack of urgently needed resources and capacities 
on the ground. As a result there seems to be little leeway for a more organic and 
culturally embedded progression of a war-torn civil sphere. Less formal actors such as 
home-grown associations, non-registered CBOs, sodalities or youth groups are to a 
much greater degree approached as beneficiaries - on rare occasions as implementing 
partners, but generally not as actors that take charge of their own interests and 
agendas.  
 
Graph 3 in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.3) further illustrated that externally-led 
peacebuilding and development efforts led to an instrumentalisation of Sierra Leone‘s 
civil society landscape. Concretely, an extensive mapping analysis of CSOs‘ functions 
on the ground showed that despite liberal aspirations of an active civil society in terms 
of ―people‘s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation‖ (8 Principles for 
CSO Development Effectiveness, 2010), donor support towards those areas was low. 
Also, lack of ownership was a recurring challenge for the majority of CSOs 
interviewed. Probably one of the main reasons for donors‘ preferences towards 
communal and social development, and consequently service delivery, can be inter 
214 
 
alia located in the many pressing needs of an impoverished, largely unschooled and 
unemployed society.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis contends that the growing support towards CSOs 
fortified aid dependency and consequently undermined the capacity of the Sierra 
Leonean state. In this context, Cubitt (2013) argues that in Sierra Leone, external 
policy interventions targeting civil society distorted democracy and removed 
accountability from the local sphere. She concludes (p. 107), ―The first step for 
interventionists is to establish local perceptions of legitimacy and understand how 
people identify genuine participatory projects themselves‖. The thesis not only agrees 
with but also further advances Cubitt‘s observation on two accounts. To begin with, 
there is undeniably a salient lack of inclusiveness. Part II of the thesis alluded to 
numerous incidences when less capacitated, rural, informal or home-grown 
organisations and associations were repeatedly excluded from important decision 
making processes affecting the country‘s overall direction and path. The thesis further 
indicates that this is also reflected in a certain top-down mentality and urban-rural 
divide among local CSOs themselves. Correspondingly, Cubitt is most accurate in 
stating that local voices are not always represented through traditionally funded civil 
society actors. Chapter 6 elaborated in detail how funding schemes usually target 
formally registered civic formations as opposed to less formal actors or activists. What 
is more, non-traditional civil society actors such as informal associations or clubs are 
often difficult to discern aside from the fact that they lack a reputation of being 
accountable and experienced partners. However, whereas Cubitt, leans towards an 
actor-oriented approach (albeit not characterised as such) in stressing how and why 
donors‘ cherry picking instrumentalised Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere, the thesis aim was 
to interlink actors voices with functional-oriented approaches as well. In doing so, the 
thesis generated new insights and knowledge as to why local agency and voices from 
below are at risk of being constantly undermined. It is also here where the thesis 
identifies a paradox. Regardless of a strong emphasis within the international 
community‘s language on empowering local civil societies by means of liberal 
functions required for a democratic idea(l) (see Chapter 3), in the case of Sierra Leone 
the majority of civil society actors appear to be neutralised and depoliticised. The 
historical and empirical accounts presented in Part II also provided new insights to 
M‘Cormack-Hale‘s and Cubitt‘s critical stance with supplementary findings. In the 
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first instance, the thesis contends that local perceptions of legitimacy (as put forward 
by Cubitt) may not always match with Western researchers‘ and interventionists‘ 
instinctive thinking of a democracy-committed and inclusive civil sphere. Recognising 
how societal structures were distorted and shaped over history and time is imperative 
for a better understanding of why war-torn societies are still in the process of 
renegotiating their own legitimising arrangements from the grassroots to the state 
level. In line with Acemoglu's (et al., 2013) findings, Chapter 4 highlighted that not 
only is Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere captured by chiefs but that efforts to strengthen it 
might just strengthen the control of the chiefs over it. More generally, the country‘s 
economic development heavily depends on the control of local elites over the civil 
sphere. Similarly, local perceptions of legitimacy depend also on the extent to which 
the civil sphere submits itself to elites. Ironically, as will be discussed in section 7.2 
below, interviews conducted by the author detected a remarkable sense of loyalism 
towards political parties, elders and chiefs despite widely articulated frustrations about 
corruption, embezzlement and fraud. In reflection of M‘Cormack-Hale‘s and Cubitt‘s 
work, the thesis stresses that it would therefore be far too simplistic, in some instances 
even unjust, to locate explanations of the instrumentalisation dilemma in the 
mechanisms of external peacebuilding and development assistance alone. There is a 
tendency in recent scholarship, specifically among the alternative discourse school, to 
portray peacebuilding and development practices as endeavours that disregard ―the 
everyday life‖ of ordinary people and their legitimising voices from below (see 
Section 1.2.4, Chapter 1). While these criticisms are in many instances vindicated, 
they nonetheless sideline the importance of thoroughly interlinking those claims with 
often conflicting perceptions and narratives from the civil sphere. These empirically 
grounded ambiguities can open up new vistas for a culturally attuned understanding of 
persisting and accepted societal power structures and how they are socially 
engineered. The thesis‘ exploratory case study of Sierra Leone provides several 
insightful examples in this respect.  
 
First, whereas funding allocations did play an essential part in instrumentalising 
civil society for a liberal agenda, it was also the local civil sphere that manoeuvred 
itself into a position to provide services that the GoSL lacked the capacity and/or 
political will to provide. In the course of both periods of field research the author 
witnessed how directors of Freetown-based CSOs used their status as a stepping stone 
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into local politics. This clearly offers a new perspective into how Sierra Leoneans 
renegotiate or even understand their very own boundaries between civil society and 
the state. Second, without denying the philanthropic intent and extremely important 
work of many local civil society actors, working for or founding a CSO is certainly an 
opportunity for income generation as well as a means of acquiring local prestige. As 
noted in Chapter 6, the emergence of numerous briefcase CSOs, but also notorious 
corruption within CSOs, elucidate how ostensible civil actors instrumentalised their 
own country‘s mushrooming civil society landscape to make ends meet. Third, from a 
postcolonial lens, one could even go so far as to argue that civic associations or 
organisations are, to varying degrees, an integral part of Sierra Leone‘s primordial 
culture and life. As such, civil society actors subtract from the civic public to the 
benefit of their primordial ties (see Chapter 4). Fourth, apart from Acemoglu's (et al., 
2013) in-depth study on how chiefs instrumentalise the civil sphere for their own 
interests, there is a noticeable patronage mentality among local politicians as well. 
Prior to the 2012 elections, interviewees (CSO No. 16, CSO No.40) referred to several 
incidences in which politicians took advantage of the desperate situation of 
disadvantaged youth to ‗buy‘ their votes. The constant lack of economic opportunities 
and prospects of a better life rendered many ex-combatants and home grown youth 
clubs prone to co-optation by political elites (Mitton 2013, pp. 329-332). Chapter 6 
further alluded to similar accounts to Gardner‘s (2014) research about FBC students. 
Instead of opposing or challenging the behaviour and actions of corrupt elders, 
political party-loyalism dominates the university culture, notwithstanding the many 
grievances students face in their everyday lives. Undoubtedly, securing the support of 
Sierra Leone‘s youth and CSOs also reflects a certain fear among the country‘s elites 
of a potential relapse into conflict.  
 
In sum, even though the thesis accedes to the general criticism that externally-
led peacebuilding and development interventions instrumentalised Sierra Leone‘s civil 
sphere, it also stresses that local dynamics should not be dismissed. A country‘s 
political culture, in the shadows of a hitherto bifurcated state, is an often overlooked 
entry point in the attempt to understand why civil society not only needs to be 
reconceptualised but also takes on a different dimension in the context of non-Western 
fragile states.  
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7.2. Cultural particularism, political culture and the bifurcated state 
Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1 pointed to the recurring debates on the difficulties of 
tailoring peacebuilding and development efforts to more context-specific and 
culturally sensitive approaches. It highlighted the dichotomous relationship between 
liberalism and cultural particularism fuelling many discussions revolving around the 
ethics of peacebuilding and development interventions (Lidén, 2009). In response to 
the fierce accusations of cultural imperialism, aid agencies have increasingly engaged 
in community-based initiatives with the expectation of ensuring a more integrated and 
inclusive approach. In doing so, CBAs are generally designed in a way that gives 
communities direct control over investment decisions; project planning, execution as 
well as monitoring (Huma 2009, p. 4). In the case of Sierra Leone, the local turn is 
noticeable in the high number of CSOs targeting communal, social and human 
development as depicted in Graph 3. In their interactions with international partner 
organisations, local CSOs repeatedly perceived themselves as gateways toward a more 
culturally sensitised peacebuilding and developmental process. Organisations such as 
CSO No.4 or CSO No. 5 serve as prime examples. In both cases, their directors are 
part of the very communities they seek to help. Still, both stressed that communication 
strategies and patterns of interaction with external actors differ from community to 
community — some are better involved than others. Correspondingly, the thesis 
elaborated on the many problems local peacebuilding and development actors 
encounter when it comes to the implementation of community-based projects aiming 
to be more culturally attuned. The empirical data presented in Part II revealed that 
expectations of fostering social cohesion and local ownership are commonly 
challenged by low participation, syndromes of aid dependency, high illiteracy rates, 
gender inequality, intergenerational power imbalances and, above all, corruption 
manifested in neopatrimonialism, clientlism and patronage. Following Labonte (2008) 
there is indeed a high risk of aggravating social exclusion, particularly affecting 
women and youth. At the same time, local accounts of their everyday challenges 
occurring at the very grassroots level led to puzzling results. On several occasions 
answers given by interviewees appeared to be a contradiction in terms. One interview 
partner (CSO No. 2) even finished the conversation by saying: ―Please take note of the 
fact that my views are very controversial‖. However, what appeared at first confusing 
for a Western researcher‘s mind-set eventually opened up an entire new perspective 
about the social and cultural quintessence of Sierra Leone‘s present civil sphere. The 
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remainder of Section 7.2 will address these contradictions and how they inform 
society‘s political culture. Concretely, particular attention will be given to the 
following three aspects: chieftaincy systems and communal life (7.2.1); liberal 
aspirations alongside illiberal customs and traditions (7.2.2); and local perceptions of 
colonialism and liberal post-colonial interventionism (7.2.3).  
 
7.2.1. Chieftaincy systems and communal life.  
To start with, it is necessary to repeat that interviewees, including CSOs, 
individuals, communities and youth clubs, frequently complained about the corrupt, 
undemocratic and exclusionary behaviour of their elders and chiefs, as well as 
injustices evoked by the neopatrimonial nature of chieftaincy systems and customary 
law. In Abraham‘s almost cynical way of putting it (2013, p. 173): ―With few good 
chiefs around, it appears that the only effective institution that presently exists in the 
chiefdoms is extortion by chiefs and chiefdom officials under protection of 
government officials and politicians. In a literal sense, the chiefdoms are in a state of 
disarray‖. Surprisingly, when interviewees were asked if they would like to put an end 
to the chieftaincy system, or at least remove power from the chiefs, none of them 
agreed. Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere is characterised by a salient socially and culturally 
embedded consensus about the duty to shower community elders and chiefs with 
loyalty and respect - even though their actions are frequently not to the benefit of all. 
A short excerpt from an interview with members of the destitute Kroo Bay community 
will better illustrate this point.143 During the conversation, a handful of fishermen 
remonstrated against the embezzlement and corruption of their community elders. In 
the natural course of the talk they expressed the need for fishing equipment as their 
work becomes more dangerous by the day. Illegal fishing vessels depleting Sierra 
Leone‘s shore line of fish force them to go further out into the sea with fishing boats 
reminiscent of prehistoric times.144 Their daily dangerous endeavours claimed many 
local fishermen‘s lives. Towards the end of the interview, the fishermen were asked 
how they would proceed if the community were given the money to buy better 
equipment so that they could catch more fish and be safe. All of them unanimously 
agreed that they would distribute the funds through the chief – in spite of the high risk 
                                                 
143
 Interview held in Freetown, 25.06.2011. 
144
 According to the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), Sierra Leone loses an estimated USD 29 
million to IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing every year. See: 
http://ejfoundation.org/oceans/issues-pirate-fishing, last access 01.05.2014.  
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of losing the funds to corruption.. Putting the phenomenon of an almost unwavering 
dutifulness aside, independent actions or decisions of community members would 
certainly risk social exclusion, enormous tensions, and in the worst case, being 
expelled from communal life.  
More generally, in conversations with local CSOs, chiefs were generally 
perceived as both facilitators and blockers of the country‘s peacebuilding and 
development process. Some CSOs expressed the need for a better reform of the 
chieftaincies and felt that chiefs should become more educated. Others described it as 
a ―cultural outfit that needs to be maintained‖ (CSO No. 3). Following Abraham‘s 
(2013) insightful discussion about ―Chieftaincy and Reconstruction in Sierra Leone‖ it 
is perhaps much more than just that. In his view, the institution of paramount 
chieftaincy is at the heart of Sierra Leone‘s traditional institutions. Indeed, it not only 
shapes Sierra Leone‘s cultural particularism of the everyday but is also an inevitable 
part of society‘s political culture influencing ordinary people‘s behaviour, belief 
systems, societal structures and ties. Yet, recalling Chapter 4, its traditional roots were 
severely distorted under colonial governance which misused the chiefs‘ traditional 
role, authority, political and social status for its own ends. From independence 
onwards, especially under Stevens‘ rule, chiefs were once again instrumentalised as 
vote-catching tools and their traditional duties further shorn. In an attempt to restore 
the past, towards the end of the war, Kabbah‘s administration radically reversed the 
country‘s policy towards chiefs.145 In retrospect, the results of these policies are, by 
and large, disappointing and in some instances the situation even worsened for weaker 
segments of the population. For example, the presence of former CDF combatants 
impeded the restoration of civil authority in some chiefdoms as they saw themselves 
above the law. In addition, local courts under customary law have degenerated into 
machineries for exploitation of the poor (Abraham 2013, p. 173). Thomson (2007, p. 
23) additionally warns that Sierra Leone‘s district councils could easily become the 
tools of central government or the chiefdoms as opposed to presenting an independent 
development force. In his view, the ―Local Government Act‖, passed in March 2004, 
                                                 
145
 In October 2002, the government launched a ―Task Force on Decentralization and Local 
Government‖ supported by the UNDP and the WB. Other international donors also became heavily 
involved. A council of paramount chiefs was set up to complement district councils as well as to 
oversee chieftaincy development reforms in consultation with the adult population to make it more 
‗people friendly‘. In addition DfID funded the establishment of a ―Governance Reform Secretariat‖ 
which introduced a decentralisation section and sought to respond to immediate problems of rural 
dislocation by facilitating the return of the paramount chiefs (Thomson 2007, pp. 20-23). 
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created a structure which has many similarities to the one which existed prior to 1972. 
More precisely (p. 23):  
 
The district councils are responsible for providing a wide range of services devolved from 
central government, while the chiefdoms perform other essential local functions, notably 
the administration of customary land rights, revenue collection and the maintenance of law 
and order. Moreover, the councils depend for their revenues either on transfers from the 
centre or on taxes collected by the chiefdoms.  
 
During interviews with CSOs and CBOs, frustrations about the mechanisms of 
the current chieftaincy system were usually articulated on the subject of customary 
land rights. To cite a northern-based CBO (No. 45):  
There are cultural customs in Sierra Leone which are outdated, like the land system. Some 
people are prioritised. (…) I would like to keep the chiefdom system but we have to 
introduce agreements regarding land issues with the Paramount Chief and the individual. 
 
Sierra Leone‘s peacebuilding and development phase is considered by 
international donors, as well as local civil society actors, as an opportune moment of 
chieftaincy reform. Thus far, post-conflict governments have been reluctant to engage 
in a thorough reform addressing the central contradictions around the institution. This 
probably stems from the fear that its rationalisation could make the chiefs less pliable 
and more independent (Abraham 2013, pp. 178-179). In addition to experts‘ opinions, 
many interviewees expressed the urgent need to reform the chieftaincy system to make 
it more responsive to the social and economic realities at the grassroots level. The 
strong disposition of local people to maintain it as a ―traditional‖ institution, in spite of 
its flaws, reinforces the matrix of local factors, identified in Chapter 2, which shape 
and socially construct the everyday of the civil sphere. Clearly, conceptualising civil 
society in contemporary Sierra Leone is inextricably linked with the legacies of 
colonial and post-colonial rule and the fabrics and social workings of neopatrimonial 
networks and chiefdom systems. Society‘s widespread acceptance of patronage, 
clientelism and ‗big men‘ mentalities rests upon a societal logic that interlinks social, 
political and economic spheres much tighter than in Western societies. For Hoffman 
(2007) this means, in practical terms, that social networks are crucial to everything 
from employment opportunities to ritual initiations to individual identity. He continues 
(p 651):  
 
Social action needs to be understood not in terms of individual activities but as the 
mobilisation of social networks. ‗People here‘, writes the anthropologist Charles Piot, 
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referring to West Africa generally, ‗do not ―have‖ relations; they ―are‖ relations. The 
social being of an individual is measured by the people with whom one has relations of 
dependence or for whom one acts as a patron. The capacity to maintain a social network 
(a demonstrable ‗wealth in people‘) is the mark of status.  
 
Put differently, a liberal understanding of civil society is probably most 
challenged by local perceptions of the role of the individual and his or her relation 
towards the state and society therein (see Chapters 1 and 2). The individual cannot be 
that easily detached from political and non-political attitudes affecting communal, if 
not societal, life. Mindsets (values, norms, orientations) about how to be a responsible 
community member, as well as the political nature of communities can stand in stark 
contrast to liberal or emancipatory understandings of individuality in the context of a 
society as a whole. It is important to stress at this point that the thesis‘ observation 
should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that sub-Saharan African societies lack the 
determination for emancipation and transformation from below. In fact, quite the 
opposite is the case. Sierra Leoneans are presently in the midst of renegotiating 
societal intersections of the primordial and civil sphere, and consequently, the nature 
and characteristics of state-society relations and communal life. This observation can 
be further substantiated with another ambiguity at hand.  
 
7.2.2. Liberal aspirations alongside illiberal customs and traditions 
In addition to the question about the characteristics of Sierra Leonean civil 
society (Section 6.2), interviewees were asked the question: How would you define the 
term and concept of civil society? (Question 1, Appendix 2). 
 
The preponderance of interviewees associated the concept of civil society with: 
activism, advocacy work, giving voice and rights to underprivileged and marginalised 
people (e.g. grassroots communities, elderly and youth). Similar definitions were also 
made by CSOs who engage purely in service delivery and are not involved in any 
advocacy work.  
 
Table 3. Question 1 (Appendix 2): How would you define the term and concept of civil society? 
―Civil society acts on behalf of innocent, poor, grassroots community people, young people and the 
elderly.‖ 
[CSO No. 15] 
―Civil society is the voice of the grassroots. It is the inter-mediator of grassroots and the 
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government. Civil society gives a voice of the grassroots to the government.‖ 
[CBO No. 44] 
―I would define civil society as all actors that represent various interests, groups, CSOs, CBOs, - 
but it does not include social clubs or INGOs, the latter are often consider as civil society but they 
are not. Civil society actors are activists, but not all of them, such as journalists, can consider 
themselves as such, because they are not independent.‖ 
[CSO No. 19] 
―Civil society is a pressure group that should represent the marginalised voices of the people.‖ 
[CSO No. 22] 
―Civil society means to work directly with CSOs, educate people on their civic rights, advice the 
government and direct people in the best way of being good citizens. But also to push the 
government to the right ideas.‖ 
[CSO No. 26] 
 
Interlacing these answers with the theoretical discourses of Part I, some central 
observations can be made. Frist, interviewees‘ responses leaned implicitly towards a 
Gramscian, and to an extent also Habermasian intellectual tradition. More concretely, 
emphasis was given to the transformative (Jantzi and Jantzi 2009) role of civil society 
and the active part it should have in shaping state society relations and the overall 
democratic nature of a state. At the same time, civil society‘s role was predominantly 
perceived as empowering fellow citizens to be in charge of their own future and lives. 
A significant number of interviewees articulated the need for stronger state 
institutions. Only one CSO (No. 27) felt that education should be privatised because of 
the untrustworthiness and extremely low standards of public schools. Apart from that, 
none of the respondents made an explicit mention with regards to a limited role of the 
state to further enhance the freedom of the individual, in line with Tocqueville‘s 
account of state-civil society relations. As Section 7.3 will further expand, the majority 
of Sierra Leoneans is de facto not in a socioeconomic position to be in charge of its 
own destiny without governmental or any other kind of external support. Thus, while 
generally valuing and upholding traditional or primordial forms of societal 
organisation and structure (e.g.: the chieftaincy system, secret societies), respondents 
still embraced a liberal understanding of the concept and term as well. This is an 
essential aspect to acknowledge if the aim is to understand how Western 
conceptualisations of civil society are socially reproduced and absorbed. This may also 
explain why the liberal-minded aspirations of civil society actors are inextricably 
implanted in a strong intersection of the private, political and economic sphere.  
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Accordingly, the aim of the thesis was to learn more about culturally attuned 
solutions in the country‘s peacebuilding and development process. All CSOs were 
therefore asked: The slogan „African solutions for African problems‟ became quite 
popular in the past decade. Do you agree? If so - with regard to your own work - what 
would an African (Sierra Leonean) solution be? (Question 5, Appendix 2) 
The author‘s high expectations of gathering fresh and new insights were soon 
damped by very generic and vague answers. At times, interviewees could not even 
think of a Sierra Leonean solution that would enhance the situation of their own land. 
Apart from a few specific accounts of local music, food, herbs or clothes, in the main, 
community development initiatives were labelled as a Sierra Leonean way of fostering 
local development. However, this again reflects a liberal rather than traditional mind-
set of empowering the grassroots level. Above all, there is also a strong focus on 
community development by Western donors and INGOs.  
 
Strikingly, even though it is not related to peacebuilding and development 
practices, a considerable number of CSOs made mention of FGM and the importance 
of keeping it up as a traditional institution but under much better medical and hygienic 
conditions. In fact only a small minority of CSOs (Nos. 22 and 33) explicitly noted 
that they wanted to abandon the procedure. As noted in Chapter 4, FGM for Sierra 
Leoneans is not simply an act of circumcision and a failure to be initiated could be a 
one-way street to social marginalisation, if not stigmatisation. Even local women‘s 
organisations who actively advocate for gender equality and better representation in 
the parliament did not speak out against the practice of FGM. The majority have close 
social ties with secret societies themselves, which is yet another example of the 
crisscrossing of primordial and civic spheres. This clearly brings back to mind Mac 
Ginty's (2010) concerns about the illiberal nature of indigenous practices and how they 
can stand in stark contrast to the principles of the West. Undoubtedly, the issue of 
illiberal practices clearly drives the Western researcher into a corner where one 
uncomfortable question can no longer be ignored: to what extent should cultural 
diversity supersede the pitfalls of importing liberal values and norms? There has been 
a vast amount of criticism in the literature addressing how cultural imperialism is 
fortified through interventionism from the West (Datzberger 2015a, forthcoming). 
Nonetheless, concerns about cultural imperialism should not distract from the need to 
uphold universal norms when it comes to torture practices that violate individuals‘ 
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human rights. As CSO (No. 33) put it ―Some local traditions are not African solutions 
such as GBV (Gender-based Violence). One has to filter out the good from the bad 
ones. […] With regards to improving the situation for women the road is very long. 
Sensitisation has to happen at the chiefdom level‖.  
Generally, although illiberal customs and traditions are valued and upheld, 
Section 6.2.2 highlighted that despite numerous challenges, the majority of 
interviewees seemed yet to be very open and welcoming towards liberal peacebuilding 
and development assistance and Western donor support.  
 
7.2.3. Local perceptions of colonialism and liberal post-colonial interventionism 
Reflecting on the historical events depicted in Chapter 4, one would assume that 
Sierra Leoneans‘ bear great resentments towards the West. Centuries of subjugation 
and distortion of their cultural identities would give them plenty of reason and 
purpose. In the course of a long interview with a northern-based CBO (Nr.44), the 
director made an unexpected comment
146
:  
 
The white men are too clever. We should borrow some of their culture, like for instance 
their tax system. Long time ago Africans were complaining that the British asked them to 
pay taxes for their houses, but these taxes are needed in order to develop the country. The 
white people are here to help us.  
 
The CBOs reinterpretation of the Hut Tax War exemplifies a persisting nostalgia 
and romanticisation of colonial rule. This is especially noticeable among older, 
educated and Freetown-based segments of the Sierra Leone population (Section 2.3, 
Chapter 2). In several informal conversations with elders, the colonial era was usually 
portrayed as a time when Sierra Leoneans benefited from a fully functioning education 
system and hospitals. In this context, it is worth reaching back to critical discussions 
about the interplay of civil society, peacebuilding and development in Chapter 1. More 
concretely, Section 1.2 commenced with a discourse surrounding the issue of self-
determination in current scholarly debates. In alignment with Chabal (1996), it put 
forward the argument that the dynamics inherent in present sub-Saharan African post-
conflict countries have to be reconnected with a pre-colonial and colonial past. This 
further implies acknowledgement and recognition of how identity was distorted, de- 
and re-constructed over time. It is precisely here where the thesis identifies another 
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 Interview held in Kabbala, 08.08.2012. 
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puzzling development stemming from Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere. Namely, despite the 
colonial experience of subjugation, by and large Sierra Leoneans appear to be very 
welcoming towards the West (most notably the British) and its liberal interventions on 
the ground. Chapter 6 brought to light that the majority of interviewees trust the 
international community even more than their own government. Occasionally, the 
author interjected the sub question, whether the legacy of slave trade and colonial rule 
is to blame for the miseries that overshadowed the country for so long. CSO No. 40 
gave a memorable answer: ―Of course we could go on and on and blame the West for 
it all. But we had over 50 years to fix that on our own. That should have been 
enough‖. Similarly, in an informal conversation with a group of young unemployed 
men sitting and drinking inside the relics of century-old slave tunnels in Freetown, the 
author wondered how they feel about the past. ―This happened a long time ago. We 
like you white people from the West‖ they replied.147 Throughout both research stays, 
people repeatedly noted that Sierra Leoneans have a very short memory, including 
with regards to the atrocities committed during the civil war. Many interviewees 
subtly indicated that Sierra Leoneans want to, and should, finally take matters into 
their own hands. The argument of the thesis would go one step further in suggesting 
that colonialism and the events on and around independence are integral parts of 
people‘s present cultural identity. Tragically, Sierra Leone‘s past cannot be reversed 
and cultural distortion is one of the features shaping the characteristics of the civil 
sphere. Consequently, the more fascinating question is how Sierra Leoneans generally 
deal with the past. In some way one encounters a collective consciousness that is 
reminiscent of Jean-Paul Sartre‘s philosophical thought. Freedom, in Sartre‘s famous 
essay on ―Being and Nothingness‖ (1943), is not only the foundation, or perpetual 
question of everyone‘s being but also the conscious decision of how one reacts 
towards an experience of injustice directly affecting oneself. From this point of view, 
freedom rests upon our ability to choose our reality and how we perceive the past. 
There is a remarkable sense of forgiveness entrenched in the Sierra Leonean cultural 
identity from the Northern to the Southern and the Eastern to the Western parts of the 
country. Reading through interview transcripts of both stays, Western interventionism 
is mostly perceived as an opportunity to start anew as opposed to agonising about the 
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 A short article was written by the author on the subject, see: Datzberger (2012c): ―Freetown‘s 
―Ajekuleh‖: Where the Good, the Bad and the Ugly revive memories of a tragic past‖, LSE Africa: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2012/09/07/freetowns-ajekuleh-where-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-
revive-memories-of-a-tragic-past/, last visit 05.05.2014. 
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past or fearing cultural imperialism. As a consequence, Sierra Leone‘s bifurcated state, 
and hence political culture, not only welcomes Western assistance but is also very 
open to embracing liberal idea(l)s. Yet, Sartre also contends that freedom has to be a 
choice in order to manifest as change. This is also expressed in Curle‘s argument that: 
(1973, p.119) ―A society will develop only as the individuals in it develop their true 
potential and are prepared to give themselves the social efforts to which they feel 
personally related and in which they have some rights to control their personal 
destinies‖. Sadly, the majority of Sierra Leoneans are still far from having the freedom 
of choice and face many constraints that thwart any form of societal self-actualisation 
in the first place.  
 
7.3. Voices from the civil sphere: Education to foster social transformation.  
Societal transformation stemming from the very grassroots level in any form 
whatsoever can only take root if certain basic needs are met. As Thomas Piketty 
recently put it, ―Democracy is not just one citizen, one vote, but a promise of equal 
opportunity‖.148 Despite considerable support from the international community, Sierra 
Leone remains among the poorest places on earth. Even with economic growth, 
overall poverty reduction has had only marginal success. Part II of the thesis 
highlighted that current life expectancy is low, almost half of the population is 
illiterate, child mortality rates are high and every fifth woman dies from preventable 
complications during birth or pregnancy – to list only a few of Sierra Leone‘s present 
development dilemmas. The country‘s high dependency on aid, arguably one of the 
legacies of century-long slave trade and colonial rule, impedes self-sufficient 
development in various areas and aspects of everyday life.  This clearly also hampers 
grassroots agency and voice. While discussing Sierra Leone‘s problems of food 
shortages in the rural areas, CSO No. 5 stated ―Peace is food. You cannot have peace 
when you are hungry‖. The principles of fundamental human needs are famously 
defined by Maslow. Simply put, if basic needs such as food, shelter and security are 
not taken care of, a population will be tremendously weakened in striving for self-
actualisation and empowerment. Against this background, Chapter 2 suggested 
including ―life circumstances‖, such as living conditions, health, nutrition or 
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 Erlanger Steven (19.04.2014): ―Taking on Adam Smith (and Karl Marx)‖, the New York Times, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/international/taking-on-adam-smith-and-karl-
marx.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1, last visit 05.05.2014. 
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education, in the matrix of local factors that shape the political culture of the civil 
sphere.  
 
In an attempt to get a much clearer impression about people‘s everyday concerns 
and needs, the field research took inspiration from the World Bank‘s trilogy, Voices of 
the Poor (a brief description was provided in Section 1.2.4). Apart from the 
quantitative data presented in Chapter 6, the thesis‘ aim was to give voice to locals and 
gain more knowledge about the priorities of ordinary Sierra Leoneans during the 
peacebuilding and development phase of their country. All interviewees were asked 
the question: “If you had three wishes for the future of your country, what would they 
be?” (Appendix 2, Question 10).  
 
 
 
Certainly, the answers summarised in Chart 4 are not representative for Sierra 
Leone as a whole. Rather, Chart 4 epitomises the voices of 179 respondents which 
include not only CSOs, CBOs and associations but also group interviews with home-
grown youth clubs, communities or individuals the author approached and spoke to in 
the street. The random sampling notwithstanding, responses correspond well with the 
findings of a country wide opinion poll conducted by the Freetown-based CEDSA in 
2009, which also ranked education on top.  
 
228 
 
All the same, Chart 4 leads to one central observation echoing some of the 
theoretical accounts of Section 1.2 in Chapter 1. That is that the first three priorities – 
education, democracy and good governance, and youth empowerment and 
employment generation - embrace areas of fundamental social change. In other words, 
they all lean towards transformative rather than assimilative peacebuilding and 
development paradigms (Jantzi and Jantzi 2009). This is particularly interesting as the 
root causes of Sierra Leone‘s structural violence are, next to other factors, manifested 
in the unequal relationship between the grassroots population and a privileged few. In 
conjunction with CEDSA‘s opinion poll, Chart 4 therefore illustrates how ordinary 
Sierra Leoneans would like to seek autonomy and self-sufficiency to equalise those 
power relationships. In so doing, the majority of respondents listed education on top. 
The importance placed on education was not only prevalent during several interviews, 
but also in the scope of many informal conversations throughout both research stays. 
An OECD Report (1998) on civil society and international development rightly states 
that ―lack of education stops a great majority of Africans from being citizens in their 
own right‖ (p. 117). Schools are indeed the birthplace for a (civil) society to flourish in 
enabling people at the individual and collective level to articulate and advocate for 
their concerns and needs. In interviews with youth clubs, education was usually 
perceived as being empowered to ―be‖ or ―become somebody,‖ as was vocational 
training. The Oxford dictionary defines the verb ‗empower‘ as ―make (someone) 
stronger and more confident, especially in controlling their life‖.149 The clear wish to 
have a certain control over their own lives and future was a recurring theme of youth 
clubs and communities. Yet, for most young people in Sierra Leone such control, as 
well as the freedom of choice, is a privilege they may never have. In the words of a 
young unemployed male: ―I believe God tests my faith with all these challenges. That 
is why I will never lose my faith. (…) With all these challenges, people have to smoke 
marijuana in order to stay at peace‖.150 Even those who had the opportunity to attend 
school are still struggling to find a stable job.151  
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 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/empower, accessed 06.05.2014. 
150
 Conversation held in Freetown, 26.06.2011. 
151
 Without drifting too far away from the thesis‘ focus, it is worth briefly mentioning that substance 
abuse has long been a problem in Sierra Leone – during and even more so after the war. The dire 
employment situation renders many vulnerable to heavy addiction. According to health practitioners 
and authorities, Sierra Leone‘s growing role as a transit route for the global narcotics trade, made harder 
drugs – cocaine and, to a lesser extent, heroin – increasingly available. Lupick, Travis for Aljazeera 
(26.01.2013): ―Drug traffic fuels addiction in Sierra Leone‖, see: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013121105523716213.html, accessed 06.05.2014. 
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By and large, the GoSL‘s response, but also that of the international community, 
towards the country‘s public educational systems has been disappointing. Simpson 
observed in 2010 (p. 168):152  
 
[E]ducation, which is ranked as the most important function of government by the public, 
is only sixth in expenditures by the Sierra Leonean government. While both the 
government and international donors believe education is important, there is simply not 
enough money to support it. Foreign aid has assisted the government in building new 
schools, but not in paying teachers, providing books, and necessary school supplies, or in 
lowering school fees necessary to provide universal public education. (…) Almost three-
fourths of the adults surveyed responded that taxes and school fees were too high, and 
more than four out of five believed that prices for goods and services were too high.  
 
Although, there has been a rapid growth with regards to the number of children 
who complete primary school since the end of the war, there are still deep 
inefficiencies in the quality of education. Learning in primary school is often minimal 
and the bribing of underpaid teachers prior to the exam period has become a standard 
procedure – also in private and international schools. In an informal conversation, a 
Sierra Leonean director of a private school remarked with an undertone of frustration: 
―There are public schools in this country I would not even send my dog to‖. According 
to the latest World Bank study (2014) on youth employment in sub-Saharan Africa, 
one of the major challenges is no longer to enrol and send children to school but 
instead the low quality levels of teaching.
153
 In his final statement to the UNSC on 22 
March 2012, Michael von der Schulenburg, UNIPSIL‘s departing ERSG (Executive 
Representative of the Secretary-General) addressed the issue concluding:154  
 
In the 1960s, South Korea had a lower per capita income than most West African 
countries; today it is the tenth largest industrial country in the world. Korean President 
Kim recently explained the secret behind such success is simply education, education, and 
again education. And my final advice to Sierra Leone would therefore be: invest in your 
education, invest in universal primary and secondary education, invest in your technical 
colleges, and invest in your universities. Education would help turn Sierra Leone‘s natural 
and mineral wealth into sustainable development, it would help lift people out of poverty, 
it would help create new opportunities, it would help reduce unfair income distribution, 
and it could help maintaining a democratic and peaceful society. Freetown was once 
called the Athens of Africa—why not again?  
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 Featured in the work of Simpson (2010 p. 161-171). CEDSA‘s public opinion poll interviewed 
college students in 2008 and adults in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and Makeni in 2009.  
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 A full version of the report can be downloaded at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/19342178/youth-employment-sub-saharan-africa-
vol-2-2-full-report, accessed 08.05.2014. 
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 See: 
http://unipsil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ssPP0CjE0Y0%3D&tabid=9634&language=en-
US, accessed 06.05.2014. 
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It is noteworthy that during von der Schulenburg‘s appointment, from 2008 – 
2012, neither UNIPSIL, nor the PBC or the PBF put strong emphasis on education. 
The PBF implemented one youth project in the total amount of USD 4 million, thereby 
creating small enterprises, but no substantial support to schools or universities was 
provided. This is undoubtedly a missed opportunity considering how low levels of 
education can affect the agency of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere and, as a consequence, a 
society‘s political culture and voice. Moreover, supporting a LDC‘s (Least Developed 
Country) educational system is usually not perceived as an initiative that strengthens 
or empowers the civil sphere. Hence, the main focus on targeting CSOs distracts from 
the necessity to empower the civil sphere of a LDC from as early on as possible. This 
is not to imply that CSOs should no longer be local counterparts of external support. 
Instead, civil society support should also include additional funding commitments to 
comprehensively capacitate and reform the educational system of a country.  
 
7.4. Reconceptualising civil society as an alternative route.  
The thesis‘ aim was to set forth the argument that a society cannot be re-
constructed, or strengthened, based on an externally introduced idea(l) but instead 
through building upon the historically, culturally and socially embedded 
characteristics that are already part of existing societal experiences. Over the past two 
decades of peacebuilding and development practice and scholarship, civil society 
emerged as a normative concept, an ethical idea, a vision of the social order that is not 
only descriptive but also prescriptive in providing a vision of a seemingly good life 
Seligman (1992, p. 201). Moreover, in view of the inherent contradictions of modern 
civilisation and state formation in the sub-Saharan African context, one must seriously 
question the theoretical and empirical possibility of a civil society as it thrived in the 
West. From this key observation, there are a couple of implications to be drawn. Those 
implications not only affect society‘s political culture and therefore agency and voice, 
but they also offer an alternative outlook on the idea of civil society in the Sierra 
Leonean context. 
 
7.4.1 Reconceptualising the status of the individual.  
A Western version of civil society is organised around the construction of a 
particular kind of social order cherishing and constantly renegotiating the rights of the 
individual members of any given society. In non-Western contexts, however, the 
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historical conditions of a classical liberal individualist conception of civil society is 
challenged by the societal and primordial fabrics of communal life. As Part II and 
Section 7.2.1 revealed, the status and the role of the individual is rooted in the 
communal experience of the everyday. Hence primordial attributes but also the 
political culture of communal life may supersede an individual‘s personal freedom or 
rights. If the aim is to empower and give voice to the very local civil sphere, it has to 
be first and foremost acknowledged that individual choices cannot be that easily 
detached from interpersonal ties and attitudes towards the community. Surprisingly, 
mainstream scholarship and practice are by and large preoccupied with what civil 
society actors ought to be (e.g. better capacitated, vibrant, independent, empowered, 
strengthened) or what their functions ought to achieve (e.g. reconciliation, social 
cohesion, service delivery, democratic legitimisation). In the case of Sierra Leone, in 
practice, these aspirations led to the reverse effect. To a large extent, Sierra Leone‘s 
civil society landscape has taken on the role of a neutralised service provider (see 
Section 6.2.3, Chapter 6). Partly, this is the case because one essential key aspect 
continues to be unaddressed, namely: what civil society actually is and entails in a 
non-Western post-conflict environment. In the attempt to avoid a Western 
deterministic approach to the country‘s political culture as to how agency and voice 
are socially engineered, Chapter 2 suggested a matrix of local factors that test liberal 
aspirations of the West. Using this matrix, Part II of the thesis then revealed that the 
tensions and dualisms between individual and communal life, between primordial and 
civic spheres, between cultural particularism and liberal values, are key factors that 
shape the political culture and also the very Sierra Leonean reality of civil society.  
 
7.4.2. Reconceptualising civil society actors and functions.  
It was repeatedly argued that in targeting specific civil society actors and 
functions, external support inadvertently renders post-conflict society into a de-
personalised set of indicators in order to measure peacebuilding and development 
outputs and outcomes. As a result, civil society emerged as a subject of evaluation 
rather as an actor on its own terms. Local organisations are implicitly and explicitly 
put into a box full of different criteria which they are expected to fulfil. While Western 
interventionism was generally welcomed by local CSOs, their managerial systems and 
M&E frameworks create pressure and tension as well as new forms of cultural 
distortion. To a certain degree, externally led efforts aiming to strengthen and 
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empower civil society landscapes de facto fortify Tocqueville‘s conservative liberalist 
thinking. In mainly supporting formally registered CSOs, the civil sphere became 
reduced to a set of predetermined actors fulfilling functions that increasingly 
undermine the role of the state. Yet, a too rigid focus on ―accountable‖ and specific 
civil society actors and their functions distracts from the important role played by 
several other actors of the civil sphere.  These include: sodalities, secret societies, 
informal associations, home-grown youth clubs, Attaya places155 or even palm wine 
huts where males regularly gather to discuss their daily concerns and affairs. Those 
informal and often loose civic formations are equally important in the making and 
shaping of patterns of social change over time. But in order to give those less formal 
societal formations more agency and voice their socioeconomic situation has to change 
- in particular with regards to food, health and education. As interviews summarized in 
Section 6.2.1 disclose, advocacy is a privilege many cannot afford and the average 
Sierra Leonean individual is far from taking matters into his or her own hands.   
 
7.4.3. Political culture as a new entry point towards agency and voice. 
Reflecting upon the above-depicted entanglements that put Sierra Leone‘s civil 
sphere at a risk of being gradually depoliticised (Sections 7.1 – 7.3), it is obvious to 
ask how the voices of the weaker segments of a population can be better heard. 
Throughout, the thesis has referred to the aspect of political culture as a potential new 
entry point in the attempt to strengthen and empower the civil sphere. The political 
culture of a society can help us to understand how agency from below is socially 
engineered but also undermined. With regards to Sierra Leone, the country‘s political 
culture not only surfaced in a completely different manner in history and time than in 
the liberal West, but it is also subject to continuous external influence. Put differently, 
Sierra Leone‘s political culture is informed by chieftaincy systems and communal life 
alongside Western interventionism and consequently a clash of cultural particularisms 
with liberal values and norms. The individual as an autonomous social actor is 
challenged by a political tradition of the collective as the true ethical and moral entity. 
Consequently, state-society relations in Sierra Leone are based on belief systems that 
strongly uphold values of patrimonial communal life. From this point of view, the 
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country‘s peacebuilding and development phase is undoubtedly a unique moment for 
the civil sphere to engage in actions to advocate for any locally desired societal 
change. This further implies that strengthening local civil society needs to be sensitive 
to how Sierra Leoneans themselves renegotiate how primordial and civic value 
systems are socially and politically manifested and intersect, if not the social contract 
of state-society relations as a whole. How values and norms that constitute a liberal 
civil society are going to be socially entrenched in the long haul should be the task of 
the Sierra Leonean civil sphere and not the Western researcher or practitioner. Then 
again, as the Sierra Leonean case has unmistakably shown, such an organic 
progression cannot take place if the average Sierra Leonean is deprived of basic 
physiological needs. 
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Conclusion and Further Implications 
 
 
Any form of conflict, be it a (civil) war, rebellion, revolt, insurgency or civil 
uprising with the aim of destabilising persisting power structures, builds on the hopes 
of manifesting socio-political change – in whatsoever type or shape. Ensuing 
peacebuilding, and consequently also development, processes are, essentially, 
concerned about affecting the social, structural, political, economic and/or cultural 
order of a society. Undoubtedly, these are highly complex and lengthy processes 
interwoven in a web of historical, cultural and geographic characteristics and events. 
Moreover, instituting socio-political change is ideally nurtured by a legitimising force 
(the people), by means of peaceful public contestation, deliberation and debate. This in 
turn presupposes granting all societal segments political agency and voice. Seen from 
this admittedly liberal perspective, peacebuilding and development are highly socio-
political albeit context-specific processes impinging upon the political culture of a 
society as a whole. 
 
Yet, what if politics, understood as influence, agency and opposition, are 
removed from a conflict-, peacebuilding and/or development-affected civil sphere? In 
the simplest terms, people per se do not have the opportunity to articulate their wants 
and needs. They lack control over their own futures, destinies and lives. The absence 
of political influence not only accumulates sentiments of frustration and anger but, in 
the long term, can even trigger new forms of conflict, resistance or violent unrest. As 
the Sierra Leonean civil war perfectly illustrates, century-long political suffocation of 
the civil sphere alongside an accumulation of grievances provide the fertile ground for 
a violent rebellion driven by a vague political agenda and course. However, when the 
state, and consequently also clientelistic power structures, collapsed, civil initiatives 
flourished and thrived. The war created an exceptional political vacuum in which 
numerous individual, collective and informal or formal civil society actors could 
emerge. Not only did they provide humanitarian relief, but they also jointly advocated 
for their common political aims: democracy and peace. Initially, civil society actors 
found themselves receiving funding commitments and external support like never 
before in their history. That Sierra Leone‘s vibrant civil society landscape came to be, 
235 
 
for the greater part, dormant, neutralised and politically weak during the later stages of 
the peacebuilding process (2007-2013), occurred as a completely unexpected 
phenomenon.  
 
Surprisingly, the depoliticisation of Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere has not been the 
subject of careful deliberation or assessment by academics, practitioners or 
international and national policy-makers. By filling in this void, this thesis stressed 
that the depoliticisation of the civil sphere was fortified by the reappearance of societal 
and cultural particularisms, such as tribalism and neopatrimonialism, in conjunction 
with the institution of a liberal agenda for prosperity and peace. Whereas a liberal 
agenda sought to strengthen and capacitate local civil society actors, by and large, 
those actors became the safety net providing the fundamental public goods and 
services the Sierra Leonean state is either too weak or unwilling to provide. Efforts to 
strengthen domestic CSOs led to shared responsibilities, as opposed to local advocacy 
work for stronger state institutions and reforms, in different sectors (such as education 
and health). This was accompanied by the fact that Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere is to a 
great extent captured by politicians, elders or chiefs. Thus, intersections of a 
primordial and civic sphere not only deepened the loss of control by the public in 
policy making but also buttressed the absence of civic contestation to challenge 
governmental policies. In this regard, one essential but often overlooked function of 
Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere today is to renegotiate how not only cultural particularisms 
but also externally introduced or distorted norms are socially reproduced – over 
history and time. Building on this argument, the thesis therefore suggested that a 
socio-historical and postcolonial perspective can help in understanding the main 
characteristics, as well as political culture and cultural matrix, of civil society in and 
not for Sierra Leone. 
 
In order to examine the above-depicted phenomena, the thesis made use of actor- 
and functional-oriented approaches to thoroughly elaborate how the civil sphere has 
become depoliticised since the end of the war. Both approaches undeniably fall short 
on one crucial account. Recalling Chapter 3, they fail to explain how and why moral 
values or norms are created and by whom. To borrow Gramsci‘s words ―Man is above 
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all else mind, consciousness - that is, he is a product of history, not of nature‖.156 In 
interpretation of his words, civic agency and voice ignites in people‘s minds as well as 
in historically accumulated and cultural values and therefore also in people‘s daily 
environment, upbringing and education. The latter, education, is also among the 
highest priorities for a better future in the view of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. Quite 
fittingly, it was also Gramsci who repeatedly urged the education of the working class 
– the poor – with the ambition of amassing organic intellectuals from below. Schools, 
following Section 7.3 of Chapter 7, can indeed be the birthplace of a flourishing (civil) 
society, enabling people at the individual and collective levels to articulate and 
advocate for their concerns. However, Sierra Leone‘s pressing need for better 
educational systems should not distract from efforts to find more creative ways of 
making the voices of weaker segments of the population better heard.  
 
More generally, even though there has been a burgeoning interest among 
researchers and practitioners regarding the role and potential of civil society in 
peacebuilding and development processes over the past two decades, the 
depoliticisation of civil society presents a puzzle to be further examined and explored. 
It is important to stress that the thesis‘ aim was not to imply that Sierra Leone‘s civil 
sphere might continue to be persistently depoliticised. Rather, the intention was to 
highlight why it occurred and, above all, why it is an important concern. In other 
words, when it comes to studying the interplay between civil society and 
peacebuilding and development in non-Western fragile states, there are several 
implications and lessons for future research to be drawn from the Sierra Leonean 
experience. In this context, some of the most salient under-researched themes shall be 
briefly introduced - with the reservation that the following list is far from being 
complete. 
 
First, the initial findings of the thesis need to be placed in a comparative context 
in order to assess whether the Sierra Leonean case is unique, or if there are similar 
occurrences in other fragile states. Haiti, for instance, already famous for being a 
―Republic of NGOs‖ (Kristof and Panarelli, 2010), presents another interesting 
example. With the risk of repeating what was already set out in Section 1.2.5 (Chapter 
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1), the country has the second highest number of NGOs per capita in the world (after 
India). Current estimates of NGOs operating in Haiti, prior to the 2010 earthquake, 
range from 3,000 to as many as 10,000. This clearly undermined the Haitian 
government in carrying out several responsibilities and led to the dilemma of whether 
the country should move towards a system of shared responsibilities between CSOs 
and the state. How this further affected the political culture and voice of the Haitian 
civil sphere remains unexplored.  
 
Second, and building on the previous point, more research is necessary on civil 
society actors and service delivery in fragile states. Are there clear interlinkages 
between a growing civil society landscape (including INGOs) and the retreat of the 
state? If so, what are the political implications for governance in those fragile states? 
Hence the key question should not only be whether a growing number of CSOs in 
fragile states improves public service delivery, but crucially, whether and what kind of 
new forms of governance emerge?  
 
Third, thus far only a few scholars (e.g. Holmén, 2010; Howell and Pearce, 
2002) have started to critically and thoroughly reflect upon the burgeoning interest in 
peacebuilding and development research on and around the civil sphere. Clearly, more 
research is required in this regard. For instance, we face considerable knowledge gaps 
about how a growing civil society landscape (including INGOs) impacts the societal 
and political realms of fragile states in various ways. There is a scarcity of the 
quantitative and qualitative research focusing on causal relationships needed to 
examine how the growing number of CSOs positively and negatively affects 
peacebuilding and development efforts in fragile states in the long term.  
 
Fourth, international frameworks tend to overlook how multifaceted transitional 
societies are in their societal composition, claims, needs and idea(l)s. Post-conflict 
societies cannot be entirely recreated by external actors nor can one assume that every 
individual of the civil sphere coherently aims at achieving long-lasting peace and 
development in the same manner and pace. As argued in Chapter 3, commonly applied 
actors- and functional-oriented approaches in peacebuilding and development practice 
and research need to be challenged to a much greater extent. A too rigid focus on civil 
society actors, their respective functions and outputs in M&E frameworks and other 
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assessments, encourages processes which instrumentalise the local civil sphere. This 
further leads to the creation of a local civil society landscape that is no longer attuned 
to cultural particularisms and the political culture of the society in question. All the 
same, more attention should be paid to what kind of civil society landscape donors 
implicitly and explicitly strengthen and co-create. 
 
Fifth, there is a commonly established consensus in the literature that in the sub-
Saharan African context the nature and characteristics of state-society relations differ 
greatly from those in the West. The shortage of research on whether and how such 
processes of societal re-negotiation take place and take hold in fragile and non-fragile 
states, is therefore all the more surprising. This is unfortunate, as a careful observation 
of such processes of re-negotiation would allow us to get a much better understanding 
of whether and how externally introduced liberal values and norms are socially 
entrenched over the long haul.  
 
Last but not least, in many fragile states, as in Sierra Leone, civil society actors 
see themselves repeatedly excluded from important decision-making processes at the 
global and local levels in the scope of peacebuilding and development efforts and 
events. One can, therefore, not avoid asking: how does continuous exclusion, or giving 
preference to only a few selected CSOs, influence, impinge upon and hamper the 
political culture and landscape of the civil sphere?  
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Appendix 1 
NOTE: The numbers indicated in the thesis next to the interviewees (e.g. CSO Nr. 8) 
have been removed from the list of interviews for the final publication given that some 
respondents requested anonymity. The identity (= indexing of CSOs etc.) of 
respondents was only disclosed to the thesis supervisor and examiners. Moreover, the 
exact day of the interview (as indicated in footnotes within the thesis) has been deleted 
in the list below and the original order of interviews modified in order to ensure 
unrecognizability.  
 
 
List of Interviews* 
 
{25 June 2011 – 11 July 2011 & 8 July 2012 – 31 August 2012} 
conducted in Sierra Leone 
 
 
Formally Registered Civil Society Organisations 
 
Nr Name 
(39 CSOs and 2 CBOs) 
Notes Date / Location 
 
XX 50/50 Group 
Fifty / Fifty Group 
Interview with director XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX ABC – Development  Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX ACEF – Action for Community 
Empowerment Foundation 
Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX ACODI-SL, Agency for Community 
Development Initiative Sierra Leone 
Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX Action for Development Interview with director of 
programme 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX AID-Salone Interview with humanitarian 
field officer and 
administration officer 
XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX Anti-Violence Movement Sierra Leone Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX APEM Association for Peoples 
Empowerment 
Interview with executive 
director 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX ARD 
Association for Rural Development 
Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX AUCAYD  
Artists United for Children and Youth 
Development 
Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX AYPAD 
African Youth for Peace and 
Development 
Interview with director XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX CADO 
Community Animation and 
Development Organization 
Interview with director XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX CADO – Northern Region Office Interview with field 
operation officer 
XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX CAHSEC – Community Action for 
Human Security 
Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX CCG 
Campaign for Good Governance 
Interview with national 
coordinator  
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX CDHR – Centre for Democracy and Interview with manager and XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
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Human Rights. Makeni Branch programme officer 
XX CDHR – Champagne for Democracy 
and Human Rights. Kabala Branch 
Interview with project 
manager  
XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX CEDA Community and Development 
Agency 
Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX Crusaders Club Ministry 
 
Interview with director (and 
2 additional staff members) 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX Democracy Sierra Leone (DSL) Interview with national 
coordinator 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX EFSL 
Evangelic Fellowship of Sierra Leone 
Interview with officer for 
advocacy 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX Fambol Tok Interview with district 
coordinator 
XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX FAWE, Forum for African Women 
Educationalist 
Interview with coordinator XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX GEKO – German Kooperation Sierra 
Leone 
Interview with associate 
director 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX GEMS 
Grassroots Empowerment for Self-
Reliance 
Interview with director XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX HAIKAL Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX Help a Needy Child in Sierra Leone Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX Help-SL – Hands Empowering the 
Less Privileged in Sierra Leone  
Interview with 2 programme 
officers 1 director of gender 
section 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX JHR – Journalists for Human Rights Interview with senior staff XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX MADAM, Mankind‘s Activities for 
Development Accreditation Movement 
Interview with executive 
director 
XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX MARWOPNET 
Mano River Women Peace 
Interview with co-founder 
(interview took place at 
UNHCR building in 
Freetown) 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX NMJP – Network Movement for 
Justice and Development 
Progamme director XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX OPARD-SL 
Organization for Peace, Reconciliation 
and Development – Sierra Leone 
Interview with Director XX/XX/2011/Mile 91 
XX PACT. Partners for Community 
Transformation 
Interview with programme 
officer 
XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX PEACE-SL Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX PRIDE-SL Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX SfCG (INGO) 
Search for Common Ground 
Interview with director / 
Africa 
SfCG is an INGO but it was 
recommended by several 
local CSOs to interview this 
particular organization given 
their local outreach and 
expertise 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX SLANGO 
Sierra Leone Association for Non-
Governmental Organizations 
Interview with senior staff 
member, SLANGO serves as 
an umbrella organization for 
local NGOs 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX SWAASL, Society for Women and 
AIDS Africa 
Interview with programme 
director 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX WANEP 
West African Network for Peace 
Interview with National 
Network Coordinator; 
WANEP coordinates in total 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
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60 local CSOs 
XX WPfP 
Women‘s Partnership for Peace 
Interview with founder and 
national coordinator  
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
 
Community Based Organisations and Local Grassroots Associations 
 
XX Grassroots Education for Development 
(For Women) 
Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX Helping Hands-SL Interview with coordinator 
and founder 
XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX Laneh Kura Farmers Association Interview with director XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX Network Movement for Youth and 
Children Welfare, NMYCW 
Interview with director and 
two programme officers 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Women‘s Urban District Farmers Group interview with 15 
female district farmers (most 
of them widows),  
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
 
Community Interviews 
 
XX Kroo Bay - Freetown Group interview with ex-
combatants, female 
prostitutes and fishermen, 12 
participants 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX Mile 91 (near Masiaka) About 10 young community 
members  
XX/XX/2011/Mile 91 
 
Youth Clubs / Youth Organisations (informal) / Gangs 
 
XX Black Man Blood (club)  
 
Club has 16 members, 5 
participated in group 
interview 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX Blackstreet Boys (Youth Group / Club) Interview with several 
members 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Central One Youth Organisation Interview with 5 members XX/XX/2012/Kabala 
XX HOT – House of Thinking Interview with one member Several group / 
individual interviews in 
the period from 
07/2012 - 
08/2012/Freetown 
XX ICON Brothers (club) 
 
Two interviews with all 18 
members 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
XX SLF 
Street Life Family  (club) 
Total number of membership 
unclear as members ‗come 
and go‘, average number 
about 50, several group 
interviews were conducted 
with up to 25 members 
Several group / 
individual interviews in 
the period from 
06/2011 - 
07/2011/Freetown 
 
Several group / 
individual interviews in 
the period from 
07/2012 - 
08/2012/Freetown 
XX The CRIPS (club / gang)  
also known as ‗The Blues‘ or CCC 
alias Cent Cost Crips 
Total number membership 
unclear (according to head of 
club ‗hundreds‘), group 
interview with about 30 
members 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
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XX US Boys Interview with one club 
member 
XX/XX/2011/Freetown 
 
Other 
 
XX 
 
Bombali District Youth Council Interview with chairman XX/XX/2012/Makeni 
XX Commonwealth Adviser Interview with 
Commonwealth Adviser  
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Female Paramount Chief Interview with female 
Paramount Chief of GBO 
Chiefdom 
XX/XX/2012/Bo 
XX Forah Bay College Interview with lecturer at 
Peace and Conflict Study 
Centre 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Fourah Bay Colleague Interview with Joe A.D. 
Alie, Head of Department of 
History & African Studies, 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Jimmy Kandeh  Interview with Sierra 
Leonean scholar Jimmy 
Kandeh (University of 
Richmond) 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
XX Sierra Leonean Youth Commission Interview with Youth 
Commissioner 
XX/XX/2012/Freetown 
 
* Note: This list does not include several individual interviews with people not 
formally involved in the work of a local CSO. Occasionally interviewed staff 
requested anonymity with regards to the information shared. In some instances I 
interviewed more than one staff member of the respective organisations or club‘s 
listed below. In certain cases I also conducted group interviews. Hence the number of 
CSOs, CBOs, Youth Clubs etc. does not equal the number of people interviewed.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview Questions  
(During both field research stays) 
 
 
1. How would you define the term and concept of civil society?  
 
2. How would you describe civil society in Sierra Leone? (Sub-questions: Is it 
separated from the state / government? Does it form public opinion? How big are the 
differences between urban and rural areas? Is it a legitimating source for state 
power?) 
 
3. In your view, what are the main cultural, structural and ideological characteristics of 
post-war civil society in Sierra Leone?  
 
4. What impact do civil society initiatives have on the peacebuilding / development 
process? – What impact does your organisation have? (Sub-question: Would you say 
that CSOs complement or in the long run might even replace external interventions?) 
 
5. The slogan ‗African solutions for African problems‘ became quite popular in the 
past decade. Do you agree? If so - with regard to your own work - what would an 
African (Sierra Leonean) solution be? 
 
6. Would you say that external actors (such as INGOS, IOs of even global media) have 
enabled or challenged the work your organisation? If so why?  
 
7. Do you think that your organisation covers areas that should be tackled by the 
government or even international community? If so – what areas – if not – why? 
 
8. What is democracy to you? Is there a Sierra Leonean way of democratic rule? 
 
9. What does social justice mean to you?  
 
10. If you had three wishes for the future of your country what would that be?  
 
For academics / government officials: 
 
1. How would you define the term and concept of civil society?  
 
2. How would you describe civil society in Sierra Leone? (Sub-questions: Is it 
separated from the state / government? Does it form public opinion? How big are the 
differences between urban and rural areas? Is it a legitimating source for state 
power?) 
 
3. In your view, what are the main cultural, structural and ideological characteristics of 
post-war civil society in Sierra Leone?  
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4. What role and impact do civil society initiatives have in the peacebuilding / 
development process? (Sub-question: Would you say that CSOs complement or in the 
long run might even replace external interventions?) 
 
5. The slogan ‗African solutions for African problems‘ became quite popular in the 
past decade. Do you agree? If so - with regard to the work of CSOs in Sierra Leone – 
how do they work towards an African solution – if so how? 
 
6. What impact do external actors have (such as INGOS, IOs of even global media) on 
local CSOs in Sierra Leone? 
 
7. If you had 3 wishes for the future of your country what would that be? 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Mapping of INGOs and CSOs active in Sierra Leone 
(compiled by Simone Datzberger in May 2011, updated in August 2012 and March 2014) 
 
Data for the mapping analysis was retrieved and compiled from: 
- UNIPSIL (United Nations Integrat+4:4ed Peacebuilding Support Office Sierra Leone) - see: 
http://unipsil.unmissions.org,  
- OSSA (UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa) - see: 
http://www.unorg/africa/osaa/ngodirectory/dest/countries/SierraLeone.htm 
- Global Hand - see: 
http://www.globalhand.org/en/search/organisation?page=1&search=Sierra+Leone 
- Directory of Development Organizations Sierra Leone, Volume I.B. / Africa, Edition 2010 - 
see: http://www.devdir.org/africa.htm 
- Accountability Alert Sierra Leone (93 Fort Street, Freetown, 232 076/033 611 685 030, 
aalert@aalert.org,),  see: www.aalert.org/NNGO.html) 
 
Activity Type Name 
Humanitarian Aid INGO AAH - Action Against Hunger 
Communal & Social Development CSO  ABC-Development 
Humanitarian Aid INGO ACF - Action contre la Faim (Sierra Leone) 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO ACF - African Christian Fellowship (Sierra Leone) 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Action for Development 
Communal & Social Development CSO  ACODI - Action for Community Development 
Initiative  
Humanitarian Aid INGO ActionAid International (Sierra Leone) 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  Action Plus 
Education INGO AED - Adult Education for Development 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  ADO - Agriculture Development Organization Sierra 
Leone 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO ADRA - Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
International 
Children, Youth INGO AEJT - Association des Enfants et jeunes Travailleurs 
(Sierra Leone) 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO AFCON - African Concern International  
Development INGO AFMAL - Associazione con I Fatebenefratelli per I 
malati lontani (Sierra Leone) 
Humanitarian Aid INGO Africare  (Sierra Leone) 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  AGF - Agro-Galliness Farm (Sierra Leone) 
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Health CSO  AGFAHD - Action Group for Family Health and 
Development 
Development CSO  AHDSR-SL Advocates for Human Development and 
Self Reliance of Sierra Leone 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law INGO AI - Amnesty International - Sierra Leone Section 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO AIMS - Africa International Mission Services (Sierra 
Leone) 
Children, Youth INGO All As One (Sierra Leone) 
Communal & Social Development INGO Alpha Foundation, Inc. (Sierra Leone) 
Religion INGO AMA - African Muslims Agency (Sierra Leone) 
Communal & Social Development CSO  AMNEet - Advocacy Network Movement 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  APEGS - Agriculture Production Extension and 
General Services (Sierra Leone) 
Communal & Social Development CSO APEM - Association for people's Empowerment (Sierra 
Leone) 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO ARC - American Refugee Committee  
Development CSO  ARD - Association for Rural Development  
Communal & Social Development CSO ASCOD - Association for Sustainable Community 
Development (Sierra Leone) 
Development CSO AsFSES - Association for Food Security and 
Environmental Services 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO ASPIR - Association of Sport of the Improvement of 
Refugees / Returnees 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO BCSL - Baptist Convention Sierra Leone 
Health  CSO BCAASL - Business Coalition Against AIDS in Sierra 
Leone  
Children, Youth CSO Ben Hirsch Memorial Child Care Centre 
Development CSO  BREDA - Brethren Relief and Development Agency  
Children, Youth INGO CAD - Children's Aid Direct 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CADO - Community Animation and Development 
Organisation 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CADS - Centre for Alternative Development Strategies  
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Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO Calmin - Calvary and Liberation ministries of Sierra 
Leone 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Camp Women‘s Multi-Purpose Organization 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CARD Community Action for Rural Development 
Humanitarian Aid INGO CARE International 
Humanitarian Aid INGO Caritas - NCDCO National Catholic Development and 
Caritas Office 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CASOPA - Community Action Support Organization 
for Poverty Alleviation 
Religion CSO  Catholic Youth Organizaiton 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO CAUSE Canada - Christian Aid for Under-Assisted 
Societies Everywhere 
Children, Youth CSO  CAW - Children Associated with the War  
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO CCFF - Canaan Christian Fellowship Fund  
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  CCOTU - Central Confederation of Trade Unions 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
CSO  CCSL - Council Churches of Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth CSO  CCYA - Center for Coordinator of Youth Activities 
Development CSO  CDS - Campaign for Development and Solidarity 
Development CSO  CDU - Civic Development Unit 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CEDA - Community Empowerment and Development 
Agency 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CEFORD - Community Empowerment for Rural 
Development 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  CEM - Current Evangelism Ministries, Women's 
Network for Peace 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
CSO  CES - Christian Extension Services (Sierra Leone) 
Development INGO CESTAS - Centro di Educazione Sanitaria e 
Tecnologie Appropriate Sanitarie (Sierre Leone) 
Good Governance, Advocay, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  CGG - The Campaign for God Governance 
Health CSO  CHASL - Christian Health Association Sierra Leone 
Environment CSO  CHECSIL - Council for Human Ecology in Sierra 
Leone 
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Development CSO  CHIDO - Chibuzor Human Resource Development 
Organization 
Children, Youth CSO  Children's Forum Network 
Children, Youth INGO Child Fund International Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth CSO  ChildHelp Sierra Leone 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO Christian Aid (Sierra Leone) 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
CSO  CINDA - Christian in Action Development Agency 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CIP - Community Initiative Programme 
Media CSO  CMET - Center for Media, Education and Technology 
Children, Youth CSO  CMFO - Christian Mission Foster Homes For Orphans 
Development CSO  CoFoSL - Circle of Friends Sierra Leone 
Development CSO  COMPASS - Community Mobilization of Poverty 
Alleviation and Social Services  
Development INGO Concern Worldwide  
Children, Youth CSO  Conic Children's Home 
Development INGO COOPI - Cooperazione Internazionale (Sierra Leone) 
Health INGO Copwanb - Care of Pregnant Women and New Born 
Babies 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO Cord - Christian Outreach, Relief and Development 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
CSO  CORD-SL - Counterparts in Rehabilitation in Siera 
Leone 
Development INGO Cordaid (Sierra Leone) 
Development CSO  Conservative Society Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth INGO COTN - Children of the Nations 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
INGO CR - Conciliation Resources 
Children, Youth INGO CRC - Child Rescue Centre Sierra Leone 
Communal & Social Development CSO  CREDO - Community Research and Development 
Organization 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO CRS - Catholic Relief Services 
Unclassified CSO  CSM - Civil Society Movement Sierra Leone 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  CSPEC - Civil Society Peace Building Engagement 
Committee 
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Environment CSO  CSSL - Conservation Society Sierra Leone 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
INGO CVT - Center for Victims of Torture 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  DADA-SL Destiny Agricultural Development 
Association  
Children, Youth INGO DCI - Defence for Children International - Sierra Leone 
Development CSO  DIP - Development Partners Initiative 
Religion CSO  Echoes of Mercy 
Development INGO ECLOF International - Sierra Leone 
Information, Consultancy, Research  CSO  EDRA - Consultancy 
Environment INGO EFA - Sierra Leone (Environmental Foundation for 
Africa) 
Religion CSO  EFSL - Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO ELCSL - Evangelical Lutheran Church in Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth INGO ERM - Enfants Refugies du Monde  
Education INGO ERNWACA - Educational Research Network for West 
and Central Africa 
Religion INGO FAHOCHA - Faith, Hope, Charity Foundation 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
CSO  Fambul Tok 
Communal & Social Development CSO  FARDASL - Friends of Africa Relief and Development 
Agency Sierra Leone 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Federation of African Muslim Women‘s Associations 
Development INGO FHM - Family Homes Movement 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  The Fifty-Fifty Group of Sierra Leone 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law INGO FIND - Foundation for International Dignity 
Development INGO FIOH - Future in our Hands Education and 
Development Fund  
Religion CSO  FLM - Fountain of Life Ministires  
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  FOWED - Forum for Women's Empowerment and 
Development 
Environment INGO FoE-SL Friends of the Earth 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  FORDI - Forum for Democratic Initiatives 
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Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
INGO FORUT - Sierra Leone 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO FRC - Finnish Refugee Council 
Children, Youth CSO  Friends of Waldorf, Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth CSO  Good Shepherd Orphanage / School 
Development INGO GEKO - German Kooperation Sierra Leone 
Education CSO  GEL - Generating Group Empowerment through 
Learning 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO  GEMS - Grassroots Empowerment for Self Reliance 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  GGEM - Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law INGO Global Rights  
Health INGO GLRA German Leprosy Relief Association 
Humanitarian Aid INGO GOAL - Sierra Leone 
Environment CSO  Green Scenery 
Development CSO  GFR - Grass Roots Finance 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  GR-WEB Grassroot Women‘s Empowerment Bureau 
Communal & Social Development CSO  Haikal Foundation 
Children, Youth INGO HANCI - Help a Needy Child International 
Health CSO  HARA - HIV and AIDS Reporters Association 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
INGO HCF - Hastings Community Farm 
Health CSO  Health for all Coaltion - Sierra Leone 
Health INGO Health Poverty Action (former Health Unlimited) 
Health INGO Helen Keller International 
Communal & Social Development CSO  HELP SL - Hands Empowering the Less Privileged in 
Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth CSO  HFHC - Home for Homeless Children 
Health INGO HI - Handicap International 
Health INGO HKI - Helen Keller International 
Development CSO  HRDO - Human Resource Development Organisation 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law INGO HRW - Human Rights Watch 
Development INGO IAS - Initiative pour une Afrique Solidaire  
Education INGO IBIS - Education for Development 
Information, Consultancy, Research  INGO ICG - International Crisis Group 
273 
 
Humanitarian Aid INGO ICMC - International Catholic Migration Commision 
Humanitarian Aid INGO ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross 
Children, Youth INGO International Christian Youth Exchange 
Education CSO  IEARN - Sierra Leone (International Education and 
Resource Network) 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
INGO IFES - International Foundation for Election Systems 
Humanitarian Aid INGO IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO IIRO - International Islamic Relief Organisation 
Health INGO IMC - International Medical Corps 
Unclassified INGO IOGT - International Organisation of Good Templars 
Humanitarian Aid INGO IRC - International Rescue Committee 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
CSO  Inter Religious Council 
Children, Youth CSO  IYF - Independent Youth Forum 
Religion INGO Jesus Evangelistic Encountering 
Development CSO  JEESDO - Jees Development Organizaiton 
Development CSO  KADDF - Kailahun District Development Foundation 
Communal & Social Development CSO  KADDRO - Kambia District Development and 
Rehabilitaiton Organisation 
Children, Youth CSO  KAYDO (Kafoima Youth Development Organization) 
Communal & Social Development CSO  KCDA - Karo Community Development Association 
Unclassified CSO  KENDDRA 
Children, Youth CSO  KEYDA (Kenema Youth Development Association) 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO  LAWCLA - The Lawyers Centre for Legal Assistance 
Development INGO LCD - Leonard Cheshire Disability 
Development INGO LemonAid Fund 
Development CSO  LEXES (Livestock Extention and General Services) 
Humanitarian Aid INGO LIFE - Life for Relief and Development 
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Development INGO LLP - LifeLine Network, the Nehemiah Project 
Children, Youth INGO LSCP - Leonet Street Children Project Inc.  
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO LWF - Lutheran World Federation 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO  Manifesto' 99 Human Rights 
Health INGO Marie Stopes Society (SL) 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  MARWOPNET - Mano River Women Peace  
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO MCSL - Methodist Church of Sierra Leone 
Health INGO MdM - Medicos del Mundo Spain 
Health  INGO Mercy Ships  Aberdeen Women‘s Centre 
Health INGO Merlin - Medical Relief International 
Communal & Social Development CSO  MICDP - Mabasima Integrated community 
Development Project 
Communal & Social Development CSO  MOCDP - Mohal community Development Programme 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Mount Carmel / Church Women's Assocition 
Unclassified CSO  MoP - Missioners of Peace 
Development CSO  MoRRD - Movement for Resettlement and Rural 
Development Volunteers 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO Mother's Union - Sierra Leone 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  MRWDA - Moawoma Rural Women's Development 
Association 
Health INGO MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres - Belgium 
Health INGO MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres - France 
Health INGO MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres - Holland 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO MSI - Marie Stopes International 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  MWA - Muloma Women Association 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  MUWODA, Muloma Women‘s Development 
Association 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  NABFAO / SL - National Breastfeeding Advocacy 
Organisation 
275 
 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  NAC - National Accountability Group  
Religion INGO NAC - New Apostolic Church 
Development INGO National Council of Cheshire Services 
Health CSO  National Council for the Prevention of Alcoholism and 
Drug Dependency 
Development CSO  NDO - Ndegbormei Development Organisation 
Development INGO NEHADO - New Harvest Development Organization 
Development INGO NELIDS - New Life Development Services 
Children, Youth CSO  Nenneh's Children Fund for Sierra Leone 
Health CSO  NETHIPS - Network of HIV Positives in Sierra Leone 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
CSO  NEW - National Election Watch 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO  NFHR - National Forum for Human Rights 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO Ngopee Foundation 
Health CSO  NHAC - National HIV and AIDS Coalition 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  NIDFO - National Industrial Development and Finance 
Organisation 
Communal & Social Development CSO  NMJD - Network  Movement for Justice  and 
Development 
Refugees, Returnees, IDPs INGO NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council- Sierra Leone 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  NUFPAW - National Union of Forestry, Plantations 
and Agricultural Workers 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO  ODHR - Organisation for Development and Human 
Rights 
Education INGO OFAL - Organization for the Advancement of Literacy 
Communal & Social Development CSO OHDRAD - Organization for the Homeless, Disabled 
and Rural Development 
Communal & Social Development CSO OREINT - Organization for Research and Extension of 
Intermediate Technology 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
CSO  OPARD-SL Organization for Peace, Reconciliation and 
Development 
Humanitarian Aid INGO Oxfam GB 
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Communal & Social Development CSO PACE - Partnership Action for Community 
Empowerment 
Communal & Social Development CSO  PACT - Partners for Community Transformation 
Communal & Social Development CSO  Partnership for Justice 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  PASCOFAAS - Pa Santigie Conteh Farmers 
Association 
Children, Youth CSO  Peacelinks 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law INGO PFI - Prison Fellowship International  
Children, Youth INGO Plan International 
Health INGO PPASL - Planned Parenthood Association Sierra Leone 
Health CSO / 
NGO 
PPF-SL Peoples Prosperity Foundation 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO Pentecostal Assembly of the World (Inc) Mission 
Children, Youth CSO Pikin to Pikin 
Health  CSO  PORSHE - Promotion of Reproductive Sexual Health 
and HIV Education 
Media CSO  Premier Media Consutancy Limited 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  PROWA - Progressive Women‘s Association Skills 
Centre 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
CSO  PUDRA - Pujehun District Relief and Rehabilitation 
Agency 
Children, Youth CSO  Pujehun Youth for Development 
Humanitarian Aid INGO PWJ - Peace Winds Japan 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
CSO  RAP - Rescue Argriculture Programmes 
Development CSO RA-SL - Rural Aid Sierra Leone 
Development CSO RAP / SL Rescue Auxiliary Partners 
Children, Youth INGO Real Aid 
Children, Youth INGO Right To Dream 
Children, Youth INGO Right To Play 
Development CSO  RODA - Rofutha Development Association  
Communal & Social Development CSO  RRCDO - Rokel Rural Community Development 
Organization 
Children, Youth CSO RYDO - Rural Youth Development Organisation 
Children, Youth INGO Save the Children UK 
Communal & Social Development INGO SfCG - Search for Common Ground 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO SFFHN - Seed Faith Fund for Humanitarian Needs 
Children, Youth CSO  SFYDP - Safer Future Youth Development Project 
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Environment CSO SHARE - Save Heritage and Rehabilitate the 
Environment 
Education CSO  Sierra eRiders  
Education CSO  Sierra Leone Adult Education Association 
Human Rights, Justice, Rule of Law CSO Sierra Leone Business Forum Association 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO Sierra Leone Market Women Association 
Health CSO  Sierra Leone Prevention Maternal Mortality 
Association 
Humanitarian Aid INGO Sierra Leone Relief and Development Outreach Inc. 
Children, Youth CSO Sierra Leone Scout Association 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Sierra Leone Women Development Movement 
Development CSO  SIGA - Sierra Grassroots Agency 
Health INGO Sightsavers International 
Development CSO SILPA - Sierra Leone Poverty Alleviation 
Health CSO  SLAB - Sierra Leone Association of the Blind 
Health CSO  SLAD - Sierra Leone Association of the Deaf 
Media CSO  Sierra Leone Association of Journalists 
 CSO SLANGO - Sierra Leone Association of Non 
Governmental Organizations 
Education CSO  SLAUW - Sierra Leone Association of University 
Women 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  SLAWW - Sierra Leone Association on Women's 
Welfare 
 CSO  SLLC - Sierra Leone Labour Congress 
Agricultural, Economic and 
Industrial Development 
INGO SL-OIC - Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialisation 
Centre 
Unclassified CSO  SLRWO (Sierra Leone Returnees Welfare 
Organization) 
Communal & Social Development INGO SLRCS - Sierra Leone Red Cross Society 
Education CSO  SLTU (Sierra Leone Teacher's Union) 
Children, Youth CSO  SLYED - Sierra Leone Youth Empowerment 
Organization 
Children, Youth INGO SMT - Salone Microfinance Trust 
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Development CSO  Social Awareness and Development Movement 
Children, Youth INGO SOS Children's Villages 
Humanitarian Aid INGO SRC Spanish Red Cross 
Development INGO SSLDF - Swiss Sierra Leone Development Foundation 
Children, Youth INGO Save the Children 
Development CSO  STDG - Sustainable Technology Development Group 
Education INGO SPW Students Partnership Worldwide 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO SWAA - Society for Women and AIDS in Africa 
International 
Development INGO Tearfund (Sierra Leone) 
Humanitarian Aid INGO Terra Tech Foerderprojekte e.V. Sierra Leone 
Good Governance, Advocacy, Anti-
Corruption 
INGO TI - Transparency International - Sierra Leone 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO UMW - United Methodist  Women 
Children, Youth INGO UNOY - Sierra Leone Network (United Network of 
Young Peacebuilders) 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  URWA - United Rural Women's Association 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO VOW - Voice of Women 
Communal & Social Development INGO VWASL - Voluntary WorkCamps Association (Sierra 
Leone Chapter) 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  WAMCS - Women's Agro Marketing Cooperative 
Society 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  WAND - Women's Association for National 
Development 
Communal & Social Development CSO  WAPEP-SL - War affected populations empowerment 
program 
Children, Youth INGO War Child 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO WCRWC - Women's Commission for Refugee Women 
and Children  
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO WCSL - Wesleyan Development and Relief Agency 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO WFT - Women's Finance Trust Ltd.  
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO WHI - World Hope International 
Development INGO Wilkins Foundation 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO WILPF - Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom 
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Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  WOCEGAR - Woman Centre for Good Governance 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Women in Crisis Movement 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  Women‘s Forum 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO Women Peace and Security Network(WIPSEN)-Africa 
Humanitarian Aid INGO WR - World Relief 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation 
(Religion) 
INGO WRF - World Rehabilitation Fund 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
CSO  WSSG - Women's Solidarity Support Group  
Children, Youth INGO WVI - World Vision International 
Children, Youth CSO  Yearn for Peace Sierra Leone 
Children, Youth CSO  Youth Development Movement 
Children, Youth INGO YEDEM - Youth Empowerment for Development 
Ministries 
Communal & Social Development CSO  You and Me Fourah Bay Development Organization 
Religion, Development, 
Reconciliation, Relief 
INGO YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association - Sierra 
Leone 
Women (Advocacy, Development, 
Empowerment) 
INGO YWCA - Young Women's Christian Association of 
Sierra Leone 
